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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant
Stafford L. Smith and Third-Party Defendant
Smith Chevrolet Co., Inc.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO
STAFFORD L. SMITH,
Plaintif:f/Counterclaim Defendant,
vs.
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,

STAFFORD SMITH REPLY TO
COUNTERCLAI1VI AND SMITH
CHEVROLET ANSvVER TO
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT

Defendant/Counterclaimant.
Civil No. CV-2014-1434
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,

Judge Jon Shindurling

Third-Party Plaintiff,
VS.

SMITH CHEVROLET CO. INC. and
STAFFWOOD PARTNERSHIP,
Third-Party Defendants.
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PlaintifiJCounterdefendant Stafford L. Smith ("Stafford") and Third-Party Defendant
Smith Chevrolet Co., Inc. ("Smith Chevrolet") (collectively "Defendants") hereby respond to the
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (collectively the "Counterclaim") of
Counterclaimant/Third-Party Plaintiff Woodruff D. Smith ("Woody") as follows:

PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 1 of the Counterclaim.

2.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 2 of the Counterclaim.

3.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 3 of the Counterclaim.

4.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 4 of the Counterclaim.

5.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 5 of the Counterclaim, Stafford denies

that he owns his interest in Third-Party Defendant Staffuood Partnership ("Staffwood") through
SLS Limited Partnership. Stafford alleges that he owns his interest in Staffwood through SLS 1
LLLP, an Idaho limited liability limited partnership that is the successor to SLS Limited
Partnership, with Stafford and his wife as partners, and that Stafford is the managing partner of
Staffuood, which is an Idaho general partnership. Except as expressly so denied, admitted and
alleged, Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 5 of the Counterclaim.
6.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 6 of the Counterclaim, Defendants admit

and allege that this Court has jurisdiction over the claims that Stafford has asserted against
Woody as set forth in Stafford's Amended Complaint, and that this Court is the proper venue to
hear Stafford's claims. The remaining allegations of paragraph 6 are legal conclusions regarding
jurisdiction and venue and, therefore, require no answer. To the extent an answer is required,
2

and except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 6
of the Counterclaim.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

7.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 7 of the Counterclaim.

8.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 8 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

allege that the allegations in this paragraph are gratuitous and irrelevant to the issues in this
litigation, and that the parties' disputes regarding these allegations were fully resolved and
settled by means of a Settlement Agreement entered into by Stafford and Woody (among others),
effective November 10, 2010 (the "2010 Settlement Agreement"). Defendants further admit and
allege that the Smith Chevrolet dealership was continuously profitable as operated by Stafford,
first as its general manager from 1980 to 1982, then as its ov\lner from 1982 until 1991, when, as
a consequence of revaluing its parts inventory, the capitalization ratio fell below the ratio
required by the flooring bank. Consequently, the flooring bank elected not to renew its flooring
commitment to the dealership. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the
allegations of paragraph 8 of the Counterclaim.
9.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 9 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

allege that the allegations in this paragraph are gratuitous and irrelevant to the issues in this
litigation, and that the parties' disputes regarding these allegations were fully resolved and
settled by means of the 2010 Settlement Agreement. Except as expressly so alleged, Defendants
are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations
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of paragraph 9 and, basing their denial on that ground, deny the allegations of paragraph 9 of the
Counterclaim.
10.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 10 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

allege that the allegations in this paragraph are gratuitous and irrelevant to the issues in this
litigation, and that 1he parties' disputes regarding these allegations were fully resolved and
settled by means of the 2010 Settlement Agreement. Further, Defendants allege that Stafford
purchased Smith Chevrolet in its entirety from his father in 1982, that Stafford's father had
nothing to do with bringing Woody into Smith Chevrolet, and that Stafford never requested that
Woody be brought into Smith Chevrolet. Further, Defendants incorporate herein by this
reference their response in paragraph 14, below. Except as expressly so alleged, Defendants
deny the allegations of paragraph 10 of the Counterclaim.
11.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 11 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

allege that the allegations in this paragraph are gratuitous and irrelevant to the issues in this
litigation, and that the parties' disputes regarding these allegations were fully resolved and
settled by means of the 2010 Settlement Agreement. Except as expressly so alleged, Defendants
deny the allegations of paragraph 11 of the Counterclaim.
12.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 12 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

allege that the allegations in this paragraph are gratuitous and irrelevant to the issues in this
litigation, and that the parties' disputes regarding these allegations were fully resolved and
settled by means of the 2010 Settlement Agreement. Further, Defendants admit and allege that,
by 2010, Woody and Stafford each o-wned an interest in the following dealerships: Smith
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Chevrolet, Smith Ford, Smith Hyundai and Smith RV, as well as several other business entities
and that Woody and Stafford also jointly owned various parcels of real property through entities
that they controlled. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the
allegations of paragraph 12 of the Counterclaim.
13.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 13 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

allege that the allegations in this paragraph are gratuitous and irrelevant to the issues in this
litigation, and that the parties' disputes regarding these allegations were fully resolved and
settled by means of the 2010 Settlement Agreement. Further, Defendants admit and allege that,
for several years prior to and including 2010, Smith Hyundai, as well as other business entities
including Staffwood, were managed with Woody's agreement through appropriate corporate
procedures, while Smith Ford was managed by a management team headed by Rex Allred in
accordance with the October 2008 Management Agreement as agreed to by Woody. Except as
expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 13 of the
Counterclaim.
14.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 14 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

allege that the allegations in this paragraph arc gratuitous and irrelevant to the issues in this
litigation, and that the parties' disputes regarding these allegations were fully resolved and
settled by means of the 20 IO Settlement Agreement. Defendants expressly deny that Woody
ever owned or was entitled to one-half of the stock of Smith Chevrolet. Defendants further
admit and allege that, as Woody expressly admitted under oath in a prior lawsuit, for many years
Woody annually signed various corporate records, and received corporate tax returns, which
5

expressly stated that Woody only owned 27.54% of Smith Chevrolet, thereby directly
contradicting his unfounded assertion that he owned 50% of Smith Chevrolet. Defendants
further admit and allege that, over the years, disputes arose between Woody and Stafford
regarding the respective ovvnership interest each had in certain businesses and the manner in
which the businesses had been managed. As a result, Woody asserted various legal claims
against Stafford, as set forth in a Complaint that Woody purportedly sent to the clerk of the court
for filing, but that was subsequently withdrawn by Woody and ultimately settled by means of the
2010 Settlement Agreement. Stafford asserted that Woody's alleged legal claims were without
merit and Stafford did not allege or threaten any legal claims against Woody, except in response
to Woody's threatened lawsuit. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny
the allegations of paragraph 14 of the Counterclaim.
15.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 15 of the Counterclaim.

16.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 16 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

allege that Woody and Stafford, individually and on behalf of various business entities signed the
2010 Settlement Agreement, which has an effective date of November 10, 2010, which
document speaks for itself as to its terms. Defendants further admit and allege that, from
November 10, 2010, up to the date of Closing pursuant to the 2010 Settlement Agreement, Smith
HyLmdai was managed with Woody's agreement through appropriate corporate procedures.
From late 2008 until said Closing, Smith Ford was managed by a management team headed by
Rex Allred in accordance with the terms of the October 2008 Management Agreement agreed to
by Woody. In addition, Woody's prior mismanagement of Smith Ford created significant
6

financial problems that had to be solved. In October of 2008, because of ongoing losses and
resultant insufficiency of cash to continue operations at Smith Ford, all of which was caused by
Woody's improper and inadequate management, Woody relinquished control of Smith Ford, as
president and majority stockholder of Smith Ford, to a management team headed by Rex Allred.
This event resulted in the establishment of the October 2008 Management Agreement. Section
1.1 of which authorized the management team to set compensation and to acquire vendor
services to resolve the problems created by Woody's mismanagement. The management team
subsequently utilized the services and expertise of various Smith Chevrolet employees for those
purposes. Given Smith Ford's precarious situation with its flooring bank, resulting from the lack
of profits and insufficient capitalization, it was necessary to defer payment for management
services while Smith Ford regained sufficient profitability and cash to ensure that Smith Ford's
bank would continue to provide flooring. This compensation deferral benefited Smith Ford
greatly. The Smith Chevrolet management team's services transformed Smith Ford's financial
performance from the abysmal financial situation created by Woody, marked by significant and
ongoing losses, to a situation where Smith Ford consistently made significant profits. This
remarkable financial turnaround exceeded $500,000 per year. The management service
payments were not made to Stafford; rather they were made to Smith Chevrolet, the company
that provided the management team. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants
deny the allegations of paragraph 16 of the Counterclaim and Defendants specifically deny the
allegations of paragraph 16 to the extent that they are inconsistent with the 2010 Settlement
Agreement.
7

17.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 17 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

allege that the 2010 Settlement Agreement speaks for itself as to its terms. Except as expressly
so alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 17 of the Counterclaim and Defendants
specifically deny the allegations of paragraph 17 to the extent that they are inconsistent with the
2010 Settlement Agreement.
18.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 18 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the parties were operating under the assumption that the referenced Outlet
Property was O'Wned by Staffwood, and it was not until Woody received a title report in
approximately November of 2013 that he determined that the record title owner of the Outlet
Property was Smith Chevrolet. The information in the title report was then passed on to
Defendants and their attorneys in correspondence from Woody's attorneys. The title report
raised the question as to the actual ownership of the Outlet Property, including the possibility
that the parties had been mistakenly operating under the improper assumption that the Outlet
Property belonged to Staffwood. Stafford has not made a determination as to the ownership of
the Outlet Property and the necessity to do so was made moot since it was one of the areas of
dispute that was settled and resolved by the parties' agreement that Stafford would purchase the
"Bid Properties," (which term is defined below in paragraph 22"), all as alleged in Stafford's
Amended Complaint herein. Thus, any dispute among the parties with regard to the ownership of
the Outlet Property was and is fully resolved and settled by the enforceable agreement entered
into between Stafford and Woody. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants
deny the allegations of paragraph 18 of the Counterclaim.
8

19.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 19 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

allege that the allegations in this paragraph are gratuitous and irrelevant to the issues in this
litigation, and that the parties' disputes regarding these allegations were fully resolved and
settled by means of a second Settlement Agreement, entered into by Stafford and Woody (among
others), effective July 5, 2012 (the "2012 Settlement Agreement"), whereby Stafford and
Woody settled all additional claims and disputes between themselves and their various business
entities that were asserted in a lawsuit that Woody filed in the Seventh Judicial District Court
of Bonneville County, State of Idaho, entitled Woodruff D. Smith, et al. v. Stafford L.

Smith, et aL, Case No. CV-11-1772 (the "Lawsuit"), as well as all other disputes that had
arisen between the parties as of the date of the 2012 Settlement Agreement. Defendants
further admit and allege that the accounting and management team that managed Smith Ford in
accordance with the October 2008 Management Agreement had full authority under the terms of
the October 2008 Management Agreement to authorize the payment of Smith Ford's obligations.
Pursuant to such authority, as well as the express terms of the Settlement Agreement, and in the
normal course of business, checks in the total amount of $424,016.82 were issued to Hebgen
Reinsurance and SV Idaho Reinsurance, on Febmary 10, 2011, in order to satisfy Smith Ford's
outstanding deficit for reinsurance loans that exceeded the amount of reserve monies for
contracts sold by Smith Ford, and to enable the owner of such to have access to the reserves for
contracts sold by Smith Chevrolet. The funds to pay this obligation were made available from
cash reserves and by flooring more of the Smith Ford vehicle inventory in accordance with the
customary manner in which funds arc obtained for the payment of obligations or to fund other
9
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required financial matters. The actual amount of Smith Ford's deficit (i.e., the amount by which
Smith Ford's reinsurance loans exceeded the reserve monies for contracts sold by Smith Ford)
was $400,204.08 and, as a result, the sum of $23,812.74 was refunded to Smith Ford on or about
Febrnary 28, 2011. The satisfaction of Smith Ford's deficit to the reinsurance companies was
expressly approved and agreed to by both Stafford and Woody in the 2010 Settlement
Agreement, which provided that the respective dealerships would have access to their reserve
funds, and the terms under which such access was accomplished was such that all dealership
ratio covenants were maintained. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny
the allegations of paragraph 19 of the Counterclaim.
20.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 20 of the Counterclaim.

21.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 21 of the Counterclaim.

22.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 22 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that on February 7, 2013, Stafford initiated the bid process for (1) the building
and related real property occupied by Smith Chevrolet (the "Smith Chevrolet Property"); (2) the
building and related real property occupied by Stafford's RV dealership (the "RV Property");
and (3) a certain building and related real property known as the Outlet Property (the "Outlet
Property") ( collectively the "Bid Properties"). Except as expressly so admitted and alleged,
Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 22 of the Counterclaim.
23.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 23 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the bidding process proceeded generally as set forth in the 2010 and 2012
Settlement Agreements, except for the fact that at least one of Woody's bids was untimely, yet
10
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Stafford allowed Woody's bid to stand. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants
deny the allegations of paragraph 23 of the Counterclaim.
24.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 24 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the August 14, 2013 email of Douglas Nelson speaks for itself. Defendants
further admit and allege that they are informed and believe, based on subsequent
communications from Douglas Nelson, that he never saw and has no record of ever having
received the purported email dated August 27, 2013, allegedly sent by Woody's attorneys, and
Defendants further affirm that the alleged August 27, 2013 email was never sent to them and that
their attorneys have likewise indicated they did not receive it. Therefore, Defendants question
whether this August 27, 2013 email was ever actually sent to Douglas Nelson. Except as
expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 24 of the
Counterclaim.
25.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 25 of the Counterclaim, Defendants are

informed and believe that Douglas Nelson did not respond to the purported email dated August
27, 2014 that Woody's attorneys allegedly sent to Douglas Nelson because, as alleged in
paragraph 24, above, Douglas Nelson never saw nor has any record of receiving said email,
therefore, he could not respond to an email that he did not receive, and that Defendants never
received or had any prior knowledge of said email and, therefore, the bidding process proceeded
after August 2014, without any reference to the purported August 27, 2014 email. Further the
alleged email contains assertions and assumptions that are contrary to what the parties had
previously agreed and would not in any event have been effective to modify the bidding process.
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Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 25 of
the Counterclaim.
26.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 26 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that after Woody made the final bid for the Bid Properties, he then improperly
asserted that he was unwilling to purchase the Bid Properties unless Stafford and Staffwood
agreed to satisfy and meet certain unjustified and umeasonable demands and conditions related
to the Bid Properties, which Stafford had no legal obligation to perform and which he was
unwilling to do. This resulted in a new dispute between Defendants and Woody. Except as
expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 26 of the
Counterclaim.
27.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 27 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the November 12, 2013 letter speaks for itself, and that the positions
asserted by Woody in this letter are unsupported, unreasonable and without merit. Defendants
further allege that, as stated in this letter, Woody took the position that the Smith Chevrolet
leases of the Bid Properties either: (1) had to be terminated as of December 12, 2013, and Smith
Chevrolet had to vacate these leased premises as of that date; or (2) Smith Chevrolet would have
to negotiate new lease terms with Woody for the Bid Properties, even though the existing leases
had recently been approved by Staffvvood's Management Board. Except as expressly so
admitted and a!Ieged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 27 of the Counterclaim.
28.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 28 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the November 12, 2013 letter speaks for itself, and that the positions
12
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asserted by Woody in said letter are unsupported, unreasonable and without merit. Except as
expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 28 of the
Counterclaim.
29.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 29 of the Counterclaim.

Defendants further admit and allege that the letter dated November 20, 2013, from Stafford's
attorneys, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1, was sent to Woody's
attorneys. Defendants further admit and allege that the referenced communications exchanged
between the parties illustrate that there was a dispute between the parties regarding the terms
under which the Bid Properties would be purchased.
30.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 30 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the December 4, 2013 letter speaks for itself, that the positions asserted by
Woody in this letter are unsupported, unreasonable and without merit, and that Woody
threatened in this letter to take legal action if Defendants did not submit to his unsupported,
unreasonable and meritless demands. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants
deny the allegations of paragraph 30 of the Counterclaim and Defendants specifically deny the
allegations of paragraph 30 to the extent that they are inconsistent with the December 4, 2013
letter.
31.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 31 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that Stafford's attorneys sent the referenced emails or letters on December 6,
11, and 17, 2013, to Woody's attorneys, that true and correct copies of the letters dated
December 11, and 17, 2013, are attached as Exhibits 2 and 3, respectively, and that these written
13

communications addressed the dispute between the parties regarding the terms under which the
Bid Properties would be purchased. Defendants further admit and allege that in these
communications, Stafford took the position that there was a question regarding ownership of the
Outlet Property based on the title report which indicated that Smith Chevrolet was the record title
o,vner and that the parties needed to determine who actually owned this property. Defendants
further admit and allege that Woody's position regarding the conditions that Defendants had to
satisfy before he would fulfill his obligation to purchase the Bid Properties, including, without
limitation, his assertion that the existing Smith Chevrolet leases of the Bid Properties would
either have to be terminated or re-negotiated with Woody if Woody purchased the Bid
Properties, is unsupported, unreasonable and without merit, and that Woody threatened in his
December 4, 2013 letter to take legal action if Defendants did not submit to his meritless
demands. In an effort to settle and resolve this dispute, Stafford's attorneys made a settlement
offer in a letter dated December 20, 2013, wherein Stafford offered to purchase the Bid
Properties based on the terms and conditions set forth in said December 20, 2013 letter, which
offer Woody unequivocally accepted, thereby resolving the claims asserted in the Counterclaim,
all as stated by Stafford in his Amended Complaint. Except as expressly so admitted and
alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 31 of the Counterclaim.
32.

In answer to the ailegations of paragraph 32 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the baseless, unsupported and outrageous threats made by Woody's counsel
in the December 4, 2013 letter were a significant factor in Mark Peterson's resigning from the
Management Board of Staffwood, which was apparently exactly what Woody wanted so as to
14
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paralyze Staffwood and prevent it from taking actions that require Management Board approval.
Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 32 of
the Counterclaim
33.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 33 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the December 20, 2013 letter speaks for itself. Defendants further admit
and allege that, in an effort to settle and resolve the dispute between the parties regarding the
terms upon which the Bid Properties would be purchased, Stafford's attorneys made the
settlement offer set forth in this letter, wherein Stafford offered to purchase the Bid Properties
based on the terms and conditions set forth in said December 20, 2013 letter, which offer Woody
unequivocally accepted, thereby resolving the claims asserted in the Counterclaim, all as Stafford
has alleged in his Amended Complaint herein. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged,
Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 33 of the Counterclaim.
34.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 34 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the January 13, 2014 letter speaks for itself, and that the express language
of this letter establishes that Woody unequivocally accepted Stafford's offer to purchase the Bid
Properties based on the terms and conditions set forth in the above-referenced December 20,
2013 letter. In addition, in the January 13, 2014 letter, Woody made an express offer to Stafford
to divide certain remaining properties jointly owned by Stafford and Woody, which offer
Stafford subsequently accepted. These two offers and acceptances created two binding and
enforceable agreements between Stafford and Woody, the terms of which resolve and dispose of
the claims that Woody has asserted in the Counterclaim, all as Stafford has alleged in his
15
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Amended Complaint herein. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the
allegations of paragraph 34 of the Counterclaim.
35.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 35 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the January 30, 2014 letter, and the enclosed Addendum thereto, speak for
themselves. Defendants further incorporate herein by this reference their responses as set forth
in paragraphs 31, 33 and 34, above. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants
deny the allegations of paragraph 35 of the Counterclaim.
36.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 36 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the January 30, 2014 letter speaks for itself, that the above-referenced
December 20, 2013, January 13, 2014 and January 30, 2014 letters created two binding and
enforceable agreements between Stafford and Woody, the terms of which resolve and dispose of
the claims that Woody has asserted in the Counterclaim, all as Stafford has stated in his
Amended Complaint herein. Defendants further admit and allege that these letters establish a
meeting of the minds by Stafford and Woody regarding all the material terms of these iwo
contracts, such that, in accordance with applicable Idaho law, there was no need to memorialize
these terms further in a formal settlement agreement so as to render them enforceable. Further
Defendants incorporate herein by this reference their responses set forth in paragraphs 31, 33 and
34, above. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of
paragraph 36 of the Counterclaim.
37.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 37 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the February 5, 2014 email speaks for itself, and Defendants further
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incorporate herein by this reference their responses as set forth in paragraphs 31, 33, 34 and 36,
above. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of
paragraph 37 of the Counterclaim.
38.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 38 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the February 6, 2014 email speaks for itself, and Defendants further
incorporate herein by this reference their responses as set forth in paragraphs 31, 33, 34 and 36,
above. Defendants further admit and allege that the parties' counsel subsequently exchanged
correspondence on February 12, 2014 and February 13, 2014, true and correct copies of which
are attached as Exhibit 4, wherein Plaintiff's counsel insisted that the parties treat the entire
transaction as a tax free dissolution and Stafford's counsel responded that the parties had
expressly agreed, and Plaintiffs counsel had expressly confirmed in writing, that the agreement
was not conditioned on treating the transaction as a dissolution. Except as expressly so admitted
and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 38 of the Counterclaim.
39.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 39 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the February 20, 2014 email and attachments thereto speak for themselves,
and Defendants further incorporate herein by this reference their responses as set forth in
paragraphs 31, 33, 34 and 36, above. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants
deny the allegations of paragraph 39 of the Counterclaim.
40.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 40 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the March 3, 2014 letter speaks for itself, and Defendants further
incorporate herein by this reference their responses as set forth in paragraphs 31, 33, 34 and 36,
7
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above. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of
paragraph 40 of the Counterclaim.
41.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 41 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that in the letter from Stafford's attorneys dated March 3, 2014 (a true and
correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit F to the Amended Complaint), and in the letter from
Stafford's attorneys dated March 7, 2014 (a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit
5), Stafford confirmed that the parties had made binding agreements regarding Stafford's
purchase of the Bid Properties and the division of Staffwood' s remaining properties, all as
alleged in Stafford's Amended Complaint, and, in these letters, Stafford demanded that Woody
perform his contractual obligations under these agreements, which Woody failed and refused to
do, thereby breaching these agreements. Defendants further admit and allege that the letters
referenced in paragraph 41 of the Counterclaim speak for themselves, and they further allege that
the March 5, 2014 letter from Woody's attorneys confirms Woody's refusal to perform his
contractual obligations under his agreements with Stafford and, instead, Woody proposed that
Stafford be paid the sum of $200,000 as part of his receipt of Property Set B, instead of the
$400,000 which Woody had offered in his letter dated January 13, 2014. Thus, Woody was
attempting to change the very terms that he himself had offered and that Stafford had already
accepted. Defendants further admit and allege that, based on Woody's refusal to abide by the
terms of the binding and enforceable agreements that he entered into with Stafford, as well as his
attempts to add to and re-negotiate terms that either he proposed or unequivocally accepted,
Stafford had no choice but to file a lawsuit against Woody to enforce the parties' agreements.
18
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Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 41 of
the Counterclaim.
42.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 42 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that, despite the fact that they had no obligation to provide to Woody a copy of
the Smith Chevrolet's sublease of the Outlet Property, in part based on the parties' binding
agreement that Stafford would purchase the Bid Properties, thereby resolving any dispute
regarding the Outlet Property, Stafford did provide to Woody a copy of said sublease. Except as
expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 42 of the
Counterclaim.
43.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 43 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that, pursuant to the parties' agreement that Stafford would purchase the Bid
Properties based on the terms set forth in the above-referenced December 20, 2013 letter from
Stafford's attorneys, which terms Woody expressly and unconditionally accepted, Stafford was
fully within his rights to pay off the Wells Fargo Bank loan, which loan was secured by property
that the parties agreed Stafford would purchase. Defendants further admit and allege that
Stafford's business needs required him to pay off this loan, which benefitted Staffwood, and
therefore Woody, since Staf:fwood owed this obligation, which actions have resulted in an unjust
enrichment of Woody, who is obligated to reimburse Stafford and Smith Chevrolet for his share
of this obligation. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations
of paragraph 43 of the Counterclaim.
44.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 44 of the Counterclaim.
19
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45.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 45 of the Counterclaim.

46.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 46 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that Stafford did not have any substantive communications or negotiations with
Wells Fargo Bank regarding the payoff of the referenced Wells Fargo Bank loan and there are no
agreements or communications between Stafford and Wells Fargo Bank regarding the payoff of
said loan. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of
paragraph 46 of the Counterclaim.
4 7.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 4 7 of the Counterclaim.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment-Lack of Binding Settlement Agreement)

48.

In answer to the allegations in paragraph 48 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

incorporate herein by this reference their responses to paragraphs 1 through 47, inclusive, of the
Counterclaim as if fully set forth herein.
49.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 49 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that certain vvritten correspondence between the attorneys for Stafford and
Woody created two binding and enforceable agreements between Stafford and Woody, the terms
of which resolve and dispose of the claims that Woody has asserted in the Counterclaim, all as
Stafford has alleged in his Amended Complaint herein. Defendants further admit and allege that
the relevant written communications between the parties' attorneys establish a meeting of the
minds by Stafford and Woody regarding all the material terms of these two contracts. Except as
expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph the allegations
of paragraph 49 of the Counterclaim.
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50.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 50 of the Counterclaim.

51.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 51 of the Counterclaim.

52.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 52 of the Counterclaim.

53.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 53 of the Counterclaim.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment-Outlet Center Property)
54.

In answer to the allegations in paragraph 54 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

incorporate herein by this reference their responses to paragraphs 1 through 53, inclusive, of the
Counterclaim as if fully set forth herein.
55.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 55 of the Counterclaim.

56.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 56 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

incorporate herein by this reference the allegations and admissions set forth in paragraph 18,
above. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of
paragraph 56 of the Counterclaim.
57.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 57 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the 2010 Settlement Agreement and 2012 Settlement Agreement speak for
themselves. Defendants further incorporate herein by this reference their response as set forth in
paragraph 18, above. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the
allegations of paragraph 57 of the Counterclaim.
58.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 58 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

incorporate herein by this reference their response as set forth in paragraph 18, above. Except as
so admitted

Defendants deny
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Counterclaim.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 59 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

59.

incorporate herein by this reference their response as set forth in paragraph 18, above. Except as
expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 59 of the
Counterclaim.
60.

In answerto the allegations of paragraph 60 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

incorporate herein by this reference their response as set forth in paragraph 18, above. Except as
expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 60 of the
Counterclaim.
61.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 61 of the Counterclaim.

62.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 62 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the February 10, 2014 lease agreement speaks for itself. Defendants farther
incorporate herein by this reference their responses as set forth in paragraphs 18 and 42, above.
Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 62 of
the Counterclaim.
63.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 63 of the Counterclaim.

64.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 64 of the Counterclaim.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Unjust Enrichment/Constructive Trust)
65.

In answer to the allegations in paragraph 65 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

incorporate herein by this reference their responses to paragraphs 1 through 64, inclusive, of the
as

set

66.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 66 of the Counterclaim.

67.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 67 of the Counterclaim.

68.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 68 of the Counterclaim.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment-Marketable Title)

65.

In answer to the allegations in paragraph 65 [sic] 1 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

incorporate herein by this reference their responses to paragraphs 1 through 68, inclusive, of the
Counterclaim as if fully set forth herein.
66.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 66 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

admit and allege that the 2010 Settlement Agreement and 2012 Settlement Agreement speak for
themselves. Defendants further incorporate herein by this reference their responses as set forth
in paragraphs 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 36, above. Except as expressly so admitted and
alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 66 of the Counterclaim.
67.

The allegations set forth in paragraph 67 of the Counterclaim consist of legal

conclusions regarding the meaning of "marketable title" under the law and, therefore, require no
answer. In addition, the legal conclusions asserted by Woody in this paragraph are inaccurate
and incorrect. To the extent paragraph 67 requires an answer, Defendants deny the allegations of
paragraph 67 of the Counterclaim.

1

There are significant typos relating to the numbered paragraphs in Woody's Answer, Counterclaim and ThirdParty Complaint. For example, while the paragraph directly above this paragraph is numbered paragraph "68,"
Woody renumbered the next paragraph as "65" and then the numbers run sequentially through numbered paragraph
74 under Woody's Fifth Cause of Action at which time Woody numbers the next paragraph as number "85." In
order to be consistent with Woody's Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, Defendants' Reply to
Counterclaim and Answer to Third-Party Complaint have used the same paragraph numbering, including the
said
as
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint.
mistakes in
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68.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 68 of the Counterclaim.

69.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 69 of the Counterclaim.

70.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 70 of the Counterclaim.

71.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 71 of the Counterclaim.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract)

72.

In answer to the allegations in paragraph 72 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

incorporate herein by this reference their responses to paragraphs 1 through 71, inclusive, of the
Counterclaim as if fully set forth herein.
73.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 73 of the Counterclaim.

74.

The allegations of paragraph 74 are legal conclusions and, therefore, require no

answer. To the extent paragraph 74 requires an answer, Defendants deny the allegations of
paragraph 74 of the Counterclaim, and they specifically deny that they have breached any
implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing.
85.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 85 of the Counterclaim.

86.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 86 of the Counterclaim.

87.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 87 of the Counterclaim.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Judgment-Stafford's Unilateral Actions on Behalf of Staffwood)
88.

In answer to the allegations in paragraph 88 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

incorporate herein by this reference their responses to paragraphs 1 through 87, inclusive, of the
Counterclaim as if fully set forth herein.
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89.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 89 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

incorporate herein by this reference their response as set forth in paragraph 5, above, and
Defendants further admit and allege that, pursuant to the terms of the 2010 Settlement
Agreement, and the acquiescence and ratification by Woody in Stafford's role and actions,
Stafford has the right to manage the day-to-day operations in the ordinary course of business of
Staffwood. Except as expressly so admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of
paragraph 89 of the Counterclaim.
90.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 90 of the Counterclaim.

91.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 91 of the Counterclaim.

92.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 92 of the Counterclaim.

93.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 93 of the Counterclaim.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Fiduciary Duty)

94.

In answer to the allegations in paragraph 94 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

incorporate herein by this reference their responses to paragraphs 1 through 93, inclusive, of the
Counterclaim as if fully set forth.
95.

The allegations of paragraph 95 are legal conclusions and, therefore, require no

answer. To the extent paragraph 95 requires an answer, Defendants deny the allegations of
paragraph 95 of the Counterclaim.
96.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 96 of the Counterclaim.

97.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 97 of the Counterclaim.
V-'-'-''"""''.,_,,,..,

deny the allegations of paragraph 98 of the Counterclaim.
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EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Mutual Mistake)

99.

In answer to the allegations in paragraph 99 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

incorporate herein by this reference their responses to paragraphs I through 98, inclusive, of the
Counterclaim as if fully set forth.
100.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph I 00 of the Counterclaim.

101.

Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph IO 1 of the Counterclaim.

102.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 102 of the Counterclaim, Defendants

incorporate herein by this reference the allegations and admissions set forth in paragraph 18,
above. Defendants further admit and allege that Smith Chevrolet has not deeded the Outlet
Property to Staffwood because it is not clear at this time who actually owns this property.
Regardless, there is no need to deed the Outlet Property to Staffwood, because the parties entered
into a binding and enforceable agreement that Stafford would purchase the Bid Properties
(including the Outlet Property), based on the terms set forth in the letter from Stafford's
attorneys dated December 20, 2013. As a result, any dispute between the parties with regard to
the ownership of the Outlet Property was and is fully resolved, settled and rendered moot by the
enforceable agreement entered into between Stafford and Woody. Except as expressly so
admitted and alleged, Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 102 of the Counterclaim.
103.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 103 of the Counterclaim.

104.

Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 104 of the Counterclaim.

105.

Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Counterclaim not expressly
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106.

Defendants deny each and every allegation upon which Woody's prayer for relief

is based and Defendants further deny that Woody is entitled to any of the relief he seeks, as set
forth in the Counterclaim's prayer for relief.

DEFENSES
Defendants assert the following distinct and separate defenses to the claims asserted in
the Counterclaim, and hereby reserve the right to raise additional defenses that may be
appropriate as discovery and fact investigation proceed in this litigation.

FIRST DEFENSE
The Counterclaim fails to state a claim against Defendants upon which relief can be
granted.

SECOND DEFENSE
Woody's claims against Defendants are barred in whole or in part due to Woody's
inequitable conduct, wrongdoing, and/or negligence.

TIDRD DEFENSE
Woody's claims are barred in whole or in part by the Paro! Evidence Rule.

FOURTH DEFENSE
Woody has failed to mitigate his damages, if any. Woody is thereby barred in whole or
in part from recovering monetary damages from Defendants. In addition, or alternatively, any
compensation or benefits received from any source by Woody must be applied to reduce any
damages claimed by Woody.

FIFTH DEFENSE
Woody has waived his rights, if any, to seek damages or other relief from Defendants.
SIXTH DEFENSE
Woody is estopped from asserting any and all claims against Defendants.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
Woody is not entitled to recover under any of his claims because his actions were not in
good faith.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Defendants' alleged acts or omissions were undertaken in good faith, without malice,
with probable cause, and were fully justified and reasonable under the circumstances.
NINTH DEFENSE
Pursuant to §12-123 of the Idaho Code, Defendants are entitled to recover reasonable
attorneys' fees against Woody on the grounds that the Counterclaim, in whole or in part, is
frivolous, is brought without merit, and has not been brought or asserted in good faith.
TENTH DEFENSE
Woody's claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the lack or failure of consideration.
ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Woody's contract claims are barred by the doctrines of accord and satisfaction and/or
modification or alteration.
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TWELFTH DEPENSE
Woody's claims are barred in whole or in part on the grounds that they have been
resolved and rendered moot by the enforceable and binding contracts that Woody entered into,
all as alleged in Stafford's Amended Complaint, herein, which is incorporated herein by this
reference.
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
Woody is barred under the doctrine of unclean hands from all forms of equitable relief
sought in the Counterclaim.
FOURTEENTH DEFENSE
Without admitting the existence of any fiduciary duty, Woody's claim for breach of
fiduciary duty is barred in whole or in part by the Economic Loss Rule.
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE
Without admitting the existence of any fiduciary duty, Woody's claim for breach of
fiduciary duty is barred in whole or in part because Stafford's actions were undertaken after
appropriate disclosure and/or with Woody's consent.
SIXTEENTH DEFENSE
Without admitting the existence of any fiduciary duty, Woody's claim for breach of
fiduciary duty is barred in whole or in part because ce1tain actions of Stafford, as alleged by
Woody, were undertaken in accordance with long-tenn, established and customary business
practices, and in accordance with recognized operating procedures that were understood
approved by and /or ratified and/or acquiesced in by Woody.

SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE
Without admitting the existence of any fiduciary duty, Woody's claim for breach of
fiduciary duty is barred in whole or in part because certain actions of Stafford, as alleged by
Woody, were beneficial to Woody.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment as follows:
1.

That Woody take nothing from Defendants by way of the Counterclaim, and that

the Counterclaim against Defendants be dismissed, with prejudice;
2.

That Defendants be awarded their costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys'

fees incurred herein; and
3.

For such other and further relief to which Defendants may be entitled as a matter

of law or equity, or which the Court determines to be just and proper.
DATED this 14th day of May, 2014.
SNOW, CHRJSTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Kara L. Pettit
Michael R. Carlston
Attorneys for PlaintijjlCounterdefendant Stafford L.
Smith and Third-Party Defendant Smith Chevrolet
Co., Inc
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PRESTON & SCOTT

By--=-____,L.-..~c-+~---"'"""--

Stanley J. P e on
Attorneys for PlaintifjlCounterdefendant Stafford L.
Smith and Third-Party Defendant Smith Chevrolet
Co., Inc.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 14, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing STAFFORD SMITH REPLY TO COUNTERCLIAM AND SMITH

CHEVROLET ANSWER TO THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT, to be delivered via first class
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following person(s):
Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage
Michael D. Mayfield
RA. Y QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant Woodriiff D. Smith
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SCOTT

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Stanley J . Preston

Direct Dial: 801 -869-1623

November 20, 2013

VL4 ELECTRONIC A.."NIJ REGULAR MAIL
Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

· Stafford Smith and Woodruff Smith

Dear Mike and Gregg:
Recent communications and events, particulmly the claims and assertions made regarding
the bidding process etc., confirm that it is in the interests of our respective clients to be separated,
to the extent it is reasonably feasible, from all joint involvement in business dealings. It is of
particular concern that at least some of those representing Woody have sent communications to
Doug Nelson without copying either me or Michael Carlston and then subsequently assert that
the communications were material and somehow modify the duties and rights of the paiiies
under the settlement agreements. Doug Nelson's involvement was limited, as explained in Mr.
Carlston's letter to Damian Smith on February 15, 2013 that "Doug Nelson has served as a
facilitator for the brothers in the implementation of the Settlement Agreements." You, of course
were directly copied on this letter.
The assertion, first communicated to me as counsel for Stafford in your letter of
November 12, 2013, that Woody's bid is premised on the leases being terminated as of
December 12, 2013, is absurd. The bidding provisions contemplate that there will be leases in
place and the Settlement Agreements established a very specific contractual process to establish
the terms of those leases, including lease periods. The contractually agreed process was followed
and Woody was given notice and opportunity to participate in all decisions. Elementary contract
law requires that provisions be read a..rid given effect together. The provision in Section 3.12.1 of
the 2010 Settlement Agreement regarding "marketable fee simple title" contemplates extraneous
matters of title and not the specific leases bai·gained for in the very same Section 3.12, and
reaffirmed in the amendments to this provision as set forth in the 20 12 Settlement Agreement.
The purported communication to Doug Nelson confirms the forgoing and the unsuccessful
attempt to alter that meaning is an irrefutable admission that this is so.

Five Gateway Office Center
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J. Savage
November 20, 2013
2

We are concerned also that the pay back for Stafford's considerable assistance given to
Woody in the transition and separation, as well as the recognition provided for Stafford's waiver
of Woody's failure to comply with the timeline for bidding, is Woody's demand that Stafford
vacate the premises, which demand is neither lawful nor practical. Certainly it is at least time
that the parties responsible cease from claiming they are on the "high road."
We are willing to meet with you to discuss these matters further and believe that this
meeting should take place as soon as reasonably possible. Mr. Carlston and I are both available
this Friday. Let me know ifthere is a time Friday that vvill work with you. We could also meet
Monday, November 25, but we both have less flexibility that day. In the meantime, we
categorically reject any other claim made that is asserted or could be inferred from your recent
letters. Finally, please communicate directly with me and Mr. Carlston as cotmsel for Stafford et
al. under the Settlement Agreements.
Sincerely,

cc:

Damian C. Smith (via electronic mail)
Douglas R. Nelson (via electronic mail)
Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail)
Bryan M. Scott (via electronic ma{[)
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail)
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Stanley J . Preston

Direct Dial: 801-869-1623

December 11 , 20 13
VIA ELECTRONIC ANJJ REGULAR 1l1AIL

Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Stafford Smith and Woodruff Smith

Dear Mike and Gregg:
Based on the discussion during the meeting held on November 26, 2013, between the
parties' respective counsel and Damian Smith, we understood that, once we confirmed the
inventory of properties, you were going to provide us with a settlement proposal suggesting a
division of the Staffvvood Partnership properties, 1 with Stafford then invited to choose between
the two groupings. Please advise when we can expect to receive this proposal.
In the meantime, we have no choice but to respond formally to the allegations and threats
contained in your December 4, 2013 letter to the Staffwood Management Board (the "Board").
At the outset, we note the irony of a letter that demands the Board to take certain actions while
also threatening and asserting baseless allegations against Board Members Mark Peterson and
Stafford Smith. It of course no surprise to those crafting the December 4 111 letter that it
obtained at least part of the outcome sought, the resignation of Mr. Peterson from the Board, thus
precluding the Board from taking any action without Woody's .approval. It is unfortlmate that a
the decision was made to threaten Mr. Peterson, when both Stafford and Woody agreed to his
selection to the Board, and .he has willingly served in this capacity as an accommodation to both.
Apparently, in your client's and Damiart;s opinion, anyone who disagrees with thein is guilty of
breaching their fiduciary duties.
.
.

is

Please be advised that Stafford will not be coerced to do anything in response to your
client's threats and attempts to bully. It would be a gross injustice and complete waste of time
and money to have to litigate Woody's threatened clain1s of breach of fiduciary duty, but our
client is fully prepared to defend himself and we are confident that he will prevail. Of course, in
th e event such claims are asserted against Mr. Peterson, Staffwood will be required to hold Mr.
1

Of ~ourse, this"reference is subject to a determination of the actual owner of the Outlet Center PT?perty.
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Spence
Greggory J. Savage
December 11, 2013
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Peterson harmless and indemnify him pursuant to Section 9.1 of the Staffwood Amended
Partnership Agreement, which Woody signed. Obviously, based on this provision, the assertion
of any claims against Mr. Peterson will merely result in an unfortunate and unnecessary
expenditure of Staffwood' s resources.
In anri7 event, as noted Woody, et al., has achieved at least one intended result of your
December 4ti letter by insuring Staffivood's inability to take any action. Of course, without Mr.
Peterson, and given the disagreements between the parties, it is highly unlikely the two
remaining Board members will be able to reach an agreement on how to respond to the key
demands in your letter, particularly within the time period demanded in your letter. Specifically,
Stafford will not agree to the first demand in your letter, nor will he concede that the leases that
were validly entered into in accordance with the express terms of the parties' prior settlement
agreements are.now somehow invalidated by the bidding process. As you know, I have
summarized the reasons for our position on this issue in my prior letter to you dated November
20, 2013. In addition, the leases themselves expressly provide that the benefits of the leases are
binding on the parties and their successors.

If Woody is unwilling to abide by the terms of the existing leases on the subject
properties, then it is fruitless to address the remaining demands in your letter. Nonetheless, we
make the following eomments regarding these demands so that you are aware of Stafford's
position.·
As to the second demand in your letter regarding the outstanding loan balanee owed to
Wells Fargo bank, this is an obligation that Staffwood will be required to pay off at some point
in the near future, regardless of whether there is a closing, a.YJ.d Stafford is open to discussing this
matter with Woody to determine how this might be accomplished.
With respect to the third demand regarding the alleged environmental issues on the Smith
Chevrolet property, this is a new point that Woody has only recently raised and should have been
considered by Woody in the bidding. It is unreasonable to demand or expect that an issue of this
magnitude may be resolved in a few weeks without more information as to the nature and extent
of the alleged problem, or a reasonable opportunity to evaluate this issue. At this point, Stafford
is not prepared to agree to this demand.
Your fourth demand ignores the fact that, without any income producing properties,
Staffwood has no capacity to pay the annual expenses that must be paid related to its remaining
properties, inciuding property taxes, loans, etc. Accordingly, it would not be prudent for
Staffwood to simply distribute all net proceeds from any closing to Stafford and Woody.

1

Michael
Spence
Greggory J. Savage
December 11, 2013
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With respect to the fifth demand in your letter, Stafford opposes the demanded action
since it is not clear who actually owns the Outlet Center property. Obviously, the parties need to
investigate and determine who o,vns t...lus property. fo the meantime, subject to maldng it clear as
to the effect otherwise on the various dealings of the parties, Stafford is willing to enter into an
agreement that the recently completed bidding process is invalid and allow Woody to obtain the
return of his escrow money. Alternatively, Stafford is willing to consider an agreement that any
closing be delayed pending a resolution of this issue. Regardless of when the issues related to
the Outlet Center are resolved, and given the short term of Smith Chevrolet's continued
occupancy of its existing building, Stafford will require a good faith understanding memorialized
in an explicit agreement allowing Smith Chevrolet to continue its current occupancy until its new
facility is operational.
Finally, Stafford agrees to the sixth demand in your letter as it relates to the Staffwood
partners, but he cannot agree to this demand insofar as it relates to non-partner Board members,
given the contractual obligations Staffwood owes to Mark Peterson, as discussed above.
Sincerely,

cc:

Damian C. Smith (via electronic mail)
Douglas R. Nelson (via electronic mail)
Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail)
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail)
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ATTOR..NEYS AT LAW
Stanley J. Preston

Direct Dial: 801-869-1623

December 17, 2013

VIA ELECTRONIC AND REGULAR MAIL
Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

Stafford Smith and Woodruff Smith

Dear Mike and Gregg:
We have reviewed your letter dated December 12, 2013. For the reasons explained in my
prior correspondence, Stafford will not agree to Woody's proposed lease terms. The rates
suggested by Woody are unreasonable and unacceptable to Stafford. Your client's repeated
threats to terminate the existing valid leases, to dictate future lease rates, and to evict Stafford's
businesses from their leased premises if Stafford is unwilling to agree to Woody's terms (thereby
effectively destroying Stafford's businesses) are inappropriate and contrary to the parties'
express agreements. Moreover, Woody's present position regarding the meaning of the phrase
"marketable fee title" is a recent fabrication that is inconsistent with various prior
communications from, and positions taken by, Woody and his representatives.
In addition, Woody is inappropriately attempting to put conditions on the closing where
no such conditions or obligations exist, either under the law or the applicable contracts. For
example, if there are any environmental problems related to the Smith Chevrolet building, such
problems were created while Woody had both an ownership interest in the building and in Smith
Chevrolet and, as result, Woody was aware of any such issues before he engaged in the bidding
process. More importantly, there is no legal or contractual requirement that would require
Staffwood to obtain any environmental clearance prior to a closing, nor is such a clearance
required under the definition of "marketable fee title." In short, Woody has no right to impose
any lender requirements on Staffwood as part of the closing.
Woody's demand that all closing issues be resolved before he is willing to malce a
settlement offer is not only directly contrary to counsel's discussion during our meeting on
November 25, 20 13, but it also appears to be a calculated attempt to coerce Stafford to accept
Woody's demands. As we discussed during our meeting on November 25, you proposed that
Woody would make an initial settlement offer to divide Staffurood' s properties to see if the
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parties could reach an agreement that would avoid any closing and its attendant, and apparently
irreconcilable, issues. Your attempt to blame our December 11, 2013 letter as the reason for
your client's current unwillingness to make the promised offer is unwarranted. The allegations
and assertions set forth in your December 4 letter required Stafford to respond formally, which
he did within the deadline you set. Given our agreement to continue the closing, there was no
need for you to send your December 4 letter when you did. Unfortlmately, your December 4
letter has now started a cycle of correspondence that certainly is not advancing a resolution.
With respect to your December 12 letter, and for the record, Stafford categorically denies
the baseless accusations against Mark Peterson that you have made in your most recent letter.
Also, pursuant to the request in your December 12 letter, please be advised that there is a
$2,000,000 loan against the Snake River Parkway property for roadways and infrastructure.
Woody is fully aware of this loan based on Stafford's correspondence to Woody regarding the
same. Also, your client's demand in your December 4 letter that all net proceeds from the
closing be distributed to the partners would mean that there would be no money in Staffwood to
pay its property taxes through the date of the closing.
It makes no sense to file a lawsuit without first exploring settlement. Accordingly, if
your client is still willing to abide by his promise to make a settlement offer, my client will
consider it. We will even agree to further extend the closing date if that will facilitate settlement
discussions. If not, Stafford is fully prepared to defend himself against Woody's meritless legal
claims, should Woody take the unfortunate step of filing yet another lawsuit. In that event,
Stafford's offer to invalidate the bid process and allow Woody to withdraw his escrow frmds will
be withdrnwn. In addition, if Woody does initiate another law suit, I have been instructed to see
the law suit through to its conclusion and all settlement discussions will be off the table once the
threatened lawsuit is filed.
Sincerely,

cc:

Damian C. Smith (via electronic mail)
Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail)
Stafford Smith (via electronic mai[)
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EXHIBIT 4

Brandon Crowther
From:

Sent:
To:
Cc:

Subject:

2014 3:18 PM
, Greggory
Mike Carlston (mcarlston@scmlaw.com); Bryan M. Scott; 'Damian Smith'
RE: RQNDOCS-#1271075-v2-Addendum_to_Escrow_and_Clsoing_Instructions

Mike and Gregg,
In the proposal you sent me at the end of the day yesterday, you state that the parties need "to
treat the entire transaction ... as a tax free dissolution," that this "is in everyone's best
interests/' and that this "would be a small ... concession on Stafford's part." We disagree. The
settlement proposal Stafford made on December 20, 2013, stated that Stafford was "willing to
purchase the subject properties." Your letter dated January 13, 2.014, stated, "Woody hereby
accepts Stafford's offer as set forth in your letter of December 20, 2013."
In that letter, you also stated that Woody's offer to divide the remaining properties was not
conditioned on Stafford's willingness to treat the transaction as a dissolution whereby
Staffwood's assets were to be distributed in liquidation of the partners' ownership
interests. Indeed you stated that, "If the parties cannot agree [to Staffwood's dissolution] prior
to Closing, Closing of the bid properties and the subsequent divisions shall take place exactly as
set forth above." Subsequently, in your February 6, 2014 email, you stated, "We realize that
Stafford has the right to treat this as a sale and exchange of the 3 bid properties under our
Settlement Agreements, but we ask Stafford to consider a dissolution ...."
Accordingly, to the extent Woody is now insisting that the transaction be treated as a
dissolution of Staffwood, such a position is contrary to, and an attempt to fundamentally
change, the parties' agreement. We are disappointed that Woody is now seeking to renegotiate
terms in a way that does not benefit both parties. To the contrary, you proposal benefits
Woody to Stafford's significant detriment. Stafford fully understands the tax implications of a
sale versus a distribution of the properties that were the subject of the bid process. What you
have asked of Stafford is certainly not a "minor concession," and it cost him a very significant
amount in tax benefits. To the extent Woody's and Stafford's accountants have not discussed
the tax implications to both sides, we hope that they would do so.
For the reasons previously explained in my letter dated January 30, 2014, Stafford does not
want to convey the seven acre plot west of the Snake River to the City of Idaho Falls as part of
the Closing. Again, based upon the emails we exchanged on February 6 and 7, 2014, I
understood that we had reached an agreement regarding how to handle this issue.
The parties have a deal. They agreed that Stafford will purchase the bid properties, that
Stafford will receive Property Set B, and that Woody will receive Property Set A. The parties
now need to proceed with the Closing on this transaction. As previously indicated, Stafford
remains willing to explore ways to minimize the overall tax burdens to the parties, but only after
the transfer of ownership of the properties is complete. Stan

Stanley J. Preston
PRESTON & SCOTT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande St., Suite 250
1

1

UT 84101
: 801-869-1620
Fax: 801-869-1621
DD: 801-869-1623

The information contained in this e-mail and any attachments is confidential and solely for the use of the intended recipient. If the intended
recipient is our client, then this information is also a privileged attorney-client communication. Unauthorized use or disclosure of this information
is prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, do not read it. Please delete it from your system without copying it, and notify the
sender by e-mail or by calling 801-869-1620, so that our address record can be corrected. Thank you.

From: Michael Spence [mailto:mspence@RQN.COM]
Sent: Wednesday, February 12, 2014 4:37 PM
To: Stanley Preston
Cc: 'damian.smith@techlawventures.com' (damian.smith@techlawventures.com); 'Woody Smith'
(woody@woodysmithford.com); 'Hal Bennett' (hal@woodysmithford.com); Greggory Savage; Ana Arras
Subject: P../1/: RQND0CS-#1271075-v2-Addendum_to_Escrow_and_Clsoing_Instructions
Stan, we are very close and, with what I/we believe would be a small 1 but meaningful concession on Stafford's part, we
can get this closed and done, once and for all. I personally want to thank you and Stafford for your efforts and
professionalism in attempting to get this resolved globally, rather than continuing the disputes and eventual litigation.
From our perspective, and as we have discussed before, we really need to treat the entire transaction, up front and now,
as a tax free dissolution. It is in everyone's best interests, including Woody's and Stafford's, to keep the IRS out of the
brothers' pockets as much as possible. I really believe that It is one thing to have a multi-year write off for the future - it
is another, and we think a more valuable one, to have a certain tax free benefit now. My compliments to you and
Stafford stated above are sincere and serious. But, Woody has also made a number of concessions, including his
concession in the bid process. Both parties have compromised and, in order to get this finally and globally resolved, we
need this "tax concession" from Stafford. As I mentioned above, such a structure keeps Stafford from having to pay a
hefty tax bill this year as well.
In order to receive such tax free treatment, we believe that the property needs to all be distributed out BEFORE any cash
is distributed from the transaction. So, Stafford's and Woody's monies (not including Woody's deposit, of course)
would need to remain in Staffwood until the gift property is deeded to the City. Therefore, it is to both parties' benefit
to make that gift as soon as possible! I have attached an amended Addendum A that accomplishes the tax free
treatment I have referenced in this email. Let's get this done, and done this week. Thanks to both you and Stafford for
your anticipated agreement to close in the manner set forth in the attached Addendum. Mike Spence

I

Michael Spence I Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C. 36 South State Street, Suite 1400 I Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Direct: 801-323-3381 I Facsimile: 801-532-75431 www.rqn.com

IRS Rules of Practice require us to inform you that advice, if any, in this email (including any attachments) concerning federal tax matters is not
intended to be used, and cannot be used or relied upon for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor for promoting,
marketing or recommending any transaction or matter addressed herein. This e-mail is sent by a law firm and contains information that may be
priviieged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e-mail and notify us immediately.
·
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW
Stanley J. Preston

Direct Dial: 801 -869-1623

March 7, 2014

VIA ELECTRONIC 1YIAIL
Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage

RAY, QUINNEY & 1\r:EBEKER
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re:

I

i

Stcifforcl Smith v. Woodruff Smith

Dear Mike and Gregg:
Pursuant to the notice I provided you in my letter dated March 3, 2014, and in light of
Woody's failure to close the real estate transactions pursuant to the terms of the parties'
agreements, please be advised that Stafford has now had to advance his own funds on behalf of
Staffwood to pay off the Wells Fargo Bank loan.
Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the amount of Stafford's payment on behalf of
Staffwood totaled $858,066, which was the pay-off amount as of January 14, 2014, as shown in
the Analysis of Staffwood Sale and Distribution dated February 20, 2014, that I previously
provided to you. Stafford hereby demands that Woody, as a 50% owner of Staffwood, pay
Stafford immediately the swn of $429,033, which represents Woody's share of the amount paid.
In addition, Woody also owes Stafford the sum of $350,000 to reimburse Stafford for the
funds that Smith Chevrolet has advanced for the benefit of Staffwood, over and above the
amounts Smith Chevrolet was obligated to pay Staffwood for its lease of properties from
Staffwood, for the purpose of servicing the Wells Fargo Bank loan and to ensure that Staffwood
had adequate funds to pay its obligations over the past few years, including, without limitation,
accounting costs, taxes, insurance, maintenance, and repairs ..
As you are aware, pursuant to Section 10.4 of the 2012 Settlement Agreement, Staffwood
was required to pay all such amounts owed to Smith Chevrolet within fifteen days of the date
that the rental rates were determined for the properties leased by Smith Chevrolet. This took
place months ago, and no payments have yet been made. Of course, in accordance \:Vith the
binding and enforceable agreement between the pmiies, as documented in your January 13, 2014
letter to me and my January 30, 2014 letter to you, the parties agreed that Woody would pay
Stafford the sum of $350,000 to satisfy this obligation, even though the amount actually owed is

178

s. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250

Five Gateway Offic1, Center
• Salt Lake City, UT 84101 • Telephone: 801-869-1620 • Fax; 801 -869-1621

!s
i

i

iI

j
I

I
l

I

222 /

Spence
Greggory J. Savage
March 7, 2014
Page 2

higher. As a result, Stafford hereby demands that Woody pay him the additional sum of
$350,000 to satisfy Woody's obligation. Accordingly, the total amount Woody nmv owes
Stafford is $779,033.
Contrary to the implication in your March 5, 2014 letter, my March 3, 2014 letter did not
constitute a counteroffer; rather it was a demand that Woody live up to the contractual
obligations he made to Stafford and to perform the required closing. In any event, you requested
that Stafford respond to yom March 5, 2014 letter by today. Stafford hereby rejects the
proposals and assertions made in your letter inasmuch as they are inconsistent with the parties
prior agreements for Stafford's purchase of the bid properties and for the division of Staffwood's
remaining properties.
I informed you by means ofmy March 3, 2014 letterthat, if Woody did not perfom1 the
required closing and complete the required real estate transactions by yesterday, March 6, 2014,
then Stafford would have no other choice but to sue Woody to enforce the parties' agreement and
recover the damages Stafford has suffered. Woody ignored this deadline and, he has repeatedly
failed and refosed to perform in accordance with his \vTitten commitments and promises.
Accordingly, please be advised that, today, Stafford has filed a lawsuit against Woody in the
Seventh Judicial District Court, in Bonneville County, State ofidaho. Please let me know if you
are authorized to accept service of the Complaint in this matter on behalf of your client, Woody.
Sincerely,

cc:

Michael R. Carlston (via electronic mail)
Bryan M. Scott (via electronic mail)
Stafford Smith (via electronic mail)

Kara L. Pettit (Idaho State Bar No. 5276)
Michael R. Carlston (Utah State Bar No. 05
SNOW. CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (80 I) 521-9000
kp(a)scmlaw.com
mrc@scmlmv.com

Pro Hae Vice Admission Pending)

Stanley J. Preston (Utah State Bar No. 4119, Pro Hae Vice Admission Pending)
PRESTON & SCOTT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 869-1620
s ip@prestonandscott.co m

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant
Stafford L. Smith and Third-Party Defendant
Smith Chevrolet Co., Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO
STAFFORD L. SMITH,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
vs.
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS FILED BY
STAFFORD SMITH AND SMITH
CHEVROLET

Defendant/Counterclaimant.
WOODRUFF D. SMlTH,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
SMITH CHEVROLET CO. INC. and
STAFFWOOD PARTNERSHIP,
Third-Party Defendants.

Civil No. CV-2014-1434
Judge Jon Shindurling

ORAL ARGUMENT
REQUESTED

Pursuant to Rules 7 and 12(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
Plaintiff:/counterclaim defendant Stafford L. Smith ("Stafford") "and Third-Party Defendant
Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc. ("Smith Chevrolet") respectfully submit this Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings on all claims asserted in this lawsuit, both the claims brought by Stafford in his
Amended Complaint and the claims asserted by defendant/counterclaimant/ third-party plaintiff
Woodruff D. Smith ("Woody") in his Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (the
"Counterclaim").
Essentially all the claims in this lawsuit rise or fall depending on whether the paiiies
entered into valid and enforceable agreements to settle and resolve their current disputes.
Stafford, in his Amended Complaint, asserts that the written communications exchanged
between the parties' attorneys give rise to binding and enforceable contracts. Specifically these
written communications, which are all attached to the Amended Complaint, consist of express
offers and acceptances regarding all the material terms necessary to create a contract. Woody
has failed to live up the obligations contained in these agreements, and as a result, Stafford has
asserted claims for breach of the subject contracts.
Woody has now responded with his Counterclaim wherein he asserts various claims,
including a claim for declaratory judgment that the subject written communications do not create
a binding settlement agreement. Significantly, Woody has also filed a motion to dismiss wherein
he asserts that the Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint based on Woody's contention
that the Court can review the written communications and determine that they do not give rise to
and

a contract.
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to

Third-Party Complaint and, now that the pleadings at issue are complete, Stafford and Smith
Chevrolet have also filed this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings asserting that under Idaho
law, the written communications do constitute valid contracts.
As a result, both sides now assert that this Court can, as a matter of law, determine
whether or not the written communications constitute valid and enforceable contracts. In short,
this lawsuit turns on the sole issue of law as to whether the parties entered into valid and
enforceable settlement agreements through the written correspondence exchanged by counsel for
the parties. By filing their cross-motions, both sides are conceding that this issue is ripe for
disposition by the Court at this time. If the Court agrees with Stafford and Smith Chevrolet and
determines that the parties entered valid and enforceable settlement agreements, then the Court
should, given the unique nature of the real property in question, grant specific performance and
enforce the two agreements by requiring a closing on the real property transactions in accordance
with these agreements. Also, since the validity of the subject agreements resolves and renders
moot all of Woody's claims in the Counterclaim, the Court should dismiss the Counterclaim on
the merits.
The specific grounds and arguments supporting this Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings are set forth with more particularity in the supporting memorandum, which is filed
concurrently herewith. In bringing this motion, Stafford and Smith Chevrolet also rely on the
pleadings filed by the parties herein, as well as the exhibits thereto. Stafford has also scheduled
a hearing before the Court to resolve this Motion for Monday, June 2, 2014 at 9:30 a.rn.,
to the
3

19th day of May, 20 l
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Kara L. Pettit
Michael R. Carlston

PRESTON & SCOTT

()

By~___,,......__.....,.....,,_~--~Stanley J. P ton
Attorneys for Plaintif.JICounterdefendant Stafford L.
Smith and Third-Party Defendant Smith Chevrolet
Co., Inc.
I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 19, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS FILED BY

STAFFORD SMITH AND SMITH CHEVROLET, to be delivered via electronic mail and
first class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following person(s):
Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage
Michael D. Mayfield
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Attorneysfor Defendant/Counterclaimant WoodruffD. Smith
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Kara Pettit (Idaho State Bar No. 5276)
Michael R. Carlston ( Utah State Bar No. 05
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
kp@scmlaw.com
mrc(q),scmlaw.com

Pro Hae Vice Admission Pending)

Stanley J. Preston (Utah State Bar No. 4119, Pro Hae Vice Admission Pending)
PRESTON & SCOTT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: ( 801) 869-1620
sip@.prestonandscott.com

Attorneysfor Plaintif.J1Counterclaim Defendant
Stafford L. Smith and Third-Party Defendant
Smith Chevrolet Co., Inc.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO
STAFFORD L. SMITH,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
vs.
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS FILED BY
STAFFORD SMITH AND SMITH
CHEVROLET

WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

Civil No. CV-2014-1434
Judge Jon Shindurling

vs.
SMITH CHEVROLET CO. INC. and
STAFFWOOD PARTNERSHIP,
Third-Party Defendants.

ORAL ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Rules 7 and 12(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
Plaintiff/counterclaim defendant Stafford L. Smith ("Stafford") "and Third-Party Defendant
Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc. ("Smith Chevrolet") respectfully submit this Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on all claims asserted in this lawsuit, both the claims
brought by Stafford in his Amended Complaint (the "Complaint") and the claims asserted by
defendant/counterclaimant/third-party plaintiff Woodruff D. Smith ("Woody") in his
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (the "Counterclaim").

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This lawsuit is the latest in a series of disputes and legal actions arising from the efforts
of two brothers, Stafford and Woody, to separate their joint ownership interests in various
businesses and real property. First, a dispute over the ownership interests and management of
the two brothers' jointly owned automobile dealerships was resolved when Stafford, Woody, and
their various business entities entered into a Settlement Agreement effective November I 0, 2010
(the "20 IO Settlement Agreement"), wherein, among other things, Stafford and Woody divided
their dealerships between them.
Then, in 2011, Woody sued Stafford over a dispute regarding Stafford's management of
the parties' jointly owned reinsurance companies, based on Woody's assertion that the
reinsurance companies were required to loan his dealerships the reinsurance funds generated
from the sales made by Stafford's dealerships. This lawsuit and other related disputes were fully
resolved and settled by means of a second Settlement Agreement effective July 5, 20 I 2 (the
I 2 Settlement Agreement").
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Finally, this lawsuit is now based on disputes that arose in late 2013 regarding the
purchase of three parcels of real property from Staffwood Partnerships, an Idaho general
partnership ("Staffwood"), owned 50/50 by Stafford and Woody. Specifically, these parcels are:

(1) the building and related real property occupied by Smith Chevrolet (the "Smith Chevrolet
Property"); (2) the building and related real property occupied by Stafford's RV dealership (the
"RV Property"); and (3) a certain building and related real property known as the Outlet Property
(the "Outlet Property"), which the parties believed at the time was owned by Staffwood
(collectively the "Bid Properties"). The parties made alternating bids to purchase the Bid
Properties until Woody made the final, successful bid in late October 20 l 3.

At that point, Woody refused to close on his purchase of the Bid Properties unless
Stafford and Smith Chevrolet complied with several unreasonable demands extraneous to the bid
protocol and which Stafford and Smith Chevrolet they had no legal obligation to perform. For
example, Woody threatened to file a lawsuit unless the Smith Chevrolet leases of the Bid
Properties were either: (1) terminated by December 12, 2013, and the premises vacated by Smith
Chevrolet; or (2) Stafford agreed to new leases at much higher rates, even though the terms of
the existing leases had recently been approved by Staffwood's management board. Woody's
unreasonable demands threatened to put Smith Chevrolet out of business. In addition, a title
report performed in November 2013 revealed that Smith Chevrolet, not Staffwood, was the
record title owner of the Outlet Property.
Finally, in an effort to avoid yet another lawsuit, Stafford offered to settle this dispute by
the

Properties

based on specific
3

terms set

in a

from

attorneys dated December 20, 2013. This settlement offer was clear and definite,

containing all of the material terms necessary to create a binding and enforceable settlement
agreement for the purchase of the Bid Properties, including the identity of the properties to be
purchased, the purchase price, the closing date, and how the proceeds of the sale would be
applied and allocated.
In response to Stafford's settlement offer, Woody's attorneys sent a letter dated January
13, 2014, which stated, "Woody hereby accepts Stafford's offer as set forth in your letter dated
December 20, 2013." Woody's unconditional acceptance of Stafford's settlement offer created a
binding and enforceable settlement agreement (the "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement") that
resolved all disputes regarding the purchase of the Bid Properties. Stafford's attorneys
acknowledged Woody's acceptance of Stafford's settlement terms in a letter dated January 30,
2014. These written communications confirm that there was a meeting of the minds between the
parties. Further, the plain language of the communications is complete and unambiguous and,
therefore the introduction of extrinsic evidence to modify or alter this agreement must be
excluded as a matter of law.
Woody's January 13, 2014 letter also made a separate offer to divide Staffwood's
remaining real property between Stafford and Woody. In the letter from Stafford's attorneys of
January 30, 2014, Stafford accepted Woody's offer regarding the division of Staffwood's
remaining properties. As a result, Stafford's unconditional acceptance of Woody's offer created
a binding and enforceable agreement (the "Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement")
regarding the

of Staffwood 's remaining properties.
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the plain

agreement was complete and unambiguous as to all of the material terms necessary to
enforce this agreement, which, as a matter of law, excludes the introduction of any extrinsic
evidence.
Now Woody has refused to perform either agreement and, in fact, he has attempted to renegotiate terms that he himself proposed and that Stafford accepted. Woody has also asserted he
will not close on the real estate transactions required by these two agreements unless the
transactions are treated as a "tax-free" distribution and dissolution of Staffwood, even though
Woody previously and expressly confirmed in writing that this requirement was not part of the
agreements, and that he would close on his agreement to sell the Bid Properties to Stafford
exactly in accordance with the terms proposed by Stafford in his December 20, 2013 letter.
The pleadings in this matter are all at issue and before the Court. Significantly, both
sides have acknowledged that the Court should now resolve as a matter of law whether the Bid
Properties Purchase Agreement and the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement constitute
binding and enforceable agreements. In fact, all the claims in the Complaint and the
Counterclaim turn on the sole issue of law regarding whether the parties' correspondence formed
valid and enforceable settlement agreements. The relevant correspondence that is necessary for
resolving this issue is attached to the parties' pleadings and the parties acknowledge the
authenticity of these written communications and the fact that their respective attorneys
represented them in the letters that were sent on their behalf.
Accordingly, the Court should now decide as a matter of law, based on the pleadings
two agreements constitute binding and
5

contracts. It is

,~;c,uu-~~

that, if the agreements are enforceable, Woody breached his obligations under the

agreements by refusing to close the subject real estate transactions in accordance with the terms
of these agreements. In addition, because the agreements are enforceable under Idaho law,
Woody is liable to Stafford for breach of these agreements and, real properties being recognized
as unique, Stafford is entitled to specific performance of the two agreements as a matter of law.
In addition, a determination that the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement is an enforceable
contract effectively disposes of all but a couple of tangential claims in the Counterclaim. The
very minor remaining claims asse1ied by Woody are disposed of by, and subject to, the release
agreed to in the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement. Accordingly, a determination that
both of these two settlements are valid resolves and moots all of Woody's claims and, therefore,
the Counterclaim should be dismissed on the merits and with prejudice.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
Based on the pleadings, the following facts provide context for the key material facts
regarding the formation, validity and enforcement of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and
the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, which material facts are undisputed for
purposes of this motion.
1.

The current lawsuit is the latest in a series of disputes between Stafford and

Woody and their efforts to separate their joint ownership interests in various businesses and real
property. See Complaint ,r,r 8-29; Answer ,r,r 8-29; Counterclaim ,r,r 12-32; Reply and ThirdParty Answer ("Reply")
2.

,r,r 12-32.

disputes began in 20 l 0,
6

Stafford adamantly disputed

s claim and asserted that Woody owned only

.54% of Smith Chevrolet, as evidenced by years of corporate records and tax returns, many of
which Woody admittedly signed. This dispute was resolved when Stafford, Woody, and their
various business entities entered into the 2010 Settlement Agreement, whereby the parties,
among other things, divided up their jointly owned automobile dealerships such that Stafford
received full ownership of Smith Chevrolet, which included the Smith Honda and Smith RV
dealerships, while Woody received full ownership of Smith Ford, Smith Hyundai and a business
known as SuperTanks. See Counterclaim
3.

,r,r 14,

16; Reply ,rir 14, 16.

In the 20 l O Settlement Agreement, the parties also agreed to a procedure for the

management of Staffwood through the appointment of a mutually approved third member of
Staffwood's management board (in addition to Stafford and Woody) for the purpose of casting
the tie-breaking vote regarding any issues where Stafford and Woody were not in agreement.
Complaint ,r 18; Answer ,r 18.
4.

The 20 IO Settlement Agreement also included a bid process whereby Stafford and

Woody could bid for and purchase real property from Staffwood. Complaint ir 19; Answer ,r 19.
5.

Within a few weeks after the parties closed on the 20 l O Settlement Agreement,

Woody filed a lawsuit against Stafford in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Bonneville
County, State of Idaho, entitled Woodruff D. Smith, et al. v. Stafford L. Smith, et al., Case
No. CV-11-1772 (the "Prior Lawsuit"), wherein he alleged that Stafford had breached the
20 l O Settlement Agreement by transferring approximately $425,000 from Smith Ford to Hebgen
Company,

is one of two

companies jointly
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and Woody. In response, Stafford filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment that the transfer
said funds was appropriate because: (1) the monies in question were generated from
reinsurance contracts sold by Smith Chevrolet and, therefore, Smith Chevrolet, not Smith Ford
was entitled to have access to these funds; and (2) the transfer of these funds was made in the
ordinary course of business and was authorized by the terms of a Management Agreement
between Stafford and Woody and their entities whereby a Smith Chevrolet management team
had taken over the management of Smith Ford to salvage Smith Ford from the precarious
financial condition that had been caused by Woody's mismanagement of the dealership. See
Counterclaim ,r 19; Reply ,r 19.
6.

Ultimately, after a series of settlement negotiations the disputes raised in the Prior

Lawsuit, as well as other disputes that had arisen, were fully and finally resolved by the 2012
Settlement Agreement, which also included the parties' agreement regarding how their
reinsurance companies' businesses would be wound up and how the loans and funds held by the
reinsurance companies would be distributed. See Counterclaim ,i 20; Reply ,i 20.
7.

The 2012 Settlement Agreement also included ce1iain amendments to the bid

process created in the 20 IO Settlement Agreement by requiring Stafford to make the opening bid
for the purchase of the three Bid Properties, as defined above. Counterclaim ,i 21; Reply ,i 21.
8.

Pursuant to the 2012 Settlement Agreement, on February 7, 2013, Stafford

initiated the bid process by making a bid to purchase the Bid Properties. Complaint~ 20;
Answer ,r 20; Counterclaim

9.

16-17, 22; Reply ,r,r 16-17, 22.
Woody

to Stafford's bid to
8

for the Bid Properties, and the patiies then traded bids for the Bid Properties for several
months. Complaint ,r
I 0.

· Answer ,r 25.

On October 17, 2013, Woody made a bid on the Bid Properties. On October 28,

2013, Stafford advised Woody and others that he would not continue bidding on the Bid
Properties. Woody was therefore the successful bidder under the terms of the 2010 and 2012
Settlement Agreements. Counterclaim ,r 26; Reply ,r 26.
11.

On November 12, 2013, Woody's attorneys sent a letter to Staffwood identifying

certain conditions that Woody claimed would have to be satisfied by Staffwood, Stafford and
Smith Chevrolet by the closing date of December 12, 2013, in order to provide Woody with
marketable fee title to the Bid Properties. Counterclaim
12.

,r 27; Reply ,r 27.

For example, Woody stated that a title report showed that the Outlet Property

was titled in the name of Smith Chevrolet and, therefore, Smith Chevrolet had to convey
marketable fee title to the Outlet Property to Staffwood. Counterclaim
13.

,r 27; Reply ,r 27.

Woody also demanded that Smith Chevrolet's existing leases of the Bid

Properties would need to be terminated (and the premises vacated by Smith Chevrolet) or
renegotiated on terms acceptable to Woody because such leases constituted encumbrances
preventing Woody from receiving marketable title. 1 At no time during the bid process had
Woody put Stafford on notice of any of the issues and demands listed in his November 12, 2013
letter. See Counterclaim

,r 27;

Reply

,r 27.

1

These leases had been approved by the Staffwood management board, of which Woody is a member, and Woody
was fully aware of these leases during the bidding process. Moreover, the value of the Bid Properties is increased
precisely because they generate rental income. In addition, Woody was fully aware of the alleged environmental
issues on the Smith Chevrolet property because the events that allegedly created these issues occurred while he was
an owner, yet he never made any of his bids subject to a resolution of these alleged environmental issues.
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14.

In an effort to resolve this dispute regarding the purchase of the Bid Properties, a

of meetings and communications took place between Woody's attorneys and Stafford's
attorneys. Complaint ,r 29; Answer ,r 29; Counterclaim

n 29, 31; Reply ,r,r 29, 31.

On November 20, 2013, Stafford's attorneys sent a letter, attached as Exhibit I to

15.

the Reply, explaining Stafford's position and arguments regarding why Woody's demands were
unreasonable and unsupported, including the fact that the 2010 Settlement Agreement
contemplated extraneous matters of title and the Settlement Agreements established a very
specific contractual process to establish the tenns of the leases in question, including the length
or term of said leases. See Counterclaim ,r 29; Reply ,r 29.
J6.

On December 4, 2013, Woody's attorneys sent a letter to the Management Board

of Staffwood (the "December 4 Letter") demanding that ( 1) Woody and/or Stafford be
empowered to execute, on behalf of Staffwood, marketable fee simple title to the Smith
Chevrolet Property and the RV Property, free of any lease; (2) the proceeds be used to pay off
the Wells Fargo loan; (3) that Staffwood defend and indemnify Woody against any
environmental liabilities and that Staffwood seek indemnification from Smith Chevrolet for
environmental liability created during its tenancy; (4) that each partner's share of the net
proceeds at closing be simultaneously paid to the partners; (5) that Staffwood demand that Smith
Chevrolet convey marketable fee simple title to the Outlet Property and pursue a cause of action
against Smith Chevrolet if such does not occur by closing; and (6) that no Staffwood funds be
authorized to pay any attorneys' fees relating to any disputes between Stafford and Woody. See

,r

Reply

,r 30.
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17.

Woody also threatened to file a lawsuit against Staffwood and Stafford if they did

not meet his unreasonable demands by December 11, 2013, so that Woody could close on
December 12, 2013. 2 See Counterclaim ,i 30; Reply ,i 30.
18.

On December 11, 2013, Stafford's attorneys sent Woody a letter, attached as

Exhibit 2 to the Reply, responding to the allegations and demands in the December 4 Letter.
Counterclaim ,r 31; Reply ,I 31.
19.

On December 17, 2013, Stafford's attorneys sent Woody a letter, attached as

Exhibit 3 to the Reply, responding to Woody's continued threats to terminate the existing valid
leases, dictate future lease rates, and to evict Stafford's businesses from their leased premises if
Stafford was unwilling to agree to Woody's terms. Counterclaim ,I 31; Reply ,I 31.
20.

Finally, in an attempt to resolve this dispute and to avoid yet another lawsuit,

Stafford's attorneys sent a letter dated December 20, 2013 to Woody's attorneys (the "December
20 Letter"), 3 which is attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint, wherein Stafford made a
settlement offer to resolve the parties' dispute regarding purchase of the Bid Properties, by
purchasing the Bid Properties himself on the following material terms:
a.

Stafford would purchase the Bid Properties for $2,800,000.00; and

b.

The net proceeds from the sale of the Bid Properties would be

2

The parties subsequently agreed to extend the closing deadline until December 20, 2013, to see if they could
resolve this dispute.
3
To the extent that Woody takes issue with Stafford's characterization of each of the key written communications
referenced herein, it should be noted that, in response to each of Stafford's allegations regarding these
communications, Woody's Answer merely asserted "that the referenced documents speak for themselves" and only
denied Stafford's ailegations to the extent they "are inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrue or inaeeurately
characterize the documents." See generally Answer. The existence and authenticity of these communications is
and
are sufficient to grant this motion regardless
disputes
may have with Stafford's
characterization.
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divided between Staffwood's partners after satisfying the WFB Loan and the
amounts Staffwood owed Smith Chevrolet for the funds Smith Chevrolet had
advanced on behalf of Staffwood in excess of Smith Chevrolet's lease obligations.
Complaint ,r 30; Answer ,r 30.
21.

In response, Woody's attorneys, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker ("RQN"), sent

Stafford's attorneys a letter dated January 13, 2014 (the "January 13 Letter"), a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit B to the Complaint, wherein RQN, as Woody's attorneys, expressly stated,
"Woody hereby accepts Stafford's offer as set forth in your letter of December 20, 2013 ."
Complaint ,r 31; Answer ,r 31
22.

In the January 13 Letter, Woody also expressly stated the following regarding his

understanding of the two material terms offered by Stafford in the December 20 Letter regarding
Stafford's offer to purchase the Bid Properties:
a.

"Stafford closes on the [Bid Properties] at $2.8 million·'; and

b.

"All funds from the Closing shall go to the account of Staffwood,

and shall be disbursed as follows: (a) payoff of [the WFB Loan] (assumed to be
about $875,000 at closing); and (b) refund of rent overpayment by Smith
Chevrolet and other expenses mentioned in your letter, will be set at $350,000.
Balance of funds shall be distributed equally to the partners." Complaint ,r 32;
Answer il 32.
23.

In the January 13 Letter, Woody also stated,

attempt to
on a way
In paragraph no. 8, below, we propose that
that this transaction may be done on a tax free basis. Woody's accountants
12

believe that by treating the entire transaction as a distribution in dissolution of the
parties' interest in Staffwood, the parties can come out the same as agreed
without incurring negative tax consequences. This would seem to be beneficial to
both parties, but since this provision is outside of the terms of Stafford's offer, -we
make clear that we do not require Stafford's agreement to [this proposal].
Complaint ,r 33 (emphasis added); Answer ,r 33.
24.

Specifically, paragraph no. 8 of the January 13 Letter, stated as follows:

In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the parties agree to
discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning ways by which
Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other divisions of cash and
property hereunder may be treated overall as an equal distribution of Staffwood
assets in liquidation of their ownership interests in Staffwood. If the parties
cannot agree prior to Closing, Closing of the bid properties and the subsequent
divisions shall take place exactly as set forth above.
Complaint ,r 34 (emphasis added); Answer ,r 34.
25.

In fact, in a subsequent email dated February 6, 2014 (the "February 6 Email"), a

copy of which is attached as Exhibit C to the Complaint, RQN again urged Stafford to acquire
the Bid Properties as "a dissolution," but RQN expressly acknowledged that this was not the deal
that the parties had agreed to, and stated, "[ w ]e realize that Stafford has the right to treat this as a
sale and exchange of the [Bid Properties] .... " Complaint ,r 35; Answer ,r 35.

26.

In addition to accepting Stafford's offer to purchase the Bid Properties, Woody

also made a separate offer to further separate the ownership interests of Woody and Stafford by
making an offer in the January 13 Letter to divide Staffwood's remaining real property between
Stafford and Woody. See Ex. B to the Complaint. Specifically, the January 13 Letter states that
"[t]he balance of the [Staffwood] properties shall be divided into two sets of property/cash ...
Stafford shall have

choice to choose Property Set A or Property Set B,
13

shall

the Property
27.

not elected by Stafford." Complaint ,r 38; Answer ,r 38.

Pursuant to the January 13 Letter, Property Set A consisted of the Snake River

Landing Property, less $400,000 Cash to be paid to the Property Set B Recipient, and Property
Set B consisted of the Bellin Road Property, the Blackfoot Property, the proceeds from the recent
sale of the Pocatello property, and $400,000 Cash to be paid by the Property A Recipient.
Complaint ,r 39; Answer ,r 39.
28.

In response to Woody's acceptance of Stafford's offer to purchase the Bid

Properties and also Woody's offer to divide the remaining Staffwood properties on the terms set
forth in the January 13 Letter, Stafford's attorneys sent a letter to RQN dated January 30, 2014
(the "January 30 Letter"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit D to the Complaint, which
stated, "Stafford is pleased that Woody has accepted Stafford's settlement offer based on the
terms communicated ... [in the December 20 Letter]. Please be advised that Stafford is willing
to divide the remaining Staffwood property consistent with the terms outlined in [the January 13
Letter], and Stafford has decided to choose Property Set B." Complaint ,r 40; Answer ,r 40.
29.

After the parties entered these two Agreements, which are defined above and in

Stafford's Complaint as the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and the Division of Staffwood
Properties Agreement (collectively the "Agreements"), Woody refused to close on the real
property transactions contemplated by the Agreements, and he then attempted to back out of his
contractual obligations and to re-negotiate the terms to which he had previously agreed. For
example, on February 12, 2014, Woody's attorneys sent an email to Stafford's attorneys, stating
the pmiies needed to treat the entire transaction as a "tax-free dissolution" and then Woody
14

2

would "get this closed and done, once and for all." See Reply ,r 38; Exhibit 4 to the Reply.
30.

Woody's insistence on conditioning any closing on a tax-free dissolution was

contrary to the parties' agreement and Woody's express admissions and confirmations in the
January 13 Letter and in the February 6 Email, as set forth above. Stafford's attorneys pointed
out the inconsistencies in Woody's assertions in an email dated February 13, 2014. See Reply

,r 38; Exhibit 4 to the Reply.
31.

In reliance on Woody's representations and promises, Stafford communicated to

Woody that he was ready, willing, able and fully prepared to close on the transactions agreed to
in both the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and in the Division of Staffwood Properties
Agreement, and convey the properties in accordance with the terms of the Agreements. See
February 20, 2014 Email from Stanley J. Preston to RQN and documents attached thereto, copies
of which are attached as Exhibit E to the Complaint. Complaint ,r 43; Answer ,r 43.
32.

In response, and in further breach of the Agreements, Woody proposed new

and/or unrelated terms that were never paii of the Agreements. Finally, Stafford sent a formal
demand to Woody to comply with the Agreements and to close the transactions in accordance
with the Agreements. See March 3, 2014 Letter from Stanley J. Preston to RQN, a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit F to the Complaint. Complaint ,r 44; Answer ,r 44.
33.

In response, Woody continued to attempt to renegotiate the terms of the

Agreements, and even stated that he would not go forward with the Closing unless Stafford
agreed to accept only $200,000 as part of Property Set B, instead of the $400,000 payment that
himself had proposed and Stafford had accepted. Counterclaim ii 41; Reply ,r 41.
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After more than a month of delays, and after it became clear that Woody was
unwilling to abide by his contractual obligations by closing the real estate transactions in
accordance with the terms of the Agreements, Stafford filed this lawsuit to enforce the
Agreements, and he gave notice of the lawsuit to Woody by means of a letter sent by Stafford's
attorneys on March 7, 2014, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 5 to the Reply. Counterclaim

,r 41; Reply,r 41.
35.

Woody has now taken the position that the parties never entered into any

enforceable contracts with respect to the Agreements, contrary to the express written offers and
acceptances between the parties as set forth above. Complaint ,r 47; Answer ,r 47.
36.

Specifically, Woody is now asserting that the reason the Agreements are not

binding and enforceable is because a material condition to any agreement was Woody's
insistence that the entire transaction be treated as a tax-free distribution of the Staffwood
properties. Woody's position, however, is directly contradicted by the express written
statements made by RQN in the January 13 Letter and the February 6 Email, as set forth above.
Complaint ,r 48; Answer ,r 48.
37.

The written communications between the parties establish that, while the division

of the remaining Staffwood properties other than the Bid Properties would be a distribution,
Woody expressly agreed that Stafford had the right to purchase the Bid Properties. Complaint

,r 49; Answer ,r 49.
ARGUMENT
judgment on

pleadings are treated
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to

summary

judgment." Bagley v. Thomason, 307 P.3d l 219, 1222 (Idaho 2013). As a result, a motion for
judgment on the pleadings should be granted if "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law," based on the relevant undisputed facts. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

I.

THE PARTIES' CONTRACT CLAIMS ARE RIPE FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS.
Here, it is undisputed that the parties' attorneys exchanged a series of written

communications in an effort to settle the parties' disputes. These communications are attached
as exhibits to the Complaint and Woody has acknowledged their authenticity. Both sides have
now asked the Court to review these written communications and determine whether they
establish binding and enforceable settlement agreements as a matter of law. If the Court
determines that either or both of the Agreements constitute valid contracts, then such
Agreements should be enforced and the relevant claims in the Counterclaim should be dismissed.
Where the validity and enforceability of a settlement agreement is the sole determination
for a court to make, as it is here, judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. See, e.g., Boss Urgent
Care, P LLC v. Urgent Care Works, LLC, 2012 WL 1825328 (E.D.N.C. 2012). In Boss, the
parties engaged in settlement negotiations and agreed upon what one party considered a "term
sheet" or "agreement to agree" and the other party characterized as a settlement agreement. Id.
at 2. The court was able to interpret the plain language of the "Letter Agreement" and determine
that, although the agreement was missing terms, it "contained sufficiently definite terms and
expressed the mutual assent necessary to create a valid and enforceable contract, which was
intended by the parties to constitute a settlement of this action." Id at 8. As in Boss, and using
the plain language of the Agreements, the Court is in a position to interpret the Agreements and
17

decide on the pleadings that they constitute valid and enforceable contracts.
Based on the cross-motions now before the Court, the parties have confirmed that this
issue is ripe for the Court's determination. Stafford is seeking judgment on the pleadings while
Woody has filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative motion for summary judgment wherein
he concedes that "[t]he key question in this motion is whether the parties formed valid contracts
based on letter [sic] and e-mails exchanged between counsel for the parties." Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Defendant's Memorandum" or "Def.'s Mem.") at 2.

II.

THE PARTIES FORi1vIED ENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS.
A.

Applicable Legal Standard for Determining Whether an Enforceable
Contract has been Formed.

Under Idaho law, "[f]ormation of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the
minds as evidenced by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract." Lawrence v. Hutchinson,
204 P.3d 532, 538 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009). "This manifestation takes the form of an offer and
acceptance." Id. "[A] contract is enforceable if it is complete, definite and certain in all its
material terms, or contains provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to
ce1iainty." General Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 979 P.2d 1207, 1215 (Idaho
1999) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). However, "[ c ]omis will not hold the
contracting parties to a standard of absolute certainty relative to every detail of a contract.
Rather only reasonable certainty is necessary before a contract will be given legal effect.

General Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 979 P.2d 1207, 1215 (Idaho 1999). The key
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is that "[t]he parties' obligations must be identified so that the adequacy of performance can be
ascertained." Id
"The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the contracting parties
at the time the contract was entered." Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, I 08 P .3d 332,
337 (Idaho 2005). "If the language of the document is unambiguous given its ordinary and wellunderstood meaning, we will not look beyond the four corners of the agreement to determine the
intent of the parties." State v. Gomez, 281 P.3d 90, 94 (Idaho 2012). "In determining whether a
contract is ambiguous, this Court ascertains whether the contract is reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretation." Page v. Pasquali, 244 P.3d l 236, 1239 (Idaho 20 I 0). Where "a
written contract is complete upon its face and unambiguous ... extrinsic evidence of prior or
contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add
to, or detract from the terms of the contract." In re University Place/Idaho Water Center

Project, 199 P.3d 102, 111 (Idaho 2008). "Courts cannot revise the contract in order to change
or make a better agreement for the parties." Page, 244 P.3d at 1239.
Settlement agreements stand "on the same footing as any other contract and [are]
governed by the same rules and principles as are applicable to contracts generally." Vanderford

Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 249 P.3d 857, 865 (Idaho 2011 ). Further, Idaho law favors the
enforcement of settlement agreements. "An agreement entered into in good faith in order to
settle adverse claims is binding upon the parties, and absent a showing of fraud, duress or undue
influence, is enforceable either at law or in equity. Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 204 P.3d 532, 538
2009).
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B.

The Parties Entered a Valid Settlement Agreement for Stafford to
Purchase the Bid Properties.

On its face, and based on the legal standards articulated above, the relevant written
correspondence between the parties' attorneys (the authenticity of which is undisputed)
demonstrates a clear meeting of the minds on the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement through an
offer, an unconditional acceptance, a clarification of certain terms in the offer, and a recognition
that this clarification was consistent with the original offer. The plain language within the four
corners of the three relevant letters that formed this agreement (namely the December 20,
January 13 and January 30 Letters) establishes the validity and enforceability of the Bid
Properties Purchase Agreement.
As stated above, the Complaint, Answer, Counterclaim and Reply establish that, after
Woody was the successful bidder to purchase the Bid Properties, a dispute arose between
Stafford and Woody regarding: (I) the "marketable fee title" to the Bid Properties that Staffwood
was required to deliver to Woody; (2) ownership of the Outlet Property; and (3) whether the
closing conditions demanded by Woody were appropriate. Statement of Undisputed Facts
("Facts") ,I,I 11-17. As a result, the parties engaged in a series of negotiations and an exchange
of written communications wherein they set forth their respective positions regarding this dispute
and discussed ways to resolve it. Id. ,I,I 11-20.
Finally, in the December 20 Letter, Stafford, through his attorneys, made a settlement
offer to purchase the Bid Properties himself, and thereby avoid Woody's threatened litigation
and resolve the parties' dispute regarding the terms by which the Bid Properties would be
purchased. Specifically, the December 20 Letter stated as follows:
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Stafford is willing to purchase the subject properties from Staffwood, including
the Outlet Center property, on the following terms and conditions:
1.
Stafford will pay the of sum $2,800,000 for the properties that
were the subject of the bid process, which amount is $50,000 more than his last
bid;
2.
The funds Woody has escrowed under the bid process will be
returned to him at closing;
3.
In light of the holidays, the closing on Stafford's purchase will take
place thirty (30) days from the date the parties sign an agreement as to the terms
of Stafford's purchase of the subject properties;
4.
The net proceeds from the sale of the subject properties will be
divided between Staffwood's partners after satisfying the following obligations:
a. Payment in full of Staffwood's loan from Wells Fargo Bank;
b. Payment to Smith Chevrolet of the funds it has advanced above
its lease obligation on behalf of Staffwood to ensure adequate
funds for Staffwood to pay its ongoing obligations, which
payment is pursuant to the parties' agreement as set forth in
Section 10.4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement. These
obligations include, but are not limited to, accounting costs, taxes,
insurance, maintenance, repairs and servicing the Wells Fargo
Bank loan. Exact amounts to be repaid to Smith Chevrolet shall
be determined by means of an audit conducted by Staffwood's
accountant, Kevin Oakey, but said amounts are anticipated to be
in excess of $350,000; and
c. Staffwood's retention of a mutually agreed amount as a reserve to
enable Staffwood to pay its ongoing obligations on its remaining
properties. Stafford recommends that the retained sum should be
$50,000 but in no event should the retained amount be less than
$20,000.
A to the Complaint. This offer to purchase the Bid Properties constituted a settlement
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proposal that resolves any disputes over marketable title to the Bid Properties, who owned the
Outlet Property, and the closing terms and conditions for the purchase of the Bid Properties.
In response, Woody, through his attorneys, sent the January 13 Letter, which constituted
by its express terms an unconditional acceptance of Stafford's offer, thereby forming a contract
between the parties. The January 13 letter states unconditionally that "Woody hereby accepts
Stafford's offer as set forth in your letter of December 20, 2013." Ex. B to the Complaint. After
unconditionally accepting the offer, Woody, in the January 13 Letter, proceeded to clarify a
couple of the terms of the agreement the parties had entered by filling in some of the additional
details, which did not materially modify the original offer. They are as follows:
l.
Stafford closes on the 3 bid properties at $2.8 million ("Closing"), which
Closing is to be held within 30 days 4 of the date hereof.
2.
Funds escrowed by Woody in the bid process shall be returned upon
finalizing this Agreement.
3.
All funds from the Closing shall go to the account of Staffwood, and shall
be disbursed as follows: (a) payoff of Wells Fargo loan (assumed to be about
$875,000 at closing); and (b) refund ofrent overpayment by Smith Chevrolet and
other expenses mentioned in your letter, will be set at $350,000. Balance of funds
from Closing shall be distributed equally to the partners.

Ex. B to the Complaint. 5
Significantly, Woody's clarification that "Closing is to be held within 30 days of
the date hereof" shows that Woody considered the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement to
4

As additional evidence that Woody intended the January 13 Letter to be an unconditional acceptance, RQN added
a footnote that ·'Woody is willing to close this in a much shorter time frame if Stafford is able to do so. Ex. B to
the Complaint.
The remaining terms relate to the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement and will be addressed in the
following section.

effective

the transmittal of the January 13 Letter. See

B to the Complaint. If

had intended to require that the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement be only a part
of a "final, global settlement," Woody could have clarified his understanding as such
rather than making the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement effective immediately. 6
In the January l3 Letter, Woody also proposed an additional term to the Bid Purchase
Agreement, however, he made it clear that his additional proposed term was not a counteroffer
and that Woody did not require Stafford to agree to Woody's additional proposal. Specifically,
the January 13 letter continues:
For purposes of certainty and clarification, we set f011h below further detail about
our understanding of the terms of settlement. In paragraph no. 8 below, we
propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way that this transaction may be
done on a tax free basis .... This would seem to be beneficial to both parties, but
since this provision is outside of the terms of Stafford's offer, we make clear that
we do not require Stafford's agreement to paragraph no. 8.
Ex. B. (emphasis added). This language shows that Woody and his attorneys were well aware of
the principle reflected in Idaho law that "[ a ]n acceptance of an offer, to be effectual, must be
identical with the offer and unconditional, and must not modify or introduce any new terms into
the offer. An acceptance which varies from the terms of the offer is a rejection of the offer and is
a counter proposition." C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Grafe & Assocs., Inc., 414 P.2d 873, 877 (Idaho
1966). The January 13 Letter chooses its language carefully to ensure that its proposed separate
modification would not be construed as a rejection and counteroffer, which would have allowed
Stafford to back away from the original offer by rejecting the counteroffer .
6

As shown by the Addendum, attached as Exhibit E to the Complaint, Stafford had fully accepted Woody's
proposed clarification regarding the closing date and
proposal that the amount to be
to Smith
Chevrolet for advancing certain funds on behalf of Staffwood be set at $350,000.
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1

This fact was later confirmed in the February 6 Email from Woody's attorneys, wherein
they stated, "We realize that Stafford has the right to treat this as a sale and exchange of the 3 bid
properties under our Settlement Agreements, but we ask Stafford to consider a dissolution
wherein he makes a contribution sufficient to get the 3 bid properties plus the Property B
properties, and Woody gets Property A plus $395,967 (as adjusted for closing costs)." Ex. C to
the Complaint (emphasis added). 7
Stafford's attorneys acknowledged Woody's acceptance in the January 30 Letter.
This acknowledgment did not raise any issues with the clarifying terms in the January 13
Letter, showing that the parties had reached a "meeting of the minds" for the Bid
Properties Purchase Agreement. Consistent with contracting principles, Stafford did not
need to "accept" the clarif}ing terms because they were not a counteroffer.
Moreover, the fact that the parties entered into the Bid Properties Purchase
Agreement is established by certain additional language in Stafford's offer and Woody's
acceptance. Specifically, in the last paragraph of the December 20 Letter, Stafford stated
that once the parties reached an agreement on the sale of the Bid Properties to Stafford,
Stafford would expect Woody to make a proposal for dividing Staffwood's remaining
real property between Stafford and Woody. Significantly, in the January 13, Letter,
Woody did make a proposal and offer to Stafford for the division of Staffwood's

7

Of course, this express reference to "our Settlement Agreements,'' is a binding admission and acknowledgement
that the parties had entered into separate settlement agreements as alleged in the Complaint, namely, the Bid
Properties Purchase Agreement, and the Division ofStaffwood Properties Agreement, and that Woody's proposal
regarding the tax treatment of the transaction was not a part of the "Settlement Agreements, because the parties had
agreed that Stafford had the right to treat the transaction "as a sale and exchange of the 3 bid properties. Ex. B to
the Complaint
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remaining properties, thereby evidencing that Woody understood that the parties had
reached an agreement regarding Stafford's purchase of the Bid Properties.
Under Idaho law, as quoted above, the parties formed the Bid Properties Purchase
Agreement through a clear offer and an unconditional acceptance of all the material
terms. The parties agreed on ( l) the properties that Stafford would purchase, (2) the price
Stafford would pay for the Bid Properties, (3) the date of closing, and (4) how to apply
the proceeds of the sale. The Bid Properties Purchase Agreement is "complete, definite
and certain in all its material terms, or contains provisions which are capable in
themselves of being reduced to certainty," and, therefore, it constitutes a valid and
enforceable contract. General Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 979 P.2d 1207,
1215 (Idaho 1999).

In a similar case, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that a contract for the sale of
land included "all of the minimum essential, material terms" where it identified the
parties, identified the land to be sold, set a purchase price, established provisions for
earnest money, provided a closing date, and disclosed prepayment penalties. Sec P.O.

Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 159 P.3d 870 (Idaho 2007). Here, as
in the Ventures, Inc. case, the parties clearly agreed upon and set forth the essential terms
for the sale of the Bid Properties to Stafford.
The plain language contained within the four corners of the Bid Properties
Purchase Agreement is "complete upon its face and unambiguous." See In re

Water

199

1 (Idaho

"extrinsic evidence

prior or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not

admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract." Id.
Woody agreed to the terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and is bound by its
terms. Parties to contracts are frequently reminded, as stated above, that"[ cJourts cannot
revise the contract in order to change or make a better agreement for the parties." Page v.

Pasquali, 244 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Idaho 2010).
The Idaho Supreme Court recently decided a case applicable here which
demonstrates that the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement is sufficiently definite to be
enforced. In Ogden v. Griffith, the parties contracted to sell two parcels of land, but one
of the parties did not complete the sale. 236 P.3d 1249, 1250 (Idaho 2010). The parties
subsequently entered settlement negotiations and "the parties' attorneys reached an
agreement that [defendants] would pay $40,000, secured by a deed of trust, to settle the
claims against them." Id. The defendants subsequently refused to pay the $40,000 and
the plaintiffs moved to enforce the settlement agreement. Id.
One of the issues before the court was whether the settlement agreement was
sufficiently definite to allow enforcement. Id. at 1255. The court held that the agreement
was sufficiently definite because the paiiies agreed to "the deed of trust, the requisite
property, the interest and the amount to be paid, the time frame for payment, the release
of the lis pendens, and the first priority status of the deed of trust." Id. The court
correctly did not focus on additional terms that might accompany a settlement agreement
because such terms were not essential to effectuating
26

payment of funds.

id.

Here, the parties similarly agreed on the essential terms to enforce the Bid
Properties Purchase Agreement. The parties agreed which properties were to be sold to
Stafford, how much Stafford was to pay Staffwood for the properties, when the sale was
to take place, and even how Staffwood was to use and distribute the proceeds of the sale.
Thus, all essential tenns necessary to effect the sale of the Bid Properties to Stafford were
set out and confirmed notwithstanding any other discussions regarding resolution of the
parties' disputes. Regardless of any ancillary discussions, the parties could have closed
on the sale of the Bid Properties and were obligated by the Bid Properties Purchase
Agreement to do so.
C.

The Parties Entered a Valid Settlement Agreement to Divide Staffwood's
Remaining Real Property.

As noted above, once the parties resolved their dispute regarding the purchase of the Bid
Properties by entering into the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, Woody, in the January 13
Letter made a settlement offer to Stafford to divide up the remaining properties owned by
Staffwood. This offer was consistent with the parties' efforts and desires to separate their jointly
owned businesses, partnerships and real estate holdings, and it was consistent with their prior
discussions that it would be advisable to divide up their joint real estate holdings so as to remove
future areas of conflict. 8

8

As discussed above, in the December 20 Letter, Stafford's attorneys concluded the letter by stating that "Of course,
once we reach an agreement on Staffwood's purchase of the bid properties, we will expect to promptly receive your
proposal for dividing Staffwood's remaining properties between the partners. Ex A to the Complaint. The clear
language of this statement, taken together with Woody's subsequent offer to divide the remaining Staffwood
property, further evidences that the parties intended the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement to be an individually
enforceable agreement rather than only a part of a global settlement. The relevant correspondence establishes that
the parties first resolved the most pressing dispute-the sale of the Bid Properties, by entering into a separate and
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As discussed above, Woody agreed to the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement in the
January 13 Letter, and in that same letter, Woody made an offer to divide up the remaining real
property owned by Staffwood on the following terms:
4.
The balance of the properties shall be divided into two sets of
property/cash as set forth below. Stafford shall have the choice to choose
Property Set A or Property Set B, and Woody shall receive the Property Set not
elected by Stafford.

Property Set B
Bellon Road Property
Blackfoot property

Property Set A
*Snake River Landing Property
Less: $400,000 Cash to Property B
Recipient

**Pocatello property
$400,000 Cash from Property A
Recipient
*Recipient A assumes and pays, and holds Recipient B harmless from, the $1. 9
million note and deed of trust pertaining to this property.
**Recipient B shall receive all proceeds from the recent sale of this property.
5.
Staffwood's approximately 7 acre plot west of the Snake River shall not
be divided, but shall be conveyed by Staffwood to the City of Idaho Falls in
connection with the Closing in order that each of the parties in their capacity of
partners of Staffwood may receive equal benefit of the write off.
6.
Conveyance of property in Property Sets A and B to the respective party
shall occur contemporaneously with the Closing. No such conveyance or transfer
of funds shall occur prior to Closing.
7.
The parties agree that upon Closing, all debts, claims or obligations (a)
owing to Staffwood from themselves or their respective entities, (b) owing to
them from Staffwood, and (c) owing to each other (except for (i) continuing
obligations of Stafford pursuant to Section 3.3 of the November I 0, 20 I 0
Settlement Agreement, and (ii) continuing obligations of the parties pertaining to
the windup of SV Idaho pursuant to Section 4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement
individually enforceable agreement on this dispute, and ihen a separate agreement was reached regarding the
division of Staffwood 's remaining properties.
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Agreement), if any, shall be released and settled by this Agreement.
8.
In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the parties agree
to discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning ways by which
Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other divisions of cash and
property to the parties hereunder may be treated overall as an equal distribution of
Staffwood assets in liquidation of their ownership interests in Staffwood. If the
parties cannot agree prior to Closing, Closing of the bid properties and the
subsequent divisions shall take place exactly as set forth above. 9
9.
Staffwood shall remain in existence after the Closing until the end of
calendar year 2014 in order that Staffwood may be used to complete a I 031 likekind exchange if desired, provided that nothing shall require any action which
increases the tax burden of the other party.
l 0.
Staffwood shall then be dissolved prior to the end of calendar year 2014,
unless it is being utilized for a I 031 like-kind exchange as described in paragraph
no. 9 above; in which case, Staffwood will be dissolved upon completion of the
I 031 transaction.
Ex. B to the Complaint.
In response to Woody's offer, Stafford, through his attorneys, sent an
unconditional acceptance. Specifically, in the January 30 Letter, Stafford's attorneys
stated: "Please be advised that Stafford is willing to divide the remaining Staffwood
property consistent with the terms outlined in your letter dated January 13, 2014, and
Stafford has decided to choose Property Set B." Ex. D to the Complaint. At this point,
there was a clear offer and acceptance of the Division of Staffwood Properties
Agreement, which is "complete, definite and certain in ali its material terms, or contains
provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." See General

9

Woody later used his proposal in this paragraph regarding the tax treatment of the transaction as the basis for
refusing to close on the real estate transactions in the Agreements. See Facts ,r,r 29-30, 36. However, the plain
language within the four corners of the Agreements makes it clear that this was not an essential term and that the
Closing would occur regardless of the outcome of these discussions. See Exhibits Band C to the Complaint.
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Auto Parts

Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 979 P.2d 1

1215 (Idaho 1999). The terms

are clearly spelled out within the four corners of the relevant correspondence and are
unambiguous. Accordingly, "extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous
negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract
from the terms of the contract." See In re Universi1y Place/Idaho Water Center Project,
199 P.3d 102, 111 (Idaho 2008).
In addition to accepting Woody's offer to divide Staffwood's remaining properties,
Stafford's attorneys enclosed a draft Addendum to effect a closing pursuant to the parties' agreed
upon terms. Stafford's attorneys also noted that "[i]n the meantime, the parties will still need to
prepare and sign a third Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of the
terms are not covered by the enclosed Addendum." Id. The purpose of this was for convenience
to memorialize the terms of the parties' agreement in a formally executed document. This is
clear as the listed terms consist primarily of the terms set forth in the January 13 Letter. See id.
Stafford's attorneys also recognized that such a rnemorialization was not necessary as the
January 30 Letter concludes: "Please let me know as soon as possible if you have any suggested
changes to the enclosed Addendum, and whether you agree that the parties should prepare and

sign a third settlement agreement along the lines proposed herein." Id. (emphasis added).
Memorializing the parties' agreement in a formal settlement would have been useful, but was not
an element required for enforceability. See Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A., 867 P.2d
260, 266 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (holding that where the parties had reached a settlement
subsequent disputes over the

ma

agreement

even

proposed changes in terms do not affect the validity of the settlement agreement).
Based on the clear, undisputed communications between the parties' attorneys, the parties
are bound to the terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and the Division of Staffwood
Properties Agreement, because they contained all required material terms of the parties'
agreements and are thus enforceable. Further, when taken together, the Agreements effect a
global settlement agreement resolving all of the major issues between the parties.

III.

WOODY BREACHED THE AGREEMENTS.
When it is confirmed that the contracts were formed, the question of whether Woody

breached the Agreements is answered. There is no credible basis or factual assertion that can be
put forth that Woody performed his contractual obligations under the Agreements.
Aner the parties formed the Agreements, Woody subsequently refused to close unless the
entire transaction was structured as a tax-free dissolution. See Facts ,r,r 29-30, 36. Woody's
attempt to require this condition was contrary to the express written statements made in the
January 13 Letter and the February 6 Email, as discussed above. Id. Woody failed to complete
the required closing within the time set by the Agreements and continues to refuse to close on the
sale of the Bid Properties and/or on the distribution of Staffwood's remaining properties. See
generally Exs. E, F to the Complaint;

4, 5 to the Reply.

With the question of formation and Woody's breach established, Stafford is entitled to
specific performance. Under Idaho law, "[t]he remedy of specific performance may be invoked
where necessary to complete justice between the parties." Fazzio v. }./Jason, 249 P.3d 390, 396
2011). "Specific performance is an extraordinary remedy that provides
31

remedies are inadequate." Garner v. Bartschi, 80 P.3d l 031, 1036 (Idaho 2003).

decision

to grant specific performance is a matter within the district court's discretion." Kessler v.

Tortoise Dev., Inc., 1 P.3d 292,299 (Idaho 2000). "When making its decision the court must
balance the equities between the parties to determine whether specific performance is
appropriate." Id. ''It is generally presumed that in an action for breach of a real estate purchase
and sale agreement there is not an adequate remedy at law due to the perceived uniqueness of
land." Garner, 80 P.3d at 1036. The key and central element of both the Bid Properties
Purchase Agreement and Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement is the transfer of specific
real property to Stafford and Woody in accordance with the terms of the Agreements, and
Stafford does not have an adequate remedy at law because of the recognition of the uniqueness
of real property and he is entitled to purchase and receive title to the properties. Further, the
properties at issue in the Agreements must be transferred from Staffwood to Stafford and Woody
to effectuate a complete separation of the parties' jointly owned real property interests. Given
the parties' lengthy history and disputes, specific performance of the Agreements is the only
credible way to fully resolve the parties' disputes. The Court should grant Stafford the relief of
specific performance, compelling Woody to complete the closing on the Agreements as agreed.

IV.

THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE AGREEMENTS MOOTS THE PARTIES'
REMAINING CLAIMS, INCLUDING ALL CLAIMS ASSERTED IN THE
COUNTERCLAIM.
The principal claims in the Complaint are Stafford's claims for breach of the Agreements

by Woody. If the court proceeds to resolve these two claims in Stafford's favor and specific
is granted, Stafford's remaining alternative claims for breach of the implied
32

covenant

good faith and fair dealing and promissory estoppel will become moot, as they

constitute alternative means of seeking enforcement of the promises Woody made under the
Agreements.
Stafford and Smith Chevrolet also seek judgment on Woody's Counterclaim in its
entirety because the enforceability of the Agreements resolves and renders moot each of the
claims asserted in the Counterclaim. Woody has brought claims for (I) Declaratory JudgmentLack of Binding Settlement Agreement; (2) Declaratory Judgment - Outlet Center Property; (3)
Unjust Enrichment/Constructive Trust; (4) Declaratory Judgment
of Contract; (6) Declaratory Judgment

Marketable Title; (5) Breach

Stafford's Unilateral Actions on Behalf ofStaffwood;

(7) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; and (8) Mutual Mistake.
Nearly all of these claims are resolved and rendered moot by a determination that the Bid
Properties Purchase Agreement is an enforceable contract, since the claims in the Counterclaim
are primarily based on issues regarding the purchase of the Bid Properties, the ownership of the
Outlet Property, and Smith Chevrolet's right to pay off the Wells Fargo Bank loan and to
sublease the Outlet Property. Of course, all of these issues are resolved if the Court finds that the
Bid Properties Purchase Agreement is a valid and enforceable contract.
For example, half of Woody's claim for "Declaratory Judgment

Lack of Binding

Settlement Agreement" would be directly resolved by specific performance of the Bid Properties
Purchase Agreement. The remainder of this claim, of course, would be resolved by specific
performance of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement.
"Declaratory Judgment - Outlet

seeks a

that the Outlet Property is owned by Staffwood. This issue is rendered moot by enforcement of
the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement because Stafford has agreed to purchase the Outlet
Property and to pay Staffwood for it regardless of who actually owns this property.
Similarly, Woody's claim for "Unjust Enrichment/Constructive Trust" asserts that
Stafford and Smith Chevrolet were unjustly enriched by failing to deliver title to the Outlet
Property to Staffwood. Regardless of who actually owns the Outlet Property, under the Bid
Properties Purchase Agreement, Stafford purchases the Outlet Property from Staffwood and,
thereby resolves any dispute regarding its ownership, and Stafford and Smith Chevrolet have not
been unjustly enriched because they will have paid the agreed price to Staffwood for the three
Bid Properties.
In his claim for "Declaratory Judgment

Marketable Title," Woody seeks a declaration

that he is entitled to receive title free and clear of certain alleged "encumbrances" to the Bid
Properties. This issue is mooted by the enforcement of the patiies' agreement that Stafford is
entitled to purchase the Bid Properties instead of Woody.
Woody's claims for "Breach of Contract," 10 "Declaratory Judgment

Stafford's

Unilateral Actions on Behalf of Staffwood," and "Breach of Fiduciary Duty" are premised on the
allegations of wrongdoing set forth in the Counterclaim. The general allegations in the
Counterclaim are: (1) issues regarding marketable title, which is mooted by the Bid Properties
Purchase Agreement, as stated above; (2) Smith Chevrolet leasing the Outlet Property to Teton
Volkswagen, which is also mooted by Stafford's purchase of the Outlet Property; (3) Stafford
This claim is truly a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Counterclaim ,r
86.
10

off the loan owed to Wells Fargo Bank, which is mooted because this was how the
proceeds of the sale under the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement were to be applied; and (4)
that "Stafford has caused other actions such as the preparation of tax returns to be taken on
behalf of Staffwood without the knowledge, consent or approval of Woody" in a way which is to
the detriment of Woody, which are conclusory allegations and, in any event, are covered by the
release under the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement, as discussed below.
Finally, Woody's claim for "Mutual Mistake" is premised on the alleged uncertainty
regarding the ownership of the Outlet Property, which uncertainty is, of course, resolved by
Stafford's purchase of the Outlet Property.
To the extent that Woody has any remaining claims that are not directly resolved by the
Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, any such claims are minor and tangential in nature and are
specifically resolved and/or mooted by the determination of the enforceability of the Division of
Staffwood Properties Agreement. That agreement states:
The parties agree that upon Closing, all debts, claims or obligations (a) owing to
Staffwood from themselves or their respective entities, (b) owing to them from
Staffwood, and (c) owing to each other (except for (i) continuing obligations of
Stafford pursuant to Section 3 .3 of the November 10, 2010 Settlement Agreement,
and (ii) continuing obligations of the parties pertaining to the windup of SV Idaho
pursuant to Section 4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement), if any, shall be
released and settled by this Agreement.
Ex. B (emphasis added). Once specific performance of the Division of Staffwood Properties
Agreement is ordered and closing occurs, all of Woody's claims will be fully resolved and
settled in accordance with the express terms of the above-referenced release and settlement.
Accordingly, all

Woody's claims are mooted by the validity and enforceability of the
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the Court can fully resolve all claims in this matter by determining

the

Agreements constitute valid and enforceable settlement agreements between the parties.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Stafford and Smith Chevrolet respectfully request that their
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings be granted and that the Court render judgment in
Stafford's favor on his claims for breach of contract and in Stafford and Smith Chevrolet's favor
on all of Woody's claims.
DA TED this 19th day of May, 2014.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Kara L. Pettit
Michael R. Carlston

PRESTON & SCOTT

By~---·-,<!,
Stanley J. P ton
Attorneys for P aintiff!Counterdefendant Stafford L.
Smith and Third-Party Defendant Smith Chevrolet
Co., Inc.
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Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiftlcounterclaim
defendant Stafford L. Smith ("Stafford") respectfully submits this memorandum in opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment
("Defendant's Motion" or "Def.' s Mot.") filed by defendant/counterclaimant/third-party plaintiff
Woodruff D. Smith ("Woody").

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's Motion asserts that Stafford fails to state any actionable claims in his
Amended Complaint (the "Complaint") based on the grounds that the written correspondence
attached to the Complaint did not form any enforceable contracts. As the Court is aware,
Stafford and Third-Party Defendant Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc. ("Smith Chevrolet") have filed a
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Plaintiffs Motion" or "Pl.'s Mot."), which asserts that,
based on the pleadings and under Idaho law, the correspondence between the parties formed two
valid and enforceable contracts that the Court should now enforce as a matter of law. As a result,
the parties agree that this issue is ripe for the Court's decision. Plaintiffs Motion is supported by
a memorandum ("Plaintiffs Memorandum" or "Pl.' s Mem.") that sets forth the facts, legal
arguments and analysis regarding the enforceability of the two relevant settlement agreements,
specifically, the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and the Division of Staffwood Properties
Agreement (collectively the "Agreements."). 1 For purposes of opposing Defendant's Motion,

1

Here, Stafford uses the same defined terms to identify the two relevant contracts that Stafford used in
the Complaint and Plaintiffs Memorandum. The first agreement is the "Bid Properties Purchase
Agreement," wherein the parties agreed that Stafford would purchase three parcels of real property from
Staffwood Partnerships, an Idaho general partnership ("Staffwood"), owned 50/50 by Stafford and
Woody, namely: (I) the building and related real property occupied by Smith Chevrolet (the "Smith
Chevrolet Property");
the building and related real property occupied by Stafford's RV dealership (the
2

Stafford hereby incorporates Plaintiffs Memorandum in its entirety by this reference.
Defendant's Motion fails because the Agreements are valid and enforceable contracts.
This lawsuit is based on disputes that arose in late 2013 when, after Woody had made the final,
successful bid for the Bid Properties, he then refused to close on his purchase of the Bid
Properties unless Stafford and Smith Chevrolet satisfied certain extraneous and unreasonable
demands that Stafford and Smith Chevrolet had no legal obligation to perform. To resolve this
dispute, Stafford made a settlement offer to purchase the Bid Properties himself based on the
specific terms set forth in a letter from his attorneys dated December 20, 2013.
In response to Stafford's settlement offer, Woody's attorneys sent a letter dated January
13, 2014, wherein Woody unconditionally accepted the terms of Stafford's offer, thereby
creating a binding and enforceable settlement agreement (the "Bid Properties Purchase
Agreement") that resolved all disputes regarding the purchase of the Bid Properties.
Woody's January 13, 2014 letter also made a separate offer to divide Staffwood's
remaining real property between Stafford and Woody. In the letter from Stafford's attorneys
dated January 30, 2014, Stafford accepted Woody's offer regarding the division of Staffwood' s
remaining prope1iies. As a result, Stafford's unconditional acceptance of Woody's offer created
a binding and enforceable agreement regarding the division of Staffwood's remaining properties
(the "Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement").

"RV Prope1iy"); and (3) the building and related real propeiiy known as the Outlet Property (the "Outlet
Property"), which, at the time the bid process was initiated, the parties believed was owned
Staffwood
( collectively the "Bid Properties"). The second agreement is the Division of Staffwood Properties
Agreement, wherein the
to divide up Staffwood's remaining real estate. See Pl.'s Mem. at
3-5.

3

In support

Defendant's Motion, Woody attempts to rely on the parties'

communications after the formation of the Agreements to show that the parties did not form
enforceable contracts. However, the plain language of the Agreements is complete and
unambiguous and, therefore, the introduction of extrinsic evidence to modify or alter the
Agreements must be excluded as a matter of law. Further, Woody quotes from and attempts to
rely upon an email dated February 5, 2014 that is not attached to the Complaint, any other
pleadings, or Defendant's Motion. Even though this email does not support Woody's position or
establish that the Agreements were not formed, it cannot be considered even as extrinsic
evidence because this email is not properly before the Court as admissible evidence.
Woody attempts to frame the Agreements as individual pieces of a future global
settlement of the parties' disputes. The plain language of the Agreements contradicts Woody's
position. Woody's unconditional acceptance of Stafford's offer and Woody's subsequent offer
that Stafford accepted establish, by the plain language in the relevant correspondence, that the
Agreements were intended to be independently enforceable. The Agreements are complete on
their face as to all the material terms of the parties' agreements and are enforceable under Idaho
law. Further, Woody's January 13, 2014 letter set a closing date of 30 days from the date of that
letter. If Woody was truly waiting for a final, global settlement, the closing date certainly would
have been based off the alleged final agreement rather than a letter that allegedly only negotiated
a piece of a global settlement agreement.
The terms of the Agreements also show that the parties had a meeting of the minds on all
of the material terms necessary to enforce the Agreements. Woody was
4

careful

his

unconditional acceptance and subsequent offer to ensure that his January 13, 2014

would

not be treated as a counteroffer. He set forth his understanding of the terms he agreed to and
Stafford acknowledged Woody's acceptance of the terms. Accordingly, these clarifications
strengthen the Agreements as they show the parties had a common understanding. Similarly,
Stafford's draft addendum to the escrow instructions was not a counteroffer. Stafford accepted
Woody's offer to divide Staffwood's remaining real property and the draft addendum was
consistent with the terms of the Agreements, and the draft addendum merely set forth a
mechanism by which the parties could go forward and close on the real estate transactions
required by, and in accordance with the terms ot: the Agreements.
Finally, Woody argues that the doctrine of mutual mistake prevents enforcement of the
Bid Properties Purchase Agreement because of a mistake regarding the ownership of the Outlet
Property. The uncertainty regarding ownership of the Outlet Property was a piece of the parties'
dispute leading up to the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement. Both parties were aware of this
uncertainty when Stafford made his offer to purchase the Bid Properties and, therefore, this
known uncertainty, under Idaho law, cannot form the basis for rescission based on mutual
mistake. Further, the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement resolved any issue regarding the
ownership

Outlet Property, as well as any misunderstanding regarding said ownership,

because the parties agreed that Stafford would purchase the Bid Properties, including the Outlet
Property, from Staffwood regardless of who actually owned the Outlet Prope1iy.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In

Memorandum, Stafford sets forth the background

5

context

disputes and settlement negotiations, as well as the undisputed material facts that
establish the validity and enforceability of the Agreements. As stated above, these facts are
incorporated herein.
Early on in Woody's narrative of the facts of this case, Woody has highlighted the issues
that gave rise to the events underlying this lawsuit by stating:
These disputes related to the business interests that the parties shared, and
included issues about the bidding process to purchase three properties owned by
Staffwood, the general partnership that is co-owned between the parties, and
division of other prope11ies owned by Staffwood.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Defendant's Memorandum" or "Def.'s Mem.") at 3-4. Woody also identifies the
two sub-issues to the disputes regarding the sale of the Bid Properties: the issues regarding the
ownership of the Outlet Property and "environmental concerns on real property leased from
Staffwood and operated by Stafford's dealership." Id. at 4. Woody's major arguments against
enforcing the Agreements are that the terms of these agreements were part of a larger settlement
of the parties' issues and that they did not represent agreement as to several material terms. See
generally id. at 13-19. However, as discussed more fully below and in Plaintiffs Memorandum,

the Agreements fully resolved each of the three main issues and two sub-issues that Woody
identified. Together, these individually enforceable agreements effected a global settlement of
the outstanding issues between the pai1ies.
A full explanation of the parties' correspondence is included in Plaintiffs Memorandum,
which incorporates documents attached to the Complaint and to Stafford's Reply to the
Counterclaim

Smith Chevrolet's Answer to Third-Party Complaint (the "Reply). To
6

establish the enforceability and terms of the Agreements, the Court only needs to consider the
letters that formed the Agreements. As set forth in more detail in Plaintiffs Memorandum,
these three letters may be summarized as follows:
1)

First, Stafford's attorneys sent a letter dated December 20, 2013

(the "December 20 Letter") wherein Stafford offered to purchase the Bid
Properties from Staffwood.
2)

Second, Woody's attorneys responded in a letter dated January 13,

2014 (the "January 13 Letter"), wherein Woody unconditionally accepted
Stafford's offer. In the January 13 Letter, Woody also made a separate offer for
the parties to divide up the remainder of Staffwood' s properties.
3)

Third, Stafford's attorneys responded in a letter dated January 30,

2014 (the "January 30 Letter"), wherein Stafford acknowledged Woody's
acceptance of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and unconditionally
accepted Woody's offer to divide Staffwood's real property.
These three documents set forth all of the material terms of the Agreements and are
complete and unambiguous on their face. All other correspondence is extrinsic evidence that
serves only as background information and confirms the parties' agreements. As extrinsic
evidence, these other communications cannot be used to change or negate the parties'
agreements.
A.

The December 20 Letter

Woody's explanation of the December

Letter inappropriately
7

text and quotes them out of context to suggest that the December 20 Letter could not have been
basis for a contract between the parties because, Woody argues, it was only intended to be a
piece of an overall settlement. For example, Woody states that "[t]he letter discussed Stafford's
potential purchase of certain properties from Staffwood, but stated that Woody had 'requested
that the proceeds from the sale not be distributed until the parties reach a settlement agreement.'"
Def.'s Mem. at 5. However, Woody fails to cite Stafford's actual proposal, which contradicts
and disposes of Woody's argument on this point:
Assuming the sale takes place as planned, it is proposed that the net proceeds
from this sale be distributed to the partners once an agreement is signed in writing
regarding Stafford's purchase of the subject bid properties, or, alternatively, that

these ftmds be distributed simultaneously with the closing of Stafford's purchase
of the bid properties.
Ex. A to Comp!. (emphasis added). This language makes it clear that Stafford intended the Bid
Properties Purchase Agreement to be an independent agreement. This proposal also recognized
that Woody might want to memorialize the terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement in a
formal writing or that the parties could reach an agreement by Woody's acceptance of Stafford's
terms without requiring a formal signed writing. Woody's unconditional acceptance of
Stafford's offer did not reference requiring a formal signed writing, so the parties' agreement
was not conditioned on being reduced to a formal signed writing.
Similarly, Woody incorrectly argues that "[t]he letter ~!so clarified that it did not outline
all of the terms for settlement between the parties: 'we will expect to promptly receive your

proposal for dividing Staffwood's remaining properties between the partners."' Defs. Mem. at
5.

out critical language of the letter and then
8

to use it to

that the

were only

to work towards a global settlement. Contrary to Woody's argument,

however, the full sentence reads: "Of course, once we reach an agreement on [Stafford's]

purchase of the bid properties, we will expect to promptly receive your proposal for dividing
Staffwood's remaining properties between the partners." Ex. A to Comp!. (emphasis added).
The express language cited above establishes that the parties were trying to fully resolve the
dispute regarding the Bid Properties before working on any separate agreements. As discussed
in Plaintiffs Memorandum, the most pressing issue for the parties was a resolution of the dispute
regarding the purchase of the Bid Properties, and it made sense to fully resolve and reach an
agreement to settle those issues as soon as possible to avoid Woody's threatened lawsuit.
B.

The January 13 Letter

The express language of the January 13 Letter contradicts the arguments Woody is now
asserting in Defendant's Motion. Specifically, the initial paragraphs of this letter make it clear
that Woody intended the January 13 Letter to serve as an unconditional acceptance of Stafford's
offer to purchase the Bid Properties, and a separate proposal of terms to fully separate Stafford
and Woody's interests by dividing up Staffwood's remaining real property:

Woody hereby accepts Stcifford 's offer as setforth in your letter of
December 20, 2013.
For purposes of certainty and clarification, we set forth below further
detail about our understanding of the terms of settlement. In paragraph no. 8
below, we propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way that this transaction
may be done on a tax free basis. Woody's accountants believe that by treating the
entire transaction as a distribution in dissolution of the parties' interests in
Staffwood, the parties can come out the same as agreed without incurring
negative tax consequences. This would seem to be beneficial to both parties, but
since this provision is outside of the terms ofStafford's offer, we make clear
we do not require Stafford's agreement to paragraph no. 8.
9

Also, as requested, we propose a division of the balance of the Staffwood
property, which we have set forth below. It does not matter to Woody which
election Stafford makes of these two Property Sets. We do not see how the
property can be divided any other way without resulting in joint or adjacent
ownership of any properties, which may cause conflict or irritation in the future.
Accordingly, the points of understanding are as follows:
Ex. B to Comp!. (emphasis added). The letter then sets forth Woody's understanding about the
terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and proposes new terms regarding the separate
agreement pursuant to which Staffwood's remaining real property would be divided between
Stafford and Woody, which offer was accepted by Stafford in the January 30 Letter, thereby
forming the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement.

C.

The January 30 Letter

As admitted by Woody, in the January 30 Letter, Stafford expressed that he was "pleased
that Woody has accepted Stafford's settlement offer based on the terms communicated in my
letter to you dated December 20, 2013." 2 Ex. D to Comp!. This acknowledgement of Woody's
acceptance of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement was followed by Stafford's acceptance of
Woody's separate offer to divide Staffwood's remaining real property, thereby forming the
Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement: "Please be advised that Stafford is willing to
divide the remaining Staffwood property consistent with the terms outlined in your letter dated
January 13, 2014, and Stafford has decided to choose Property Set B." Id. Woody has
acknowledged that this letter also included an attached "draft Addendum to the TitleOne Escrow

2

Woody inexplicably emphasized the phrase "settlement offer" as if it suppo1is Woody's position that the
parties were striving for a global settlement when a reading of the full sentence establishes that Stafford
was pleased that Woody accepted Stafford's ofter to purchase the Bid Properties
the Bid Properties
Purchase Agreement), which settled the pariics' disputes regarding the Bid Properties.
10

Instructions" to effect the closing of the real estate transactions required by the Agreements.
After summarizing these earlier points of the letter, Woody incorrectly argues that
Stafford "emphasized the need for a drafted and signed third Settlement Agreement and
explained that several material terms were up in the air." Def.'s Mem. at 8. These material
terms were not "up in the air," since they merely reflect the terms in the December 20 and the
3

January 13 Letters. As set forth in Plaintiffs Memorandum, memorializing the terms of the
Agreements in a formally executed document is not required for the enforceability of the
Agreements under Idaho law. The January 30 Letter also concludes by making it clear that a
formal signed writing was not necessary for enforceability of the Agreements: "Please let me
know as soon as possible if you have any suggested changes to the enclosed Addendum, and

whether you agree that the parties should prepare and sign a third settlement agreement along
the lines proposed herein." Ex. D to Comp!. (emphasis added).

D.

The February 5 and 6, 2014 Emails

These two emails, and the other communications referenced in Defendant's Motion are
extrinsic evidence and cannot be used to contradict or vary the terms of the parties' agreements
as set forth within the four comers of the three letters discussed above.
In addition, Woody goes beyond the scope of the pleadings by including language from
an email dated February 5, 2014 that was never attached to the pleadings. The language Woody
cites from this email, which is not part of the record before the Court, is as follows:
Unfortunately, prior history indicates that when trying to finalize agreements
between these parties, the 'devil is in the details.' We have yet to receive a
Further, if any differences

they are not material to the Agreements.

1

response we sent to you last Thursday so we don't know at this stage how close
we are to an agreement. In light of Mike [Spence)' s email to me last Thursday
that 'there will, indeed, be a material issue or two,' (that he is cautiously
optimistic will be worked out), we do not think it is advisable to release the
escrow funds at this time.
Def.'s Mem. at 8-9.

4

The email containing this language is not attached to the Complaint and as

discussed below, is not properly before the Court in any form as it is not attached to the
pleadings or to Defendant's Motion. Regardless, even if the Court does not exclude this email
from consideration entirely, it is extrinsic evidence and cannot vary the terms of the parties'
agreements. Further, when taken in context, the "details" referenced in this email simply refer to
non-material issues addressed in the Addendum to the TitleOne Escrow Instructions, and the
question raised in this email is how close the parties are to reaching an agreement as to the form
of the draft closing addendum. 5
Woody also cites the email from his counsel dated February 6, 2014 (the "February 6
Email") as evidence that the parties had not reached an agreement at this point. This email is
self-serving and, as mentioned above, is extrinsic evidence that cannot contradict or vary the
terms of the Agreements. The February 6 Email does, however, demonstrate that Woody was
4

The manner in which Woody cited this quote is troubling because the quote appears in Defendant's
Memorandum following a reference to the February 5 Email and the paragraph that contains this language
concludes with the following statement and citation: "[h]is e-mail further clarifies that no final agreement
had been reached between the parties when he asks: '[w]hen do you anticipate getting back to us on our
proposal[?]' [citing Ex. C to Comp!.]." Def.'s Mem. at 9. This is a mischaracterization of what the email
states and, while Woody does not use any citation when referring to the quoted language itself, the prior
citation to Exhibit C to the Complaint is misleading because it suggests that this language was referenced
and attached to the Complaint when, in fact, it was not.
5
Stafford knew, from past experience, that until the property was actually transferred, he could not rely
on Woody's complying with his contractual obligations. Thus, Stafford did not want to release Woody's
escrow funds until the transaction closed as proposed in the December 20 Letter, the terms of which
Woody accepted. Woody's subsequent backtracking on his obligations and his refusal to close as agreed
is sufficient evidence that Stafford's mistrust of Woody was merited.
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backtracking and trying to make new demands on Stafford that were not part of the Agreements.

See Ex. C to Comp!. For example, Woody wanted Stafford to immediately return his escrowed
money when the parties had previously agreed that these funds were to be returned at the closing
on the real estate transactions required by the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement. 6 See id.
E.

February 20, 2014 Email

Woody attempts to use Stafford's email dated February 20, 2014 (the "February 20
Email") to show that Stafford never addressed his concerns or the "myriad outstanding issues
outlined in the February 6 email." See Def.'s Mem. at 10. These alleged "outstanding issues,"
however, were contrived to enable Woody to back out of, or renegotiate, the Agreements. For
example, in an email from Woody's attorneys dated February 12, 2014 (the "February 12
Email"), Woody demanded that the parties treat the sale of the Bid Properties as a tax-free
dissolution. See Ex. 4 to Reply. This position was contrary to the Agreements and Woody's
express acknowledgments and statements in the January 13 Letter and the February 6 Email. See
Exs. B, C to Comp!. Pursuant to the Agreements, a closing was to take place by February 12,
2014, and Woody breached his obligation to close on that date. See Ex. B to Com pl. Thus, the
February 20 Email pointed out Woody's breach of the Agreements, expressed frustration and
disappointment at Woody's delay, and demanded that Woody close on February 25, 2014.
to Comp!.

6

In any event, the
of the return of the funds was not material to the Agreements. The parties
agreed that the escrowed funds would be returned to Woody. At the iatest the escrowed funds would
have been returned at closing, which was to be at most 30 days from the January 13 Letter, if not sooner.
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F.

The March 3, 2014 Letter

Woody's chief argument regarding the letter dated March 3, 2014 (the "March 3 Letter")
is that Stafford's counsel refers to the Agreements as a "settlement agreement." Def.'s Mem. at
10. This distinction is trivial because the Agreements, both individually valid and enforceable,
did settle all the disputes between the parties. Regardless, the facts establish that there were two
separate agreements. First, Stafford offered to purchase the Bid Properties in the December 20
Letter, which offer Woody accepted in the January 13 Letter. This agreement stands alone and
separate from the second agreement. Second, in the January 13 Letter, Woody made an offer to
divide Staffwood's remaining real property, which offer Stafford accepted in the January 30
Letter. The unambiguous language in these letters evidences a meeting of the minds on the
material issues needed to enforce both of these contracts separately.

ARGUMENT
As evidenced by Defendant's and Plaintiff's respective Motions, Woody and Stafford
agree that the key question to be decided by the Court is whether the relevant correspondence
formed valid and enforceable settlement agreements. Def.'s Mem. at 2. Therefore, the parties
agree that this issue is ripe for the Court's decision.

I.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION RELIES ON EVIDENCE OUTSIDE THE
COMPLAINT.
Rule l 2(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shail be
treated as one
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
14

all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

In Defendant's Motion, Woody attempts to rely on '·matters outside the pleadings," by
citing language from an email dated February 5, 2014 that is not only completely outside the
pleadings, but Woody's citation to this language is also misleading, all as discussed above. This
email is neither referenced by nor attached to the Complaint or any of the pleadings before the
Court. In fact, Woody did not even attach a copy of this email to Defendant's Motion. Since
this email is neither before the Court nor part of the record that can be relied on by the Court, it
should be "excluded by the court." 7 See Idaho R. Civ. P I2(b ); see also id. at 56( c) (requiring
the Court to render summary judgment based on the "pleadings, depositions, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any" (emphasis added)). Accordingly, reference to this email
should be ignored by the Court entirely. 8 If Woody really intended for the Court to rely on this
email as evidence, he had the obligation to include it in his initial motion and memorandum.
Moreover, he cannot now attach it to his reply memorandum. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c)
(requiring that additional evidence be provided by the moving party in the initial motion and
memoranda).
Woody has apparently recognized that Defendant's Motion attempts to rely on material
7

Obviously, a court cannot rely on matters outside the pleadings for purposes of converting a motion to
dismiss into a summary judgment motion if the evidence is not properly before the court. Pursuant to
Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the evidence relied on for purposes of a summary
judgment motion must actually be presented to the court by means of evidence that is based on admissible
documents or testimony. A party cannot simply quote from a document that is not even before the court,
or that is not part of the record. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).
8
Additionally, as discussed in more detail below, this email is extrinsic evidence that cannot be used to
vary the terms of the Agreements, the terms of which arc unambiguous and, therefore, the Court's
determination of the validity of the Agreements is limited to the four corners of the documents that
comprise the Agreements. See State v. Gomez, 281 P.3d 90, 94 (Idaho 2012).
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outside of the pleadings as he has titled it as "Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for
Summary Judgment." See generally Def.'s Mot. However, the only evidence Woody has
presented outside of the pleadings is the above-referenced email dated February 5, 2014, which
is not properly before the Court. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is properly styled a motion to
dismiss and it should not be converted to a summary judgment motion. 9
Of course, in resolving a Motion to Dismiss, the Comi views "all facts and inferences
from the record in favor of the non-moving party." Losser v. Bradstreet, 183 P.3d 758, 760-61.
Based on this standard, each of the claims in the Complaint state a claim upon relief may be
granted. Each claim alleges the appropriate elements of the claim in question based upon
allegations that if true establish the claim. Defendant's Motion is not based on assertions that the
pleadings of the claim are insufficient, in fact this argument is never even raised; rather, Woody
is arguing that the correspondence in question does not form a valid and enforceable contract.

II.

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE CANNOT BE USED TO VARY THE AGREEMENTS .
As set forth in Plaintiff's Memorandum, the plain language of the Agreements is

complete and unambiguous as to all of the material terms necessary to enforce the Agreements.

See Pl.'s Mem. at 20-31. Accordingly, "extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous
negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add
9

or detract from

In reality, Defendant's Motion is a motion for judgment on the pleadings because Woody's arguments
focus on the merits of Stafford's claims rather than any insufficiency in pleading.· Woody actually seeks
a final resolution of Stafford's claims on the merits, based primarily on the pleadings. Accordingly, the
parties agree that the Court may decide as a matter oflaw, and based on the basis of the parties'
communications attached to the Complaint, whether the Agreements are valid and enforceable contracts.
See lntennountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 31 P.3d 921,923 (Idaho 2001) ("Where
the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues and theories,
the parties effectively stipulate that there is no genuine issue of material fact that would preciude the
district court from
summary judgment.").
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terms of the contract." See In re University Place/Idaho Water Center Project, 199 P.3d l
111 (Idaho 2008). Woody has sought to rely on the language of the parties' subsequent
communications to argue that the parties never reached an agreement. While Stafford has
addressed these arguments above and shown how these subsequent communications are
consistent with the Agreements, since they are extrinsic evidence they are irrelevant to the
interpretation of the Agreements.
Further, any communications by Woody's attorneys after the parties' formed the
Agreements are self-serving. After the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement was formed in
accordance with Stafford's offer in the December 20 Letter, and Woody's unconditional
acceptance of that offer in the January 13 Letter, Woody attempted to change the agreed terms
by insisting that Stafford's purchase of the Bid Properties be treated as a tax-free dissolution.

See Ex. 4 to Reply. This abrupt change in position contradicts the express language of Woody's
January 13 Letter and February 6 Email. Apparently, Woody began to regret his bargain, but his
self-serving demand cannot undo the Agreements. Of course, "[ c]ourts cannot revise the
contract in order to change or make a better agreement for the parties." Page v. Pasquali, 244
P.3d 1236, 1239 (Idaho 20 I 0).

III.

THE PARTIES FORMED ENFORCEABLE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS.
As discussed above and in Plaintiff's Memorandum, the December 20 Letter set forth the

terms of Stafford's offer to purchase the Bid Properties from Staffwood. In the January 13 Letter
Woody unconditionally accepted Stafford's offer. fn this letter, Woody also made a separate
offer regarding the

Staffwood's remaining
17

property and gave Stafford

of which property set to choose. In the January 30 Letter, Stafford acknowledged Woody's
acceptance of Stafford's offer to purchase the Bid Properties and accepted Woody's proposal for
division of Staffwood's remaining real property. As a result, the Agreements are complete and
show that the parties reached a meeting of the minds on all of the material terms necessary to
enforce the Agreements. Under Idaho law, this is sufficient to form an enforceable contract.
A.

The Bid Properties Purchase Agreement Is An Independently Enforceable
Agreement.

Woody seeks to frame the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement as "simply part of a broad
contemplated settlement agreement." Def.'s Mem. at 13. This position is contradicted by the
plain language of the three letters that constitute the Agreements.
The December 20 Letter is clearly written as an offer (and was perceived as such based
on Woody's acceptance of the offer) and only covers terms relevant to Stafford's purchase of the
Bid Properties from Staffwood. See Ex. A to Comp!. It is illogical, and contrary to the parties'
communications, to suppose that the parties intended to effect only a global settlement by
negotiating an agreement piecemeal. What would be the point of reaching an agreement on a
subset of the parties' issues and then moving on to another subset, knowing that the first subset
was still open to further negotiation.
In addition, the December 20 Letter grew out of the parties' discussions regarding the
sale of the Bid Properties to Woody. It is important to remember the context in which Stafford
made this offer. Woody was refusing to close on his purchase of the Bid Properties unless
Stafford and Staffwood agreed to certain demands made by Woody, which Stafford believed
were unreasonable and without merit. Woody threatened to file a lawsuit unless his demands
18

were satisfied in a matter of days. See Pl.' s Mem. at l; Ex. 2 to Reply. To resolve the urgent
issues regarding the sale of the Bid Properties and avoid a lawsuit, Stafford made his offer to
purchase the Bid Properties. The resulting Bid Properties Purchase Agreement resolved the
parties' most-urgent issue and once there was an agreement on this issue, Woody then made an
offer regarding the division of Staffwood's remaining real property, which resulted in the
formation of the Division of Staffwood Prope1iies Agreement.
Further, as discussed in Plaintiff's Memorandum, the parties did not need to sign a formal
settlement agreement to make the Agreements enforceable. See PI.' s Mem. at 30-31. The plain
language of the Agreements shows that the parties agreed to all of the material terms necessary
to enforce the Agreements and such enforcement was never made conditional on signing a
formal writing. In the January 13 Letter, Woody even set the date for the closing of the sale of
the Bid Properties to Stafford to be 30 days from the date of the January 13 Letter, wherein
Woody accepted the terms of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement. This date was also to be
used for the closing of the Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement after Stafford accepted
Woody's offer regarding this agreement, which Stafford did.
As discussed above, if Woody had intended to reserve a right to later negotiate the terms
of the Agreements, he should have made his acceptance and subsequent offer conditional on a
formal signed writing. Instead, the January 13 Letter states unconditionally that "Woody hereby
accepts Stafford's offer as set forth in your letter of December 20, 2013." Ex. B to Comp!. The
January 13 Letter further sets forth an additional proposal for dividing Staffwood's remaining
thereby completing

process that
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begun several years before to

Stafford and Woody's jointly owned businesses, partnerships and real property. See id. That
offer is likewise never conditioned on later memorializing the terms of the Division of Staffwood
Properties Agreement in a formal signed writing.
Under Idaho law, "a contract is enforceable if it is complete, definite and certain in all its
material terms, or contains provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to
certainty." General Auto Parts Co., Inc. v. Genuine Parts Co., 979 P.2d 1207, 1215 (Idaho
1999). The Agreements are individually complete, definite and certain in all their material
terms, as discussed in detail in Plaintiff's Memorandum. Accordingly, they are independent,
enforceable contracts on their face. Since the Agreements are complete and definite within the
four corners of the documents, Woody cannot now rely on or use extrinsic evidence to vary or
contradict the terms of the Agreements, including his attempt to require a formal signed writing
to enforce the Agreements.
B.

The Additional Terms Proposed by Woody Were a Separate Proposal, not a
Counteroffer.

As discussed in Plaintiff's Memorandum, the additional terms proposed by Woody in the
January 13 Letter were a separate proposal to further separate the parties' interests, and the
unambiguous and express language used in this letter was carefully worded to make it clear that
Woody was not making a counteroffer to Stafford's offer. See Pl.'s Mem. at 23. Woody made it
clear that he unconditionally accepted Stafford's offer to purchase the Bid Properties. He also
stated that the fu1iher detail set forth in the January l 3 Letter was "[f]or purposes of certainty and
clarification" and, therefore, a counteroffer. Ex. B to Comp!. Woody also referred to these
clarifications as "points of understanding." Id. The three points of understanding relating to the

Bid Properties Purchase Agreement were consistent with the terms of Stafford's offer, which
Stafford acknowledged in the January 30 Letter by acknowledging Woody's acceptance of the
offer. Ex. D to Comp!. Rather than constituting a counteroffer, as Woody now argues, these
points of clarification demonstrate that the parties truly had a meeting of the minds on the terms
of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement. Additionally, Woody was very careful to indicate
that the sole term that could change the parties' agreement, which was his proposal to consider
structuring the sale as a tax-free dissolution, was "outside of the terms of Stafford's offer" and
that Woody did "not require Stafford's agreement to paragraph no. 8." 10 Ex. B to Comp!.
Woody was being extremely careful not to alter the terms of the Bid Properties Purchase
Agreement in apparent recognition that requiring Stafford's assent to any additional terms would
be a counteroffer and would give Stafford the opportunity to walk away from the deal.
Further, in the January 30 Letter, Stafford accepted Woody's offer to divide Staffwood's
remaining real property and elected property set B consistent with the terms of Woody's offer.
Ex. D to Compl. The January 30 Letter also included "a draft Addendum to the TitleOne Escrow
Instructions to effect a Closing," consistent with the parties' agreements. This was an express
recognition that the parties had reached agreement on all material terms of the Agreements and
accordingly, the parties could now proceed to close on the required real property transactions.
There was no further need to negotiate and the Agreements were complete and capable of being
fulfilled at that time if Woody had met his contractual obligations thereunder.

10

After negotiating the Agreements, Woody subsequently refused to close unless the entire transaction
was structured as a tax free agreement. See Pl.'s Mem. at 3 J. Woody's attempt to require this condition
was contrary to both the January 13 Letter and the February 6 Email. See Exs. B, C to Compl.
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C.

The Doctrine of Mutual Mistake is Inapplicable Because the Uncertainty
\Vas Known By the Parties.

Woody asserts that even if the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement formed, it would not
be enforceable because "there was a mutual mistake between the parties about the ownership of
the Outlet Property." Def.'s Mem. at 17. This argument is without merit because the parties
were fully aware of the uncertainty regarding the ownership of the Outlet Property. Where a
party is aware of uncertainty regarding a fact when entering an agreement, he may not later rely
on the doctrine of mutual mistake to undo his agreement. Sec, e.g., Gielow v. Napiorkowski, 673
N.W.2d 351,358 (Wis. 2003) ("If there was conscious doubt or uncertainty on the part of the
parties as to the existence or nonexistence of a fact or situation, and the parties reached an
agreement under such circumstances, it is considered that it was their intention and
contemplation to accept and compromise the consequences of the doubt and uncertainty, and
they would not then be acting under mutual mistake of fact."); Bentley v. Slavik, 663 F. Supp.
736, 741 (S.D. Ill. 1987) ("The party that was aware of the uncertainty prior to the contract may
not assert mutual mistake of fact." (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154 cmt. c)).
The uncertainty regarding the ownership of the Outlet Property was one of the issues that
began this dispute between the parties. See Def.' s Mem. at 4. Both parties were fully aware of
this uncertainty. The parties entered the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement precisely to resolve
any issues or disputes over the ownership of the Outlet Property, along with other disputes
regarding alleged environmental issues and marketable title to the Bid Properties. Stafford
agreed to purchase the Bid Properties, including the Outlet Property, from Staffwood regardless
of who actually owned the Outlet Property. Thus, the uncertainty of the Outlet Property's true

ownership was

accounted for and resolved by the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement.

Regardless, this known uncertainty could not be the basis for rescission based on the doctrine of
mutual mistake.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Stafford respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendant's
Motion in its entirety.
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Pursuant to

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaintiff and

Third-Party Plaintiff Woodruff D. Smith ("Woody"), by and through counsel, respectfully
submits this Opposition to Stafford Smith and Smith Chevrolet's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.

INTRODUCTION
At its core, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is another attempt by Stafford
Smith ("Stafford") to paint the parties' continued, back-and-forth negotiations as somehow
forming two discrete, enforceable contracts. The problem for Stafford is that the very
communications on which he relies, and other communications from his own counsel, establish
that (1) the parties were negotiating towards an all-encompassing settlement agreement, (2) the
parties never reached such an agreement, and (3) negotiations about the Bid Properties and
remaining Staffwood properties were simply pieces of that larger puzzle, which never resulted in
an enforceable contract. Stafford's counsel said it best in an email he wrote on February 5, 2014:

"prior history indicates that when trying to finalize agreements between these parties, the
'devil is in the details."' (Attached as Ex. 1. (emphasis added). That email, which came after
the point in time in which Stafford contends the contracts were formed, puts to rest any notion
that the parties had entered enforceable agreements: "[w]e have yet to receive a response to the
proposal we sent you last Thursday so we don't know at this stage how close we are to an

agreement." (Id. (emphasis added).) Stafford's counsel's email reflects what every experienced
lawyer knows: settlement discussions can and do fall apart at any time, even over seemingly
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issues. This statement reflects a truism that there is no agreement on any single term until

all

the material issues are resolved.
Despite this earlier admission, Stafford now attempts to cherry-pick select excerpts from

the communications between the parties to bolster his claims, but his efforts are unavailing. The
parties simply did not form an enforceable contract and Stafford's Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings should accordingly be denied.

BACKGROUND
This action is about a failed attempt by Stafford and Woody to settle a prolonged dispute
for the third and what was hoped to be, final time. The parties are brothers who have had various
business relationships over the years. (Am. Compl. 116 & 8.) Disputes arose between the
parties about the management and ownership interests in certain businesses. These disputes
came to a head in approximately 2010. (Id.

1 8.)

The parties asserted legal claims against one

another and later entered a Settlement Agreement dated effective as of November 10, 2010 (the
"2010 Settlement Agreement".). (Id.

118-9.)

The 2010 Settlement Agreement divided various

car dealerships and other businesses between the parties and included a mutual release of all
claims. (Id.

19.)

But after the closing of the 2010 Settlement Agreement in February 2011,

another lawsuit was filed and it became apparent that the parties still had disputes over several
issues both related to the 2010 Settlement Agreement and otherwise. (Id.

11 11-13.)

Effective as of July 5, 2012, the parties entered a second settlement agreement (the "2012
Settlement Agreement."). (Id. 114.) This second settlement agreement purported to settle all
-·-,.. .,~ and disputes between the parties and their various business entities and also included a
3

mutual release of claims. (Id. ,i,r 14-15.) The lawsuit was also dismissed with prejudice in light
of the 2012 Settlement Agreement. (Id.

i! 15.)

But like the 20 IO Settlement Agreement, the

2012 Settlement Agreement was not the end of the story.
Disputes arose between the parties again in 2013. (Id. ,i 26.) These disputes related to
the business interests that the parties shared, and included issues about the bidding process to
purchase three properties owned by Staffwood, the general partnership that is co-owned between
the parties, and division of other properties owned by Staffwood. (Id.

,rir 4 , 20-19.)

One of the

three properties that Woody won the right to purchase was known as the Outlet Property, but an
issue arose as to whether that property was even owned by Staffwood. 1 (Id.

ir 27.)

Other issues

came to light such as environmental concerns on real property leased from Staffwood and
operated by Stafford's dealership, third-party defendant Smith Chevrolet Co, Inc.
Several communications between the parties and their counsel are relevant to the current
lawsuit. Those communications include at least the following: (1) a December 20, 2013 letter
from Stafford's counsel to Woody's counsel (the "December 20 letter"); (2) a January 13, 2014
letter from Woody's counsel to Stafford's counsel (the "January 13 letter"); (3) a January 30,
2014 letter from Stafford's counsel to Woody's counsel (the "January 30 letter"); (4) emails
between Stafford's counsel and Woody's counsel on February 5 and 6, 2014 (the "February 5
a.m. email," "February 5 p.m. email" and "February 6 email"); (5) a February 20, 2014 email
from Stafford's counsel to Woody's counsel (the "February 20 email"); and (6) a March 3, 2014

1

Stafford contends that the Outlet Property is owned
Property to be leased to a third-party.

Smith Chevrolet and in

4

20 l 4 he caused the Outlet

from Stafford's counsel to Woody's counsel (the "March 3 letter"). These communications
clear that, instead of forming two discrete contracts about the purchase and division of
properties, the parties were working to resolve their disputes through an all-encompassing
settlement agreement that was never reached. This memorandum describes each communication
in turn.

A.

The December 20, 2013 Letter

Stafford's counsel wrote a letter to Defendant's counsel on December 20, 2013, which
was incorporated into the Amended Complaint and attached thereto as Exhibit A. The first line
of that letter suggested that it was part of an on-going correspondence aimed at settlement. It
thanked Woody's counsel for their "letter yesterday and settlement proposal." (Id) The letter
discussed Stafford's potential purchase of certain properties from Staffwood, but stated that
Woody had "requested that the proceeds from the sale not be distributed until the parties reach a
settlement agreement." (Id) The letter also clarified that it did not outline all of the terms for
settlement between the parties: "we will expect to promptly receive your proposal for dividing
Staffwood's remaining properties between the partners." (Id (emphasis added).)

B.

The January 13, 2014 Letter

Woody's counsel responded to Stafford's counsel in a letter dated January 13, 2014,
which was incorporated into the Amended Complaint and attached thereto as Exhibit B. The
second line of that letter suggested that the December 20 letter was not sufficiently specific to
constitute a valid offer to contract: "For purposes of certainty and clarification, we set forth

detail about our understanding of the terms of settlement
5

(Am.

B

9

added).) The January 13 letter also included proposals that were not part of the
December 20 letter. It stated, "we propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way this
transaction may be done on a tax free basis," and "[a]lso, as requested, we propose a division of
the balance of the Staffwood property, which we have set forth below." (Id) Moreover, the
letter suggested that any agreement would need further finalizing before it was valid: "Funds
escrowed by Woody in the bid process shall be returned upon finalizing this Agreement." (Id
(emphasis added).) The letter then outlined ten "points of understanding," most of which were
terms that had not appeared at all in the December 20 letter, including the following:
•

"The balance of the properties shall be divided into two sets of property/cash as
set forth below. Stafford shall have the choice to choose Property Set A or
Property Set B, and Woody shall receive the Property Set not elected by Stafford.
"

•

"Staffwood's approximately 7 acre plot west of the Snake River shall not be
divided, but shall be conveyed by Staffwood to the City of Idaho Falls in
connection with the Closing in order that each of the parties in their capacity of
partners of Staffwood may receive equal benefit of the write off."

•

"Conveyance of property in Property Sets A and B to the respective party shall
occur contemporaneously with the Closing. No such conveyance or transfer of
funds shall occur prior to Closing."

•

"The parties agree that upon Closing, all debts, claims or obligations (a) owing to
Staffwood from themselves or their respective entities, (b) owing to them from
Staffwood, and (c) owing to each other (except for (i) continuing obligations of
Stafford pursuant to Section 3.3 of the November I 0, 2010 Settlement Agreement,
and (ii) continuing obligations of the parties pertaining to the windup of SV Idaho
pursuant to Section 4 of the July 5, 2012 Settlement Agreement), if any, shall be
released and settled by this Agreement."

•

"In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the parties agree to
discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning ways by which
Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other divisions of cash and
6

9

property to the parties hereunder may be treated overall as an equal distribution of
Staffwood assets in liquidation of their ownership interests in Staffwood. If the
parties cannot agree prior to Closing, Closing of the bid properties and the
subsequent divisions shall take place exactly as set forth above."
•

Staffwood shall remain in existence after the Closing until the end of calendar
year 2014 in order that Staffwood may be used to complete a 1031 like-kind
exchange if desired, provided that nothing shall require any action which
increases the tax burden of the other party."

•

"Staffwood shall then be dissolved prior to the end of calendar year 2014, unless
it is being utilized for a 1031 like-kind exchange as described in paragraph no. 9
above; in which case, Staffwood will be dissolved upon completion of the 1031
transaction."

Thus, the January 13 letter contained at least 7 proposed material terms that had not been spelled
out in the December 20 letter and stated that any agreement would need finalizing.
C.

The January 30, 2014 Letter

Stafford's counsel responded to the January 13 letter in a letter dated January 30, 2014,
which is attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit D. The first line of that letter stated that
"Stafford is pleased that Woody has accepted Stafford's settlement offer based on the terms
communicated in my letter to you dated December 20, 2013." (Am. Compl. Ex. D (emphasis
added).) The letter enclosed "a draft Addendum to the TitleOne Escrow Instructions to effect a
Closing regarding Stafford's purchase of the properties subject to the bid process, as well as the
transfer of Property Set A to Woody and Property Set B to Stafford." (Id.) The letter also stated
that Stafford had not yet decided on Woody's proposal of structuring the transfer of Staffwood
properties as a liquidation and that "Stafford anticipates that he will be provide[ d] a description

7
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two options

the near future and

let Woody choose which way

wants to

proceed." (Id.)
The letter also emphasized the need for a drafted and signed third Settlement Agreement
and explained that several material tem1s were up in the air: "In the meantime, the parties will

still need to prepare and sign a third Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as
a number of the terms are not covered by the enclosed Addendum." (Id. (emphasis added).)

The letter outlined seven "issues" that would need to be addressed by a third Settlement
Agreement and then stated, "Please let me know as soon as possible if you have any suggested
changes to the enclosed Addendum, and whether you agree that the parties should prepare and
sign a third settlement agreement along the lines proposed herein." (Id.) Thus, the January 30
letter was clear in its call for a formalized, signed settlement agreement and in the need to
resolve several outstanding terms.

D.

The February 5 and 6, 2014 Emails

Stafford also made emails from early February a part of the Amended Complaint and
attached them thereto as Exhibit C. The first email was from Stafford's counsel to Woody's
counsel on February 5, 2014 ("February 5 a.m. email"). It attached "a spreadsheet showing the
financial breakdown of the closing [Stafford] ha[s] proposed." (Am. Compl. Ex. C.) On
February 5, 2014, Stafford's counsel sent an email to Woody's counsel. It attached "a
spreadsheet showing the financial breakdown of the closing [Stafford] ha[s] proposed." In
response to a request from Woody's CFO that the deposit be released, Stafford's counsel
on

stating, "Unfortunately, prior history indicates
8
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trying to finalize agreements between these parties, tile 'devil is

the details.' We have

yet to receive a response we sent to you last Thursday so we don't know at this stage how close
we are to an agreement. In light of Mike's email to me last Thursday that 'there will, indeed, be
a material issue or two,' (that he is cautiously optimistic will be worked out), we do not think it
is advisable to release the escrow funds at this time." His e-mail further clarifies that no final
agreement had been reached between the parties when he asks: "[w]hen do you anticipate getting
back to us on our proposal[?]" (Id (emphasis added).)
Stafford conspicuously omitted another email from February 5 from his Amended
Complaint and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Attached as Ex. 1.) That email (the
"February 5 p.m. email") was sent by Stafford's counsel after the other February 5 email
discussed above and described a request to allow Woody to withdraw an escrow deposit.
Stafford's counsel wrote, "[ u]nfortunatcly, prior history indicates that when trying to finalize
agreements between these parties, the 'devil is in the details."' (Id.) The email continued, "[w]c
have yet to receive a response to the proposal we sent you last Thursday so we don't know at this
stage how close we are to an agreement." (Id.)
Woody's counsel responded via email on February 6, 2014. That email stated that "it
seems we are very close to agreement," but clarified that any agreement was "subject to some
clarifications or decisions on the following list of issues." (Id) The email listed several such
"issues" that needed clarifying or resolution before closing, one of which was that Woody would
need to receive a"[ d]raft of an acceptable Settlement Agreement." (Id.)
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February 20, 2014 Email
On February 20, 2014, Stafford's counsel sent an email to Woody's counsel that is
incorporated into the Amended Complaint and attached thereto as Exhibit

The email

contended that the parties had "reached an agreement as to the terms for Stafford's purchase of
the bid properties and the distribution of other real property owned by Staffwood partnerships."
(Am. Compl. Ex. E.) The email transmitted certain attachments and stated, "[w]e believe these
attached documents reflect the terms of the parties' agreement." (Id.) The email did not,
however, provide a draft third Settlement Agreement as requested in the February 6 email and
January 30 letter, nor did it address with specificity the myriad outstanding issues outlined in the
February 6 email.

F.

The March 3, 2014 Letter

Stafford's counsel wrote Woody's counsel a letter dated March 3, 2014, which was
incorporated into the Amended Complaint and attached thereto as Exhibit F. Importantly, the
letter refers to the potential purchase of the bid properties and the division of other property as
part of a single settlement agreement: "it is the position of my client, Stafford Smith, that the
parties have entered into an enforceable settlement agreement regarding: (1) Stafford's
purchase of the bid properties for the sum of $2,800,000; and (2) the division of certain
remaining Staffwood properties, ... " (Am. Compl. Ex. F (emphasis added).) The letter also
referred to those terms of the expected settlement agreement as "two primary issues": "Stafford
has relied to his detriment on the fact that the parties have reached an agreement on these two
"

(emphasis added).) The letter
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that "[i]f

Closing does

not

place by March 6, then Stafford will have no other choice but to sue Woody to enforce

the parties' settlement agreement." (Id. (emphasis added).) It is notable that the March 3 letter
refers to a single "settlement agreement" between the two pmiies instead of the two distinct
agreements that are alleged in the Amended Complaint and that it refers to the subject matter of
those alleged agreements as "tvvo primary issues."
G.

The March 6, 2014 Letter

This letter from Woody's counsel, which is attached as Exhibit 2, responded to the March
3 letter from Stafford's counsel. This letter is a further illustration why the "devil is in the
details." Early on in the negotiations concerning the third settlement agreement, Stafford's
accountant had prepared an analysis of the dissolution of Staffwood, in which he made the
assumption that the capital accounts of the brothers in Staffwood would need to be equalized
upon dissolution, as a result of which Woody would have to come up with an additional
$252,419 in cash payable to Stafford. The point had never been explicitly raised in previous
correspondence, but was a matter of great consequence to Woody. The failure of two previous
settlement agreements suggested the need to be cautious and obtain clarification on all issues.
Consequently, Woody's counsel raises this as an issue which would need to be agreed upon and
clarified in the final agreement. The clarification was never provided. This issue is more than a
"detail," but further illustrates the necessity of a final, comprehensive agreement.

RESPONSES TO STAFFORD'S "STATEMENT 01•' UNDISPUTED MATERIAL
FACTS"
1.
and

The current lawsuit is the latest in a series of disputes between Stafford and
efforts to separate their joint ownership interests various businesses and
11
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See Complaint
8-29; Answer
Third-Party Answer ("Reply") ,r,r 12-32.

8-29; Counterclaim ,r,r 1

Reply and

RESPONSE: Undisputed.
2.
These disputes began in 2010, when Woody claimed he owned 50% of Smith
Chevrolet. Stafford adamantly disputed Woody's claim and asserted that Woody owned only
27.54% of Smith Chevrolet, as evidenced by years of corporate records and tax returns, many of
which Woody admittedly signed. This dispute was resolved when Stafford, Woody, and their
various business entities entered into the 2010 Settlement Agreement, whereby the parties,
among other things, divided up their jointly owned automobile dealerships such that Stafford
received full ownership of Smith Chevrolet, which included the Smith Honda and Smith RV
dealerships, while Woody received full ownership of Smith Ford, Smith Hyundai and a business
known as SuperTanks. See Counterclaim ,r,r 14, 16; Reply ,r,r 14, 16.
RESPONSE: Disputed to the extent it suggests that Woody started the dispute between
the parties and to the extent that it mischaracterizes the nature and basis of that dispute. See
Counterclaim ,r 14.
3.
In the 2010 Settlement Agreement, the parties also agreed to a procedure for the
management of Staffwood through the appointment of a mutually approved third member of
Staffwood's management board (in addition to Stafford and Woody) for the purpose of casting
the tie-breaking vote regarding any issues where Stafford and Woody were not in agreement.
Complaint ,r 18; Answer ,r 18.
RESPONSE: Undisputed.
4.
The 2010 Settlement Agreement also included a bid process whereby Stafford and
Woody could bid for and purchase real property from Staffwood. Complaint ,r 19; Answer ,r 19.
RESPONSE: Undisputed.
5.
Within a few weeks after the parties closed on the 2010 Settlement Agreement,
Woody filed a lawsuit against Stafford in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Bonneville
County, State of Idaho, entitled Woodruff D. Smith, et al. v. Stafford L. Smith, et al., Case No.
CV-11-1772 (the "Prior Lawsuit"), wherein he alleged that Stafford had breached the 2010
Settlement Agreement by transferring approximately $425,000 from Smith Ford to Hebgen
Reinsurance Company, which is one of two reinsurance companies jointly owned by Stafford
and Woody. In response, Stafford filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment that the transfer
of said funds was appropriate because: (1) the monies in question were generated from
reinsurance contracts sold by Smith Chevrolet and, therefore, Smith Chevrolet, not Smith Ford
12
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was entitled to have access to these funds; and (2)
transfer of these funds was made in the
ordinary course of business and was authorized by the terms of a Management Agreement
between Stafford and Woody and their entities whereby a Smith Chevrolet management team
had taken over the management of Smith Ford to salvage Smith Ford from the precarious
financial condition that had been caused by Woody's mismanagement of the dealership. See
Counterclaim ,r 19; Reply ,r 19.
RESPONSE: Disputed to the extent that it mischaracterizes the basis and nature of the
dispute. See, e.g., Counterclaim ,r 19.
6.
Ultimately, after a series of settlement negotiations the disputes raised in the Prior
Lawsuit, as well as other disputes that had arisen, were fully and finally resolved by the 2012
Settlement Agreement, which also included the parties' agreement regarding how their
reinsurance companies' businesses would be wound up and how the loans and funds held by the
reinsurance companies would be distributed. See Counterclaim ,r 20; Reply ,r 20.
RESPONSE: Disputed. The dispute between the parties was not fully and finally
resolved by the 2012 Settlement Agreement, as evidenced by the current lawsuit.
7.
The 2012 Settlement Agreement also included certain amendments to the bid
process created in the 2010 Settlement Agreement by requiring Stafford to make the opening bid
for the purchase of the three Bid Properties, as defined above. Counterclaim ,r 21; Reply ,r 21.
RESPONSE: Undisputed.
8.
Pursuant to the 2012 Settlement Agreement, on February 7, 2013, Stafford
initiated the bid process by making a bid to purchase the Bid Properties. Complaint 20;
Answer ,r 20; Counterclaim ,r,r 16-17, 22; Reply ilil 16-17, 22.

ir

RESPONSE: Undisputed.
9.
In response to Stafford's bid to purchase the Bid Properties, Woody submitted his
own bid for the Bid Properties, and the parties then traded bids for the Bid Properties for several
months. Complaint ,r 25; Answer if 25.
RESPONSE: Undisputed.
10.
On October 17, 2013, Woody made a bid on the Bid Properties. On October 28,
2013, Stafford advised Woody and others that he would not continue bidding on the Bid
Properties. Woody was therefore the successful bidder under the terms of the 2010 and 2012
Settlement Agreements. Counterclaim i! 26; Reply 26.

,r
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RESPONSE: Undisputed.
11.
On November I 2013, Woody's attorneys sent a letter to Staffwood identifying
certain conditions that Woody claimed would have to be satisfied by Staffwood, Stafford and
Smith Chevrolet by the closing date of December 12, 2013, in order to provide Woody with
marketable fee title to the Bid Properties. Counterclaim 1127; Reply 1127.
RESPONSE: Disputed to the extent that it mischaracterizes the nature or content of the
November 12, 2013 letter. See Counterclaim 1127.
12.
For example, Woody stated that a title report showed that the Outlet Property was
titled in the name of Smith Chevrolet and, therefore, Smith Chevrolet had to convey marketable
fee title to the Outlet Property to Staffwood. Counterclaim 1127; Reply if 27.
RESPONSE: Disputed. The letter simply asserted that "Woody needs confirmation that
Staffwood will be able to deliver marketable title to this property at closing." Counterclaim ir 27.

13.
Woody also demanded that Smith Chevrolet's existing leases of the Bid
Properties would need to be terminated (and the premises vacated by Smith Chevrolet) or
renegotiated on terms acceptable to Woody because such leases constituted encumbrances
preventing Woody from receiving marketable title. 2 At no time during the bid process had
Woody put Stafford on notice of any of the issues and demands listed in his November 12, 2013
letter. See Counterclaim 1127; Reply 1127.
RESPONSE: Disputed to the extent that it mischaracterizes the nature or content of the
November 12, 2013 letter. See Counterclaim 1127. Woody also disputes the assertions in the
footnote of this paragraph.
14.
In an effort to resolve this dispute regarding the purchase of the Bid Properties, a
series of meetings and communications took place between Woody's attorneys and Stafford's
attorneys. Complaint 1129; Answer 1129; Counterclaim iJ1129, 31; Reply if,[ 29, 31.
RESPONSE: Disputed. Meetings and communications took place to reach an allencompassing settlement agreement, of which the Bid Properties were just one component.
Stafford's Memorandum includes the following footnote with 1 13, which Woody disputes: These leases had been
approved by the Staffwood management board, of which Woody is a member, and Woody was fully aware of these
leases during the bidding process. Moreover, the value of the Bid Properties is increased precisely because they
generate rental income. In addition, Woody ,vas fully aware of the alleged environmental issues on the Smith
Chevrolet property because the events that allegedly created these issues occurred while he was an owner,
he
never made any of his bids subject to a resolution of these alleged environmental issues.
2
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15.
On November 20, 2013, Stafford's attorneys sent a letter, attached as Exhibit 1 to
the Reply, explaining Stafford's position and arguments regarding why Woody's demands were
unreasonable and unsupported, including the fact that the 2010 Settlement Agreement
contemplated extraneous matters of title and the Settlement Agreements established a very
specific contractual process to establish the terms of the leases in question, including the length
or term of said leases. See Counterclaim i! 29; Reply ,r 29.
RESPONSE: Disputed. This paragraph states legal conclusions, not undisputed material
facts.
16.
On December 4, 2013, Woody's attorneys sent a letter to the Management Board
of Staffwood (the "December 4 Letter") demanding that (1) Woody and/or Stafford be
empowered to execute, on behalf of Staffwood, marketable fee simple title to the Smith
Chevrolet Property and the RV Property, free of any lease; (2) the proceeds be used to pay off
the Wells Fargo loan; (3) that Staffwood defend and indemnify Woody against any
environmental liabilities and that Staffwood seek indemnification from Smith Chevrolet for
environmental liability created during its tenancy; (4) that each partner's share of the net
proceeds at closing be simultaneously paid to the partners; (5) that Staffwood demand that Smith
Chevrolet convey marketable fee simple title to the Outlet Property and pursue a cause of action
against Smith Chevrolet if such does not occur by closing; and (6) that no Staffwood funds be
authorized to pay any attorneys' fees relating to any disputes between Stafford and Woody. See
Counterclaim 30; Reply ,r 30.

,r

RESPONSE: Undisputed.
17.
Woody also threatened to file a lawsuit against Staffwood and Stafford if they did
not meet his unreasonable demands by December 11, 2013, so that Woody could close on
December 12, 2013. See Counterclaim ,r 30; Reply 30.

,r

RESPONSE: Disputed. Characterizing Woody's demands as "unreasonable" is hardly
stating an undisputed material fact, nor does the December 4, 2013 letter say that a lawsuit was
threatened "so that Woody could close on December 12, 2013." See Counterclaim il 30.
18.
On December 11, 2013, Stafford's attorneys sent Woody a letter, attached as
Exhibit 2 to the Reply, responding to the allegations and demands in the December 4 Letter.
Counterclaim ,r 31; Reply il 31.
RESPONSE: Undisputed.
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19.
On December 17, 2013, Stafford's attorneys sent Woody a letter, attached as
Exhibit 3 to the Reply, responding to Woody's continued threats to terminate the existing valid
leases, dictate future lease rates, and to evict Stafford's businesses from their leased premises if
Stafford was unwilling to agree to Woody's terms. Counterclaim ,i 31; Reply ,i 31.
RESPONSE: Disputed. This paragraph mischaracterizes Woody's communications and
the posture of the parties. See Counterclaim ,i 31.
20.
Finally, in an attempt to resolve this dispute and to avoid yet another lawsuit,
Stafford's attorneys sent a letter dated December 20, 2013 to Woody's attorneys (the "December
20 Letter"), which is attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint, wherein Stafford made a settlement
offer to resolve the parties' dispute regarding purchase of the Bid Properties, by purchasing the
Bid Properties himself on the following material terms:
a.
Stafford would purchase the Bid Properties for $2,800,000.00; and
b.
The net proceeds from the sale of the Bid Properties would be divided
between Staffwood's partners after satisfying the WFB Loan and the amounts Staffwood
owed Smith Chevrolet for the funds Smith Chevrolet had advanced on behalf of
Staffwood in excess of Smith Chevrolet's lease obligations. Complaint 30; Answer

ir

130.
RESPONSE: Disputed. The December 20, 2013 letter speaks for itself and Woody
disputes this paragraph to the extent that it is inconsistent with or otherwise misconstrues or
inaccurately characterizes the same.

In response, Woody's attorneys, Ray, Quinney & Nebeker ("RQN"), sent
21.
Stafford's attorneys a letter dated January 13, 2014 (the "January 13 Letter"), a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit B to the Complaint, wherein RQN, as Woody's attorneys, expressly stated,
"Woody hereby accepts Stafford's offer as set forth in your letter of December 20, 2013."
Complaint if 31; Answer 31.

,r

RESPONSE: Disputed. The January 13 letter also stated "For purposes of certainty and
clarification, we set forth below further detail about our understanding of the terms of
settlement," and then outlined ten different "points of understanding," which had not been
included in the December 20, 2013 letter. Am. Com pl. Ex. B.
22.
In the January 13 Letter, Woody also expressly stated the following regarding his
understanding of the two material terms offered by Stafford in the December 20 Letter regarding
Stafford's offer to purchase the Bid Properties:
a.
"Stafford closes on the [Bid Properties] at $2.8 million"; and
b.
"All funds from the Closing shall go to the account of Staffwood, and
disbursed as follows: (a) payoff of[the WFB Loan]
to
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$875,000 at closing); and (b) refund ofrent overpayment by Smith Chevrolet and other
expenses mentioned in your letter, will be set at $350,000. Balance of funds shall be
distributed equally to the partners." Complaint i! 32; Answer ,i 32.
Disputed. The January 13 letter also stated, "For purposes of certainty and
clarification, we set forth below further detail about our understanding of the terms of
settlement," and then outlined different "points of understanding," which had not been included
in the December 20, 2013 letter. Am. Compl. Ex. B.
23.

In the January 13 Letter, Woody also stated,
In paragraph no. 8, below, we propose that the parties attempt to agree on
a way that this transaction may be done on a tax free basis. Woody's accountants
believe that by treating the entire transaction as a distribution in dissolution of the
parties' interest in Staffwood, the parties can come out the same as agreed
without incurring negative tax consequences. This would seem to be beneficial to
both parties, but since this provision is outside of the terms ofStafford's offer, we
make clear that we do not require Stafford's agreement to [this proposal].
Complaint il 33 (emphasis added); Answer i/ 33.
RESPONSE: Disputed. The January 13 letter also stated, "For purposes of certainty and
clarification, we set forth below further detail about our understanding of the terms of
settlement," and then outlined different "points of understanding," which had not been included
in the December 20, 2013 letter. Am. Compl. Ex. B.
24.

Specifically, paragraph no. 8 of the January 13 Letter, stated as follows:
In order to reduce taxes to the maximum extent possible, the
parties agree to discuss and attempt to agree prior to Closing concerning
ways by which Stafford's receipt of the 3 bid properties along with other
divisions of cash and property hereunder may be treated overall as an
equal distribution of Staffwood assets in liquidation of their ownership
interests in Staffwood. If the parties cannot agree prior to Closing,
Closing of the bid properties and the subsequent divisions shall take place
exactly as set forth above.

Complaint ri 34 (emphasis added); Answer i! 34.
RESPONSE: Disputed. The January 13 letter also stated, "For purposes of certainty and
clarification, we set forth below further detail about our understanding of the terms of
settlement," and then outlined different "points of understanding," which had not been included
13
Am. Compl.
B.
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25.
In fact, in a subsequent email dated February 6, 2014 (the "February 6 Email"), a
copy of which is attached as Exhibit C to the Complaint, RQN again urged Stafford to acquire
the Bid Properties as "a dissolution," but RQN expressly acknowledged that this was not the deal
that the parties had agreed to, and stated, "[w]e realize that Stafford has the right to treat this as a
sale and exchange of the [Bid Properties]. ... " Complaint ,r 35; Answer ,r 35.
RESPONSE: Disputed. The February 6, 2014 email also stated, "we are very close to
agreement, subject to some clarifications or decisions on the following list of issues" and made
clear that a "Draft of an acceptable settlement agreement" was required before closing. Am.
Comp!. Ex. C.
26.
In addition to accepting Stafford's offer to purchase the Bid Properties, Woody
also made a separate offer to further separate the ownership interests of Woody and Stafford by
making an offer in the January 13 Letter to divide Staffwood's remaining real property between
Stafford and Woody. See Ex. B to the Complaint. Specifically, the January 13 Letter states that
"[t]he balance of the [Staffwood] properties shall be divided into two sets of property/cash ...
[and] Stafford shall have the choice to choose Property Set A or Property Set B, and Woody shall
receive the Property Set not elected by Stafford." Complaint ,r 38; Answer ,r 38.
RESPONSE: Disputed. This paragraph states legal conclusions, which are not
supported by the various communications between the parties.
27.
Pursuant to the January 13 Letter, Property Set A consisted of the Snake River
Landing Property, less $400,000 Cash to be paid to the Property Set B Recipient, and Property
Set B consisted of the Bellin [sic] Road Property, the Blackfoot Property, the proceeds from the
recent sale of the Pocatello property, and $400,000 Cash to be paid by the Property A Recipient.
Complaint ,r 39; Answer ,r 39.
RESPONSE: Undisputed.
28.
In response to Woody's acceptance of Stafford's offer to purchase the Bid
Properties and also Woody's offer to divide the remaining Staffwood properties on the terms set
forth in the January 13 Letter, Stafford's attorneys sent a letter to RQN dated January 30, 2014
(the "January 30 Letter"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit D to the Complaint, which
stated, "Stafford is pleased that Woody has accepted Stafford's settlement offer based on the
terms communicated ... [in the December 20 Letter]. Please be advised that Stafford is willing to
divide the remaining Staffwood property consistent with the terms outlined in [the January 13
Letter], and Stafford has decided to choose Property Set B." Complaint 140; Answer 140.
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RESPONSE: Disputed. This paragraph contains legal conclusions. Moreover, the
January 30 letter also stated that "the parties will still need to prepare and sign a third Settlement
Agreement regarding this matter" and outlined seven different issues that the "settlement
agreement will need to address." Am. Compl. Ex. D.
29.
After the parties entered these two Agreements, which are defined above and in
Stafford's Complaint as the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and the Division of Staffwood
Properties Agreement (collectively the "Agreements"), Woody refused to close on the real
property transactions contemplated by the Agreements, and he then attempted to back out of his
contractual obligations and to re-negotiate the terms to which he had previously agreed. For
example, on February 12, 2014, Woody's attorneys sent an email to Stafford's attorneys, stating
that the parties needed to treat the entire transaction as a "tax-free dissolution" and then Woody
would "get this closed and done, once and for all." See Reply ir 38; Exhibit 4 to the Reply.
RESPONSE: Disputed. This paragraph contains legal conclusions and mischaracterizes
Woody's action. Moreover, the parties did not enter two agreements as this paragraph asserts.
See Woody's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and
discussion below.
30.
Woody's insistence on conditioning any closing on a tax-free dissolution was
contrary to the parties' agreement and Woody's express admissions and confirmations in the
January 13 Letter and in the February 6 Email, as set forth above. Stafford's attorneys pointed
out the inconsistencies in Woody's assertions in an email dated February 13, 2014. See Reply
if 38; Exhibit 4 to the Reply.
RESPONSE: Disputed. The various communications in January and February establish
that there was no agreement, just a series of back-and-forth negotiations.
31.
In reliance on Woody's representations and promises, Stafford communicated to
Woody that he was ready, willing, able and fully prepared to close on the transactions agreed to
in both the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement and in the Division of Staffwood Properties
Agreement, and convey the properties in accordance with the terms of the Agreements. See
February 20, 2014 Email from Stanley J. Preston to RQN and documents attached thereto, copies
of which arc attached as Exhibit E to the Complaint. Complaint ,i 43; Answer ,i 43.
RESPONSE: Disputed. There was no "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement" or a
"Division of Staffwood Properties Agreement." See Woody's Motion to Dismiss or in the
Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and discussion below.
32.

In response, and in further breach of the Agreements, Woody proposed new
terms that were never part of the Agreements. Finally, Stafford sent a formal
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to Woody to comply with the Agreements and to close the transactions in accordance
with the Agreements. See March 3, 2014 Letter from Stanley J. Preston to RQN, a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit F to the Complaint. Complaint ,r 44; Answer ,r 44.
RESPONSE: Disputed. There were no enforceable agreements to be breached and this
paragraph contains legal conclusions, not undisputed material facts. See Woody's Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and discussion below.
33.
In response, Woody continued to attempt to renegotiate the terms of the
Agreements, and even stated that he would not go forward with the Closing unless Stafford
agreed to accept only $200,000 as part of Property Set B, instead of the $400,000 payment that
Woody himself had proposed and Stafford had accepted. Counterclaim ir 41; Reply ,r 41.
RESPONSE: Disputed. There were no enforceable agreements to be breached and this
paragraph contains legal conclusions, not undisputed material facts. See Woody's Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and discussion below. Woody also
disputes the assertion that he "renegotiate[d]" any "Agreements."
34.
After more than a month of delays, and after it became clear that Woody was
unwilling to abide by his contractual obligations by closing the real estate transactions in
accordance with the terms of the Agreements, Stafford filed this lawsuit to enforce the
Agreements, and he gave notice of the lawsuit to Woody by means of a letter sent by Stafford's
attorneys on March 7, 2014, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 5 to the Reply. Counterclaim
,r 41; Reply ,r 41.
RESPONSE: Disputed. This paragraph contains legal conclusions and
mischaracterizations, not undisputed material facts. There were no enforceable agreements to be
breached. See Woody Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment
and discussion below.
35.
Woody has now taken the position that the parties never entered into any
enforceable contracts with respect to the Agreements, contrary to the express written offers and
acceptances between the parties as set forth above. Complaint i! 47; Answer ,r 47.
RESPONSE: Disputed. This paragraph states legal conclusions, not undisputed material
facts. There were no enforceable agreements to be breached. See Woody Motion to Dismiss or
in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment and discussion below.
36.
Specifically, Woody is now asserting that the reason the Agreements arc not
binding and enforceable is because a material condition to any agreement was Woody's
insistence that the entire transaction
treated as a tax-free distribution of the Staffwood
20

properties. Woody's position, however, is directly contradicted by the express written
statements made by RQN in the January 13 Letter and the February 6 Email, as set forth above.
Complaint ,r 48; Answer ,r 48.
RESPONSE: Disputed. This paragraph states legal conclusions, not undisputed material
facts, and mischaracterizes Woody's claims. See Woody Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative
Motion for Summary Judgment and discussion below.
37.
The written communications between the parties establish that, while the division
of the remaining Staffwood properties other than the Bid Properties would be a distribution,
Woody expressly agreed that Stafford had the right to purchase the Bid Properties. Complaint
,r 49; Answer if 49.
RESPONSE: Disputed. This paragraph states legal conclusions, not undisputed material
facts.

ARGUMENT
Stafford's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 3 and Memorandum in Supp01i
("Mem.") allege that "all the claims in the Complaint and the Counterclaim turn on the sole issue
oflaw regarding whether the parties' correspondence formed valid and enforceable settlement
agreements." (Mem. at 5.) The problem for Stafford is that the correspondence establishes that
no such contracts were formed. Instead, it establishes that the parties realized that the "devil is in
the details," that the parties contemplated and Stafford's counsel requested a signed "third

3 Stafford asserts that "Motions for judgment on the pleadings are treated 'similarly to motions for
summary judgment."' (Mem. at 16-17 (quoting Bagley v. Thomason, 307 P3d 1219, 1222 (Idaho 2013). But,
as explained by Rule 12(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, that is only true where "matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court." I.R.C.P. 12(c). Otherwise, [t]he standard
for addressing a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Admiral Ins. Co v. Adges, No. 11 Civ. 8289 JPO, 2012 WL
2426541 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2012) (additional citation omitted). Thus, Stafford finds himself in the
odd procedural posture of moving for judgment on the pleadings not only on Woody's claims, but on
Stafford's own claims as well. (Mem. at 2 (explaining that Stafford brings a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings "on all claims asserted in this lawsuit, both the claims brought by Stafford in his Amended
Complaint ... and the claims asserted by [Woody].")).
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"which was never realized, and that as

February 5th, the parties

did not "know . . how close [they were] to an agreement." (Ex. 1.)
This memorandum is divided in three parts. First, it explains why the parties' continued
negotiations could not be read as having formed enforceable contracts. Second, it explains that
genuine issues of material fact v1ould preclude a ruling on whether \Voody breached any such
agreement. Third, it explains that even if Stafford were entitled to relief on his Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, which he is not, such relief would not moot several of the claims that
Woody asserts in his Counterclaim.
I.

The Parties Did Not Form Enforceable Contracts Because They Were Negotiating
Toward an All-Encompassing Settlement Agreement, Their Negotiations Were a
Series of Counter Offers, and There Was No Agreement as to Several Material
Terms.

Stafford argues that the parties formed two distinct enforceable contracts, but his
arguments fail. Stafford glosses over the fact that the true aim of the parties in negotiating with
one another was to reach a formalized, all-encompassing settlement agreement. As such, there
was never a valid offer or acceptance because the negotiations were a series of counterproposals
and because there was no meeting of the minds as to several material terms for settlement. This
section explains how the parties intended to reach a formalized settlement agreement, and then
explains in detail why the parties' negotiations did not create enforceable contracts as to the
purchase of the Bid Properties or the division of the remaining Staffwood Properties.

Settlement Was at the Heart of the Parties' Negotiations.
Stafford's Motion overlooks that the main goal of the parties in negotiating was to
achieve an all-encompassing settlement agreement. Negotiations about the bid properties and
division of Staffwood properties were just steps in that direction. The context of the negotiations
tells the story-litigation between Stafford and Woody has gone on for years and the
negotiations came on the heels of two previous settlement attempts that failed to bring final
resolution between the two parties. As the Amended Complaint states, there was "a new dispute
between Plaintiff and Defendant," (Am. Compl. 126), and the communications between the
parties was "an effort to negotiate a resolution of this dispute," not to simply agree on real estate
transactions. (Arn. Compl.

if 29.)

For those reasons, the January 30 letter made clear that "the parties will still need to
prepare and sign a third Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of the
terms are not covered." (Am. Compl. Ex. D.) It is telling that this statement came after the time
in which Stafford contends a "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement" was formed because it
establishes that no complete agreement had been reached. That statement, from Stafford's
attorney, made clear that the intent of the parties was to reach a formalized agreement that would
resolve the entire dispute between the parties. It was against that backdrop--an effort to resolve
the entire dispute-that the parties negotiated about the Bid Properties and remaining Staffwood
properties. Those items were simply pieces of the larger puzzle.
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B.

The Parties Did Not Form an Enforceable Contract for the Purchase of the
Bid Properties.

Stafford contends that the parties entered into an enforceable contract called the "Bid
Properties Purchase Agreement," but that contention fails. As a threshold matter, there is no
document entitled the "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement" as Stafford suggests, he made that
name out of whole cloth. Instead, there was a series of back-and-forth negotiations about a
whole range of issues, which included the Bid Properties, among others.
There also is no enforceable "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement" because there was
never an "offer" or "acceptance" of such an agreement. It is axiomatic that "[ajn offer ... must
be so complete that upon acceptance an agreement is formed which contains all of the terms
necessary to determine whether the contract has been performed or not" and that "[a]n
acceptance of an offer, to be effectual, must be identical with the offer and unconditional, and
must not modify or introduce any new terms into the offer." CH Leavell & Co. v. Grafe &

Assocs., Inc., 90 Idaho 502,511,414 P.2d 873 (Idaho 1966) (emphasis added). Stafford suggests
that Woody accepted the terms of his December 20 offer, but the reality is that Stafford's
December 20, 2013 letter was not a valid offer and was followed by a series of counter proposals
and clarifications that refute any notion of acceptance. This memorandum addresses those
subsequent communications in turn.
1.

January 13 Letter

Stafford asserts that the January 13, 2014 letter was "an unconditional acceptance of
Stafford's offer, thereby forming a contract between the parties." (Mem. at 22.) But Stafford

a cherry-picked version of that letter and does not tell the whole story. The reality is
that the second line of January 13 letter stated that "[ f]or purposes of certainty and clarification,
we set forth below further detail about our understanding of the terms of settlement." (Am.
Comp1. Ex. B.) Stafford tries to downplay the meaning of that sentence, and the ten points of
understanding that followed, 4 by contending that "[a]ftcr unconditionally accepting the offer,
Woody ... proceeded to clarify a couple of the terms of the agreement the parties had entered by
filling in some additional details, which did not materially modify the original offer." (Mem. at
22.) But the ten points of understanding laid out in the January 13 letter rebut any notion of an
"unconditional acceptance." (Id.) In fact, the January 13 letter makes clear that the December
20, 2013 letter was not sufficiently detailed to constitute a valid "offer." Instead of an
acceptance, the January 13 letter was just another step in the negotiating process.
In addition to providing "further detail" for purposes of "certainty and clarification," the

January 13, 2014 letter also could not constitute an acceptance because it proposed new terms.
First, it stated "[i]n paragraph no. 8 below, we propose that the parties attempt to agree on a way
that this transaction may be done on a tax free basis." (Am. Compl. Ex. B (emphasis added).)
Even though the letter states that Stafford's assent to that term was not required, that proposal
"introduce[d] a[] new term[]"to the agreement and, therefore, negated any notion of acceptance.

Leavell, 90 Idaho at 511.

Granted, not all ten points of understanding related specifically to the Bid Properties and some related
to the division of the remaining Staffwood property, but that fact simply establishes that the parties were
not
to negotiate two discrete contracts, as Stafford contends, and instead viewed these issues
collectively as they pursued a broad settlement.

1

January 13 letter included additional proposals as well. It stated, "[a]lso, ... we
propose a division of the balance of the Staffwood property," (Am. Compl. Ex. B), and then the
letter outlined ten "points of understanding" in which Woody clarified and proposed various
terms that were not included in Stafford's alleged "offer." The second point of understanding,
for example, proposed that "[f]unds escrowed by Woody in the bid process shall be returned
upon finalizing this Agreement." (Id) That provision alone makes clear that the January 13
letter was not an outright acceptance and that the agreement was not yet final. The 30-day
closing date was another proposal that undercuts the notion of a valid contract, despite Stafford's
arguments to the contrary. (Mem. at 22-23) The other myriad clarifications and proposals also
made clear that the January 13 letter was a far cry from an acceptance.
2.

January 30 Letter

Stafford's memorandum does not say much about the January 30 letter as it relates to
whether the parties formed a contract about the Bid Properties, simply stating that "Stafford's
attorneys acknowledged Woody's acceptance in the January 30 letter." (Mem. at 24.) The
reason Stafford's treatment of that letter is so sparing is probably because that letter made clear
the "the parties will still need to prepare and sign a third Settlement Agreement regarding this
matter inasmuch as a number of terms are not covered by the enclosed Addendum." (Am.
Compl. Ex. D (emphasis added).) The letter then outlined several proposals for the settlement
agreement and asked whether Woody would "agree that the parties should prepare and sign a
third settlement agreement along the lines proposed herein." (Id) Importantly, one of the
that is "helpful

determining the intention
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the parties" to contract is "whether the

negotiations themselves indicate that a written draft is contemplated at the final conclusion of the
negotiations." Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892,898,204 P.3d 532 (Idaho Ct. App.
2009) (citations omitted). The January 30 letter is conclusive that the parties contemplated such
a formalized agreement. Moreover, that letter also put forward a series of counter proposals that
showed that the parties had not yet had a meeting of the minds as to aii material terms.
3.

February 5 p.m. Email

That the parties had not formed an enforceable contract related to the Bid Properties is
also conclusively established by the February 5 p.m. email. Stafford does not address that email
in his Amended Complaint or his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, but its relevance cannot
be disputed. Stafford's counsel suggested that the parties were contemplating a formalized
agreement instead of a series of back-and-forth negotiations when he wrote, "[u]nfortunately,
prior history indicates that when trying to finalize agreements between these parties, the 'devil
is in the details."' (Ex. 1 (emphasis added).) Then Stafford's counsel took the added step of

clarifying that an agreement had not yet been reached: "[ w]e have yet to receive a response to
the proposal we sent you last Thursday so we don't know at this stage how close we are to an
agreement." (Id (emphasis added).) That email makes clear that the parties had not yet

finalized an enforceable agreement.
4.

February 5 (a.m.) and 6 Emails

Stafford tries to parse language from the February 6 email from Woody's counsel to
argue that the parties had entered an enforceable agreement. To be sure, that email states "[w]e
Stafford has the right to treat this as a sale and exchange of the 3 bid properties under

our Settlement Agreements," (Am. Compl. Ex. C), but the reference to "our Settlement
Agreements" does not establish that the parties had entered a singular Bid Properties Purchase
Agreement as Stafford contends. (Mern. at 24.) Instead, it is clearly a reference to the 2010
Settlement Agreement and the 2012 Settlement Agreement, under which the parties "agreed to a
procedure whereby the parties had the right to initiate a bid process for the purpose of purchasing
real property owned by Staffwood." (Am. Compl.

,r 19.)

Moreover, the February 6 email

outlined a list of unresolved issues and made clear that any closing was subject to the receipt of a
"Draft of an acceptable Settlement Agreement." (Am. Compl. Ex. C.) That a draft of an
acceptable Settlement Agreement was required, and had not yet been received, further
underscores that the parties had not yet entered an enforceable contract.
The February 5 a.m. email further established that no enforceable contract had been
formed about a purchase of the Bid Properties. Referring to the closing for the purchase of the
bid prope1iies, Stafford's counsel asked "[w]hen do you anticipate getting back to us on our
proposal[?]" (Am. Compl. Ex. C.) That question established that there was no final agreement
at that time. Woody's counsel underscored that point when he responded on February 6 that "it
seems we are very close to agreement, subject to some clarifications or decisions on the

following list of issues." (Id. (emphasis added).) That statement and the accompanying list of
unresolved issues further show that the parties had not had a meeting of the minds as to several
material terms and therefore had not formed a valid contract about the purchase of the bid
properties. Taken together, the various communications outlined above are conclusive evidence
the

did not enter an enforceable contract about the purchase of

Bid Properties.
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Stafford elaborates on a couple of cases to bolster his claims that there was an
enforceable agreement, but those cases are inapposite. Stafford cites, P. 0 Ventures, Inc. v.
Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, for example, to argue that the parties had agreed on all of the

essential terms related to a purchase of the Bid Properties. (Mem. at 25 (citing 159 P.3d 870
(Idaho 2007)).) But P. 0. Ventures involved purely an agreement to purchase real property, not
the purchase of real property in the context of settlement negotiations. And "the Addendum" at
issue in that case, "did not demonstrate any intent to sign a more formal document in the future,"
P.O. Ventures, 159 P.3d at 875, whereas here the parties did demonstrate an intent to sign a

formal settlement agreement. As Stafford's counsel wrote in the January 30 letter, "the parties
will still need to prepare and sign a third Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch
as a number of terms are not covered by the enclosed Addendum." (Am. Compl. Ex. D
(emphasis added).) P. 0. Ventures is inapposite to this case and undercuts Stafford's assertion
that a contract was formed.
Stafford's reliance on Ogden v. Griffith is also misplaced. (Mem. at 26 (citing 236 P.3d
1249 (Idaho 2010).) Unlike the alleged "agreement" here, the settlement agreement in Ogden
purported to resolve the entire dispute between the parties. The Idaho Supreme Court also
clarified that the terms that are required for a contract to be sufficiently definite depend on the
specific context and are not universal, stating, "the Court found that those terms were essential
terms to that particular agreement, not all agreements for real estate." 236 P.3d at 1256. The
decision in Ogden does nothing to cure the deficiencies in Stafford's assertion that a valid
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contract was formed. Stafford simply cannot establish that the parties

an enforceable

contract related to the Bid Properties.

The Parties Did Not Form an Enforceable Contract for the Division of
Staffwood's Remaining Real Property.
Stafford's contention that the parties entered an enforceable agreement about the division
of the remaining Staffwood property suffers similar shortcomings. Stafford argues that the
January 30 letter "was a clear offer and acceptance of the Division of Staffwood Properties
Agreement." (Mem. at 29.) But the plain language of that letter makes clear that no agreement
was reached. To start, it proposed various new terms for Woody's consideration. Some of those
terms were in an enclosed draft Addendum related to the purchase and division of properties.
Other proposals were outlined in the letter itself, including seven "issues," or material terms, that
needed to be addressed for settlement. An acceptance, is simply not valid if it is not "identical
with the offer and unconditional" or if it "modif1ies J or introduce[ s] any new terms into the
offer." Leavell, 90 Idaho at 511 (emphasis added). The January 30 letter ran afoul of those
requirements.
The letter also made clear that no enforceable agreement had been reached because it
proposed that the parties sign a "third Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a
number of the terms are not covered by the enclosed Addendum." (Am Compl. Ex. D.)
Importantly, one of the factors that is "helpful in determining the intention of the parties" to
contract is "whether the negotiations themselves indicate that a written draft is contemplated at
the final conclusion of the negotiations." Lawrence, 146 Idaho at 898. Far from constituting an
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acceptance, the January

letter indicated that the parties expected to enter a formalized written

settlement agreement.
Stafford attempts to trivialize his attorney's proposal for a third settlement agreement by
asserting that such a formalized agreement was simply "for convenience" and "would have been
useful, but was not an element required for enforceability." (Mem. at 30.) But that suggestion is
unpersuasive given the context-these negotiations came on the heels of two previous
formalized settlement agreements and years of protracted litigation. Nor can Stafford explain
why an agreement would need to be "memorialize[d]" if it was already sufficiently definite.
In any event, Stafford's own counsel rebutted any suggestion that a formalized agreement
was unnecessary less than a week later when he wrote that "prior history indicates that when
trying to finalize agreements between these parties, the 'devil is in the details."' (Ex. 1.) For
that reason, it is no surprise that Stafford's counsel in the January 30 email wrote, "[p]lease let
me know as soon as possible if you have any suggested changes to the enclosed Addendum, and
whether you agree that the parties should prepare and sign a third settlement agreement along
the lines proposed herein." (Am. Compl. Ex. D (emphasis added).) A formalized settlement
agreement was the aim of the parties' negotiations and the January 30 letter accordingly fell
short of creating an enforceable contract.
Stafford cites Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho to bolster his contention that the parties
have entered a valid contract despite failing to agree on a formalized settlement agreement as
they had contemplated. (Mem. at 30 (citing 867 P .2d 260, 266 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993).) The
parties in Suitts,

, had drafted a formal stipulation for judgment and had an oral
31

agreement as to all of its essential terms. Suitts, 867 P.2d at 265. The issue in that case was
simply whether one party's proposal to add the clause "full and final settlement" to the
stipulation prevented formation of a contract. Id. The court found it did not because regardless
of whether that language was included or not, "the effect [of the draft stipulation] would have
been a complete settlement of all of the claims in their existing complaint." Id. at 266-67. Suitts
is inapposite because the parties here are not disputing whether the proposed addition of a single
clause renders their otherwise completed settlement contract invalid. The parties here have not
come anywhere near entering the kind of all-encompassing settlement agreement involved in

Suitts, which is fatal to Stafford's motion.
The communications between the parties make clear that they were negotiating with the
aim of entering a formalized, all-encompassing settlement agreement and that they fell far short
of achieving that goal. Stafford's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should accordingly be
denied.

II.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact Preclude a Ruling on Whether Woody Breached
Any Agreements and Stafford Is Not Entitled to Specific Performance In Any
Event.
Stafford asserts in cursory fashion that Woody has breached agreements with Stafford.

(Mem. at 31.) That contention fails at the outset for the reasons outlined above-the parties
simply did not enter enforceable agreements about the Bid Properties or division of remaining
Staffwood Property. But it fails for another reason as well-there are genuine issues of material
fact that preclude a determination about whether Woody breached any such agreement. Stafford
argues Woody's attempt to structure the transaction as a tax-free dissolution "was contrary to the
32

32

written statements made in the January 13 Letter and February 6 Email." (Mem. at 31.)
But the February 5 p.m. email from Stafford's counsel establishes that the parties were still
negotiating the details about proposed closing. In fact, it asserted that "the 'devil is in the
details,"' and that "[w]e have yet to receive a response to the proposal we sent you last Thursday
so we don't know at this stage how close we are to an agreement." (Ex. 1.) Thus, even if the
parties had entered an enforceable agreement about the Bid Properties, which they did not, there
would be genuine issues of material fact about whether Woody breached that would preclude
judgment in favor of Stafford.
Stafford also seeks specific performance, but even if there were any enforceable
agreements, which there are not, he would fail to satisfy the requirements for that remedy.
"Specific performance is an extraordinary remedy that provides relief when legal remedies are
inadequate." Garner v. Bartschi, 80 P.3d 1031, 1036 (Idaho 2003). One problem for Stafford is
that the "law requires as a condition to specific performance that the contract be proved by clear
and convincing evidence." Anderson v. Whipple, 227 P.2d 351,358 (Idaho 1951). For the many
reasons outlined in this memorandum, Stafford fails to make that showing. Moreover, a "greater
degree of certainty is required to sustain a decree for specific performance than is required to
sustain a judgment for damages at law." Id. Stafford falls fall short of showing that "greater
degree of certainty." Put simply, Stafford does not merit specific performance for the simple
reason that "[ s]pecific performance is not available to enforce ambiguous or incomplete real
estate agreements." Garner, 80 P.3d at 1036.
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Several Claims in Woody's Counterclaim Would Not Be Moot Even If the Parties
Had Entered Enforceable Agreements, Which They Did Not.

Stafford argues that if this Court determines that the parties entered enforceable
agreements about the Bid Properties and the division of the remaining Staffwood Property, that
all of claims asserted in Woody's Counterclaim are rendered moot. (Mem. at 33.) Staffwood's
arguments about mootness are self-serving and conclusory. The reality is that even if Stafford's
motion had merit, which it does not, judgment in Stafford's favor would fail to resolve several of
Woody's claims. Those claims include Unjust Enrichment/Constructive Trust; Breach of
Contract; Declaratory Judgment

Stafford's Unilateral Actions on Behalf of Staffwood; Breach

of Fiduciary Duty; and Mutual Mistake, among others.
CONCLUSION

Stafford does not merit a judgment on the pleadings in his favor. The communications
between the parties clearly establish that they were negotiating back and forth toward an allencompassing settlement agreement, which they never reached. Stafford's Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings should therefore be denied.
DATED this 23rd day of May, 2014.

Greggory J. s·avage
Michael D. Mayfield
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaim-Piaintif.f
and Third-Party Stafford Woodruff D Smith
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of May, 20] 4, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing OPPOSITION TO STAFFORD SMITH AND SMITH CHEVROLET'S

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS was mailed, First Class, postage
prepaid, to the follmving:
Kara L. Pettit
Michael R. Carlston
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
and Hand Delivered to:
Stanley J. Preston
PRESTON & SCOTT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande Street, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

1284322

Greggory Savage
From:
Sent:

M.

Cc:

Damian Smith

Release of Woody's Escrow Funds

Mike and Gregg,
Stafford received earlier today a request from Hal Bennett to allow Woody to withdraw his escrow deposit from
TitleOne. We have advised Stafford that we should respond to this request through counsel. Hal cites as the basis for
this request the fact that the parties "have reached an agreement in principle and are just hammering out the
details." Unfortunately, prior history indicates that when trying to finalize agreements between these parties, the "devil
is in the details." We have yet to receive a response to the proposal we sent you last Thursday so we don't know at this
stage how close we are to an agreement. In light of Mike's email to me last Thursday that "there will, indeed, be a
material issue or two," (that he is cautiously optimistic will be worked out), we do not think it is advisable to release the
escrow funds at this time. The offer we made on December 20, 2013, which Woody accepted by means of your letter
dated January 13, 2014, stated at paragraph 2 that the escrow funds would be released at the closing and my client
wants to hold to this provision.
We recognize that you need an appropriate period of time to fully evaluate our last proposal and to discuss it with your
client. Nonetheless, we believe the proposal is fair to both sides and we did our best not to introduce anything that was
inconsistent with the outlined settlement and an appropriate division of Staffwood's property. As a result, we are
hopeful that we can move forward with the Closing in a matter of days, along the lines we proposed, and then work
together to get a formal settlement agreement in place thereafter, as discussed in my letter dated January 30, 2014. Of
course, Woody's escrowed funds would be released to him as part of this Closing. Thus, we do not anticipate that
Woody will have to wait much longer to have his funds released to him in any event. In the meantime, we look forward
to hearing from you regarding a Closing date and if you have any suggested changes to the Addendum previously sent to
you. Regards, Stan
Stanley J. Preston

PRESTON & SCOTI
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande St., Suite 250
SLC, UT 84101
Tel.: 801-869-1620
Fax: 801-869-1621

DD: 801-869-1623
sjp@prestonandscott.com
www.prestonandscott.com
The information contained in this e-mail and any attachments Is confidential and solely for the use of the intended recipient. If the intended
recipient is our client, then this information is also a privileged attorney-client communication. Unauthorized use or disclosure of this information
is prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, do not read it. Please delete it from your system without copying it, and notify the
sender by e-mail or by calling 801-869-1620, so that our address record can be corrected. Thank you.
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Exhibit 2

Mr. Stan Preston
Preston & Scott
178 S Rio Grande St, #250
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Re:

Woody Smith v. Stafford Smith

SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE

PO Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0385
36 South State Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah

Dear Stan:
This letter responds to your email and letter both dated March 3,
2014. Stafford's counteroffer contained therein is rejected.

84111
801 532-1500 TEL
801 532-7543 FAX
www.rqn.com

But in our on-going effort to resolve this dispute (and we realize that
you assert, and we dispute, that a settlement has been reached), Woody will
give Stafford the option to choose between two alternatives as follows:

801 342-2400 TEL
801 375-8379 FAX

Arthur B. Berger
Frederick R. Thaler, Jr.

John W. Mackay
McKay M. Pearson
Mark W. Pugsley

Matthew N. Evans
Gary L. Longmore
John P. Wunderti

Michael R. Johnson

PROVO OFFICE

86 North University Ave
Suite 430
Provo, Utah
84601-4420

ATIORNEYS AT LAW
Clark P. Gl!es
Narrvel E. Hall
Douglas W, Morrison
Herbert C. Livsey
D. Jay Curtis
Jonathan A, Dibble
Scott Hancock Clark
Loren L Weiss
James S. Jardine
Janet Hugie Smith
Douglas Matsumori
Larry G. Moore
Bruce L Olson
John A. Adams
Douglas M. Monson
Craig Carlile
Jeffrey W. Appel
David J. Castleton
Ellen J. D. Toscano
Kevln G. Glade
Lester K, Essig
!ra B. Rubinfeld
Stephen C. Tingey
John R. Madsen
Michael W. Spence
Scott A. Hagen
Mark M. Bettilyon
Rick L. Rose
Rick B. Hoggard
Llsa A. Yerkovich
Brent D. Wride
Michael E. Blue
Steven W. Call
Elaine A. Monson
Mark A. Cotter
Greggory J. Savage
Kelly J, Applegate
Justin T. Toth
Uese! B. Stevens
Robert 0. Rice

I.

Reach settlement under the following tenns:
A. Reduce the $400,000 cash to be paid by Woody at closing to
$200,000. This would be a "net" permanent reduction, not a
deferment or offset against any other obligation that Stafford
owes Woody. As I discussed with you last week, the
$200,000 was a number to achieve the approximate amount of
net cash Woody would have received if the entire transaction
were accomplished on a tax free basis as proposed by Woody.
In lieu ofreducing the payment to $200,000, Woody would
still agree that the transaction could be closed as a tax free
dissolution as set forth in our proposed Addendum previously
provided to you, which sets forth instructions to accomplish
the closing on a tax free basis.

B. Both the non-solicitation and right of first refusal provisions in
the second Settlement Agreement will be eliminated.

E. Blaine Rawson
Samuel C. Straight
Matthew R. Lewis

Paul C. Burke
Elaina M. Maragakis
D. Zachary Wiseman
Michael D. Mayfield
Brett L Tolman
Bryan K. Bassett
Kamle F. Brown
Janelle Eur!ck Bauer
Gregg D. Stephenson
Kristine M. Larsen
Gregory S. Roberts
Christopher N. Ne!son

Angela E. Atkin
Samuel A, Lambert
David H. Leigh
Gavin M. Reese

Richard H, Madsen, II
Ryan B. SeH
S. Brandon Owen
Charles H. Uvsey

David 8, Dibble
Emily S, Loeffler
Bryant J. McConkie
Maria E. Heckel
Blake R. Bauman
Michael K. Erickson
Eric G. Benson
R. Troy Mo!!erup
Matthew M. Cannon
James A. Sorenson
Mica McKinney
Adam D. Wentz
Robert P. Harrington
Greg M. Newman

Adam K. Richards
James M. Swan
Beth J. Ranschau

Aaron K. Olsen
Kimberly A. Chi!d
Calvin R. Winder
A.J. Green
Katherine E. Priest

C. Stafford may treat the transaction as a purchase. The rest of
the transaction is a tax free distribution in which the parties
receive the A and B properties as previously discussed. To
avoid any misunderstanding, we need to clarify that there will
be no equalization of capital accounts as contained in one of
Kevin Oakey's liquidation analysis worksheets. Each

A

PROFESS10NAL

CORPORATION

OF COUNSEL
Robert M. Graham
M. John Ashton
Gerald T. Snow
Katie A. Eccles
Jordan Christianson

Anjali J. Patel
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or
remaining obligations left intact under the Settlement
Agreements; or
IL Close the Purchase of the Properties under Woody's winning bid.
The second alternative is to return to the original agreement and close
Woody's purchase of the three properties in accordance with his winning bid
of $2,925,000. Woody's deposit remains with the Closing Agent. We would
simply proceed as mandated by the Settlement Agreements. There is no
question that Woody has won the bid and has the right to close. The only
dispute between the parties is the delivery of marketable title to the properties
to Woody. This returns us to at least the three issues previously raised on
behalf of Woody. First, the Outlet Center needs to be deeded from Smith
Chevrolet to Staffwood. 1 Second, we need to come to an agreement on a
"holdback" or indemnity to address the environmental issues on the Smith
Chevrolet property. Finally, there is the issue of the properties being
encumbered by the Stafford leases In order to address the issues related to
the leases, Woody proposes to close with each party reserving all rights on
the Staffwood leases issue, and to leave to the court (or future agreement) the
resolution of the following discrete issues:

1

(1)

Whether Woody's title is subject to the Staffwood leases. If the
Court rules that Woody is entitled to marketable title, and
therefore not subject to the Sta:ffvvood leases, such leases will be
terminated unless Woody and Stafford can agree on FMV lease
terms. However, it has always been Woody's intention to
provide Stafford an appropriate period of time to remain on the
property while he makes alternative arrangements, despite
Woody's legal right to reclaim, free and clear of the leases,
possession of the property immediately upon Closing.

(2)

In the unlikely event the court finds that the property is bound
by the remaining leases, then we would ask for the Court's
determination of the FMV rent to be paid. Under the terms of
the Settlement Agreement, the rent is subject to periodic review
by the Board to bring it to FMV rent. We are approaching the
expiration of the original three year term. The question will be

Last week we e-mailed you regarding whether Stafford has entered into a lease with Teton
Toyota for the Outlet Property and asking for information about such a lease. We repeat that
request and state the obvious which is that such a lease has not received Woody's approval or
consent.

lS

hope that the parties can agree on a "replacement" third member
at this point, Woody will ask the Court to determine the "market
rent" for the properties.
(3)

Until this judicial resolution is achieved, Stafford may continue
to occupy the properties at the current rent. Any determination
by the court will be retroactive.

Obviously, under this second option scenario, we are not asking for a
change to any provision of the Settlement Agreements, meaning that the nonsolicitation and right of first refusal provisions will remain in force. In the
unlikely event the court rules against us on the "market title" issue, we
understand that Stafford has a perpetual one-year renewal right. Woody has
no use for the RV property at this point and needs a renter. So he is willing
to have Stafford remain on the property indefinitely as provided by the
Settlement Agreements as long as he is paying market rent.
This arrangement requires no agreement beyond the Settlement
Agreements already signed. This also means that there is no division of the
balance of the properties unless Stafford wishes to do so, but there is no
agreement as to how that will be completed. We would start from square
one, or just continue to own the properties jointly through Staffwood, which
would continue in existence. We will need to address and resolve some
unilateral actions taken by Stafford with respect to Staffwood properties (e.g.,
return of the Pocatello proceeds), and we will ask the Court to direct that
Stafford no longer make any unilateral decisions in Staffwood, but instead be
required to obtain Woody's agreement. We are also open to the Court's
appointment of a third board member for prospective decisions.
Frankly, Woody would much prefer the second option, but it is up to
Stafford.
Now in conclusion, let us address briefly the "settlement" question. I
have addressed these points with you over the phone, but I will now do so in
writing. We understand and acknowledge (but dispute) your position
regarding the enforceability of our recent settlement negotiations. However,
from our prospective it is absolutely clear we have no settlement, or we
wouldn't still be talking now.

at
accomplished on a tax
acknowledge that whoever closed on a bid pursuant to the Settlement
Agreements has the right to treat the transactions as a purchase. But the
settlement proposals were for a global settlement, rather than a mere closing
under the signed Settlement Agreements. So, under this "global" settlement
proposal, Woody was always asking for Stafford's agreement that the
settlement be completed on a tax free basis, rather than treated as a
"purchase" as provided in the "separate universe" of the Settlement
Agreements. Stafford stated that he would "consider" it.
We have long since learned that there is never a settlement between
these brothers until both parties have signed a formal document, and even
then, they have disputes. Therefore we determined that there would be no
agreement until every point has been agreed to and made part of the
supplemental signed settlement document.
We proposed a closing statement for a tax free closing, and Stafford
rejected it out of hand. Such rejection made it clear that Stafford, contrary to
his earlier statement, never even seriously considered a fully tax free
arrangement. And, furthermore, every time either side has allegedly
"accepted" the terms of a proposed settlement, the "acceptance"
correspondence has included matters not yet agreed upon, which is nothing
more than a rejection of the previous offer and a new "counter offer". We
had no meeting of the minds on any material points and therefore we had no
agreement.
Please be advised this correspondence, as well as all our past mutual
correspondence and discussions, are subject to Rule 408 of the Rules of
Evidence and all other applicable privileges and protections. We urge
Stafford, in the strongest possible terms, to not waste everybody's time, effort
and money (including tens of thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees and
costs) attempting to "enforce" an unenforceable "string of emails",
unresolved material issues and "he said"/ "he said" statements and
assumptions.

\j

not
or
not
timely respond, we will proceed to give notice of closing of our bid under the
Settlement Agreements. If Stafford or Staffwood refuses to move forward, as
outlined in this letter, Woody will talce the appropriate formal legal action.
Respectfully Yours,

RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKERP.C.

~$~
Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage
MSW/ahh
1274135

u/l--0~~

Michael
Spence (Admitted Pro Hae Vice)
Greggory J. Savage (Admitted Pro Hae Vice)
Michael D. Mayfield (Idaho State Bar No. 7857)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaintiff and
Third-Party Plaintiff Woodruff D. Smith

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE, STATE OF IDAHO

STAFFORD L. SMITH,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

V.

Civil No. CV-2014-1434
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Judge Jon Shindurling
Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff.
WOODRUFF D. SMITH,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.

SMITH CHEVROLET CO. INC. and
STAFFWOOD PARTNERSHIP,

to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56(b)

Idaho Rules of

Procedure,

Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaintiff and Third-Party Plaintiff Woodruff D. Smith ("Woody"), by
and through counsel, respectfully submits this Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Stafford Smith's ("Stafford") Opposition to Woody's Motion to Dismiss or in
the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment ("Opp'n") makes one point unmistakably clearStafford is simply trying to cherry-pick select excerpts from the parties' continued negotiations
in hopes that it will create the appearance that the parties entered valid, enforceable contracts.
To that end, Stafford makes the extraordinary argument that, in determining whether enforceable
contracts exist, this Court should not even consider several communications that Stafford
attached to his own Amended Complaint.
Stafford's arguments about those communications and the negotiations generally are
unavailing for at least two reasons. First, the communications between the parties, both before
and after January 30, 2014, make it unmistakably clear that the parties contemplated a
formalized, all-encompassing settlement agreement that was never realized. Second,
communications between the parties after January 30, 2014, are not "extrinsic evidence, as
Stafford contends, but instead are relevant to the threshold question of whether contracts were
entered in the first place. That Stafford himself attached those communications to his own
Amended Complaint establishes that Stafford understands their relevance to this dispute. The
lS

the

did not enter enforceable contracts about the purchase
2

or

of the Staffwood properties. Instead, they engaged

a series of

negotiations and counter proposals that fell short of settling the dispute.
ARGUMENT
This memorandum is divided in three parts. First, it explains why the three letters on
which Stafford relies did not form enforceable contracts. Second, it explains that the
communications after the January 30 Letter should not be excluded, but instead are relevant to
the key questions of contract formation and establish that the parties did not enter valid contracts.
Third, it explains that Stafford's failure to even address Woody's arguments about Stafford's
claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and promissory estoppel
is a concession that those claims are defective.

I.

The Parties Did Not Form Enforceable Contracts Because Their Communications
Were Simply a Series of Back-and-forth Negotiations Toward an All-Encompassing
Settlement Agreement That Was Never Reached.
Stafford goes to great lengths to argue that only the December 20 Letter, the January 13

Letter, and the January 30 Letter between the parties should be considered for purposes of
determining whether the parties formed contracts. (Opp'n at 16-17.) Part II of this motion
explains why that argument is misguided, but regardless, Stafford cannot get around the fact that
those three letters alone establish that that parties did not enter an enforceable contract. Instead,
the letters make clear that the parties contemplated a formalized, all-encompassing settlement
agreement and that they were simply engaged in a series of negotiations and counter proposals
toward that end. The three letters rebut Stafford's contentions and make clear that there is no
)

Properties, or
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the

The Parties Did Not Form an Enforceable Contract for
Bid Properties.

Purchase of the

Stafford contends that the parties entered into an enforceable contract which he labels the
"Bid Properties Purchase Agreement," but that contention fails. As a threshold matter, there is
no document entitled the "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement" as Stafford suggests, he made
that name out of whole cloth.
There also is no enforceable "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement" because there was
never an "offer" or "acceptance" of such an agreement. It is axiomatic that "/ajn offer . .. must

be so complete that upon acceptance an agreement is formed which contains all of the terms
necessary to determine whether the contract has been performed or not" and that "[a]n
acceptance of an offer, to be effectual, must be identical with the offer and unconditional, and

must not modify or introduce any new terms into the offer." CH Leavell & Co. v. Grafe &
Assocs., Inc., 90 Idaho 502,511,414 P.2d 873 (Idaho 1966) (emphasis added). Stafford suggests
that Woody accepted the terms of his December 20 "offer," but the reality is that Stafford's
December 20, 2013 Letter was not a valid offer and was followed by a series of counter
proposals and clarifications that refute any notion of acceptance. This memorandum addresses
the December 20 Letter, the January 13 Letter, and the January 30 Letter in tum to explain why
those three letters together do not form valid contracts.

1.

December 20 Letter

Stafford recites a sentence from the December 20 Letter to argue that it "makes clear that
Stafford intended the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement to be an independent agreement."

4

at 8.)

Stafford overlooks that

matters is "the intention of the parties, not just

one party, to enter a formalized contract. Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 898, 204 P.3d
532 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The December 20 Letter makes
clear that Woody contemplated a broad settlement agreement, instead of an independent
agreement about the Bid Properties, because it states that \Voody "requested that the proceeds
from the sale [of Staffwood' s Pocatello property] not be distributed untilthe parties reach a

settlement agreement." (Am. Compl. Ex. A (emphasis added).) Thus, Stafford's counsel
acknowledged that, at least in Woody's mind, the parties were negotiating towards a broad
settlement agreement.
The December 20 letter also makes clear that Stafford himself contemplated a formalized
agreement that would be signed by both parties:
Assuming the sale takes place as planned, 1t 1s proposed that the net
proceeds from this sale be distributed to the partners once an agreement is
signed in writing regarding Stafford's purchase of the subject bid
properties, or, alternatively, that these funds be distributed simultaneously
with the closing of Stafford's purchase of the bid properties.

(Id. (emphasis added)) To be sure, that sentence suggests that Stafford was proposing a
formalized agreement about the Bid Properties, but nonetheless it establishes that Stafford
contemplated an agreement that would be formalized and signed by both parties. The language
in that letter makes clear that the parties contemplated much more than back-and-forth letters as
a basis for agreement.
The December 20 letter also makes clear that its proposals did not cover certain terms
were

to a

agreement

the
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s

we reach an agreement on Staffwood's purchase

the bid properties, we will expect to

promptly receive your proposal for dividing Staffwood's remaining properties between the
partners." (Id.) Stafford argues that this language "establishes that the parties were trying to
fully resolve the dispute regarding the Bid Properties before working on any separate
agreements." (Opp'n at 9.) But the correct reading of that language is that the pariies were
negotiating pieces of a broader settlement agreement one at a time as they worked toward an allencompassing settlement. Stafford argues that such an approach is "piecemeal" and "illogical,"
(Opp'n at 18), but it is commonplace for parties to negotiate broad settlement agreements in such
fashion, reaching agreements in principle on certain portions and then negotiating other portions
with those tentative agreements in mind. In short, the December 20 letter establishes that the
paiiies contemplated a formalized, all-encompassing settlement agreement and that certain
material terms for any such settlement were not outlined therein.
2.

January 13 Letter

Stafford argues that "if Woody had intended to reserve a right to later negotiate the terms
of the Agreements, he should have made his acceptance and subsequent offer conditional on a
formal signed writing." (Opp'n at 19.) The problem for Stafford is that is precisely what Woody
did. Point number 2 in Woody's January 13 Letter specified such a formalized agreement in no
uncertain terms: "Funds escrowed by Woody in the bid process shall be returned upon finalizing
this Agreement." (Am. Compl. Ex. B.) That statement makes clear that the January 13 Letter
was not the "unconditional acceptance" that Stafford describes and that any valid acceptance
the

a finalized agreement. Indeed, as discussed above, Stafford
6

3

the December 20 Letter that Woody requested such a "settlement agreement."
Compl. Ex. A.) Moreover, in his January 30 Letter, Stafford's own counsel acknowledged
that such a formalized agreement was required, writing, "the parties will still need to
prepare and sign a third Settlement Agreement." (Am. Compl. Ex. D (emphasis added).)

These communications make clear that both parties understood that a formalized settlement
agreement was required to form an enforceable contract. 1
The January 13 Letter rebuts Stafford's argument that Woody unconditionally accepted
an offer in other ways as well. The second line of that letter, for example, stated that "[f]or
purposes of certainty and clarification, we set forth below further detail about our understanding
of the terms of settlement." (Am. Compl. Ex. B (emphasis added).) It is significant that the

January 13 Letter used the phrase "terms of settlement" and that it outlined ten different "points
of understanding," only three of which directly related to the Bid Properties. (Id.) That language
makes clear that Woody was not unconditionally accepting a discrete offer about the Bid
Properties as Stafford contends, but instead was outlining various "terms" or proposals for a
broad settlement agreement that had yet to be reached.
Finally, Stafford tries to make much out of the fact that the January 13 Letter also
included a proposed closing date. (Opp'n at 19.) But the 30-day closing date was just another
proposal that undercuts the notion of a valid contract. That proposal does nothing to cure the

1

As addressed below, Stafford's counsel specifically recognized in an e-mail that when it comes to
dealings between Stafford and Woody, "prior history indicates that when trying to finalize agreements
between these parties, the' devil is in the details."' Stafford would prefer that the Court ignore his
counsel's recognition of the reality of these circumstances.
7
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myriad defects in Stafford's theory and instead establishes that the parties had not formed
enforceable agreements.
3.

January 30 Letter

The January 30 Letter also puts to rest any notion that the parties intended to enter two
discrete contracts instead of an all-encompassing settlement agreement. That letter made clear
that "the parties will still need to prepare and sign a third Settlement Agreement regarding this
matter inasmuch as a number of terms arc not covered by the enclosed Addendum." (Am.

Compl. Ex. D (emphasis added).) The January 30 Letter then outlined several proposals for a
settlement agreement and asked whether Woody would "agree that the parties should prepare
and sign a third settlement agreement along the lines proposed herein." (Id.) Stafford attempts
to parse the language of that sentence to suggest that it made "clear that a formal signed writing
was not necessary" and instead simply asked whether Woody agreed that the parties should
prepare and sign a third settlement agreement at all. (Opp'n at 11.) But the most natural reading
of that sentence is that it asks not whether the parties should prepare and sign a settlement
agreement at all, but instead whether they should prepare and sign a settlement agreement "along
the lines proposed herein." (Am. Compl. Ex. D.) Indeed, that is the only plausible reading of

that sentence in light of other portions of that letter, in which Stafford's counsel is unequivocal
that such a settlement agreement is required: "the parties still need to prepare and sign a third
Settlement Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of the terms are not covered
by the enclosed Addendum." (Id (emphasis added).)

8

The January 30 Letter establishes that the parties' "negotiations themselves indicate

a

written draft [contract was] contemplated at the final conclusion of the negotiations." Lawrence
Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892,898,204 P.3d 532 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted).

Stafford's claims fail because the parties never entered such a contract.
B.

The Parties Did Not Form an Enforceable Contract for the Division of
Staffwood's Remaining Real Property.

Stafford also fails to establish that the parties entered an enforceable agreement about the
remaining Staffwood property. Stafford argues that in the January 30 Letter "Stafford accepted
Woody's offer to divide Staffwood's remaining real property." (Opp'n at 21.) But the plain
language of that letter makes clear that no agreement was reached. Instead, it proposed various
new terms for Woody's consideration, some of which were in an enclosed draft Addendum
related to the purchase and division of properties. Stafford suggests that the draft Addendum
"was an express recognition that the parties had reached agreement on all material terms of the
Agreements and accordingly, the parties could now proceed to close on the required real
property transactions." (Opp' n at 21.) The draft Addendum, however, is a far cry from such "an
express recognition," and instead establishes that the parties had not reached agreement on
several material terms. Moreover, as explained above, the January 30 Letter rebuts Stafford's
argument about "an express recognition that the parties had reached an agreement on all material
terms" where it states, "the parties will still need to prepare and sign a third Settlement
Agreement regarding this matter inasmuch as a number of the terms are not covered by the
enclosed Addendum." (Id.) That statement is at odds with any notion of "an express
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on all material terms" and forecloses Stafford's argument of an

of

enforceable contract about the remaining Staffwood properties.
Other proposals were outlined in the letter itself, including seven "issues," or material
terms, that needed to be addressed for settlement. An acceptance, is simply not valid if it is not
"identical with the offer and unconditional" or if it "modiflies] or introduce[s] any new terms
into the offer." Leavell, 90 Idaho at 511 (emphasis added). The January 30 letter ran afoul of
those requirements. The three letters on which Stafford relies simply did not form an
enforceable contract with respect to the Bid Properties of remaining Staffwood properties.
II.

The Communications From After January 30, 2014, Which Stafford Attached to his
Own Amended Complaint, Arc Not "Extrinsic Evidence" And Establish that the
Parties Failed to Form Enforceable Contracts.
Stafford argues that "[t]o establish the enforceability of the terms of the Agreements, the

Court only needs to consider the three letters that formed the Agreements" and that "[a]ll other
correspondence is extrinsic evidence." (Opp'n at 6-7.) This argument is simply an attempt by
Stafford to tell less than the full story. The three letters on which Stafford relies fall short of
forming enforceable contracts for the reasons outlined above. But the other communications
between the parties arc also relevant and further establish that the parties had not formed valid
contracts. This part explains in turn (1) why the other communications between the parties are
not "extrinsic evidence" and should not be ignored, (2) why the February 5 (a.m.) and 6 Emails
establish that no agreement had been entered, and (3) why the February 5 p.m. Email from
Stafford's counsel is properly before this Court and makes clear that the parties had not entered

an

contract

JO

Stafford's Arguments About "Extrinsic Evidence" Are Misplaced Because
They Relate to Proper Interpretations of Valid Contracts, Not Whether a
Contract Was Formed to Begin With.
Stafford asserts that communications between the parties after the January 30 Letter "arc
extrinsic evidence" and "irrelevant to the interpretation of the Agreements." (Opp'n at 17.)
Stafford's argument is that those subsequent communic~tions "cannot be used to change or
negate the parties' agreements." (Opp'n at 7.) Those arguments, however, are based on a flawed
premise. Woody does not reference those subsequent communications to "vary" or alter any
agreements. Those subsequent communications are instead relevant to the threshold question of
whether the parties formed enforceable agreements to begin with. Stafford recognized the
relevance of those communications when he attached all but one of them to his Amended
Complaint. Stafford thus now finds himself in the odd position of asserting that the Court should
ignore the very materials that he attached to his Amended Complaint and incorporated by
reference.
Stafford cites In re University Place/Idaho Water Center Project to argue that "extrinsic
evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not admissible to
contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract." (Opp'n at 17-18
(quoting 146 Idaho 527, 536 (2008).) But Stafford conveniently omits the first portion of that
sentence, which makes clear that that rule only applies "[i]f a written contract is complete upon
its face and unambiguous." In re University Place, 146 Idaho at 536. In other words, this notion
of extrinsic evidence applies to the interpretation of contracts that are presumed to be valid, not
contracts were

The Idaho Supreme Court made

point

when it rejected an argument similar to

Stafford's in CH Leavell & Co. v. Grafe & Associates. 90 Idaho 502,414 P.2d 873 (1966).
One of the paiiies in CH Leavell argued that "when two parties have entered into a binding
contract, subsequent attempted modifications by one party do not impair the agreement
previously reached." Id. at 512,877. But the Court observed, "[t]hat conclusion, however, begs
the issue, i.e., was a binding contract entered into?" Id. In other words, the Comi made clear
that whether a valid contract had been formed to begin with is the threshold question. To answer
that question, the court did not exclude certain "subsequent" communications on the basis that
they were extrinsic, as Stafford recommends here, but instead determined that "[tj/1e record fails
to establish that the parties had a complete meeting of the minds ... " Id. (emphasis added).
Stafford's attempt to exclude the parties' communications after January 30th is misguided
because the question before the Court is whether a binding contract had been formed in the first
place, not whether such a contract should be varied or modified.
Other decisions also make clear that communications like those that Stafford seeks to
exclude are relevant to whether the parties formed a contract. The Idaho Court of Appeals, for
example, explained in Lawrence v. Hutchinson that whether a contract was formed "is largely a
question of intent," which can "be determined by the surrounding facts and circumstances of
each particular case." 146 Idaho 892, 898, 204 P.3d 532, 538. Those "circumstances" include
"whether the negotiations themselves indicate that a 1;vritten draft is contemplated at the final
conclusion of the negotiations." Id Under that rule, the communications between Stafford and
are not extrinsic,

instead are relevant to the parties' intent
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two

reasons.

they show that the parties were continuing to negotiate several material terms of

their purported agreement, which is conclusive evidence that they had not yet reached a final
agreement. Second, those communications establish that the parties intended for their agreement
to take the form of a formalized, written settlement agreement, not a series of back-and-forth
letters. The subsequent communications that Stafford seeks to exclude are not extrinsic
evidence, but instead establish that the parties did not enter enforceable contracts to begin with.
B.

The February 5 (a.m.) and 6 Emails Further Establish That the Parties Had
Not Entered Enforceable Agreements.

The February 5 (a.m.) and 6 Emails are two of the communications that are relevant to
whether the parties entered enforceable agreements and should not be excluded as extrinsic
evidence. The February 5 a.m. Email established that no enforceable contract had been formed
about a purchase of the Bid Properties. Referring to the closing for the purchase of the bid
properties, Stafford's counsel asked "[w]hen do you anticipate getting back to us on our
proposal[?]" (Am. Compl. Ex. C.) That question makes clear that there was no final agreement
at that time. Woody's counsel further established that there was no enforceable agreement when
he responded on February 6 that "it seems we are very close to agreement, subject to some
clarifications or decisions on the following list of issues." (Id (emphasis added).) That

statement and the accompanying list of unresolved issues further show that the parties had not
had a meeting of the minds as to several material terms and therefore had not formed a valid
contract about the purchase of the bid properties. The February 5 (a.m.) and 6 Emails are
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conclusive evidence that the parties did not enter an enforceable contract about the purchase of
the Bid Properties.
C.

The February 5 p.m. Email Is Properly Before the Court and Establishes
That No Enforceable Agreements Had Been Reached.

Stafford also asserts that a February 5, 2014 email from his counsel (the "February 5 p.m.
Email") "should be ignored by the Court entirely." (Opp'n at 15.) A copy of that email is
attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Stafford argues that the February p.m. Email should be excluded
under Rule 12(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure because it "is neither referenced by nor
attached to the Complaint or any of the pleadings before the Court." (Id.) Stafford's Amended
Complaint, however, incorporates by reference the various back-and-forth negotiations between
the parties, stating, "[ w]hile there was some additional back and forth on some other nonmaterial terms, regarding which the parties ultimately reached agreement, the written exchanges
between the attorneys for Plaintiff and Defendant establish ... " (Am. Compl.

ir 36.)

Those

"back and forth" negotiations and "written exchanges between the attorneys" certainly include
the February 5 p.m. Email from Stafford's counsel. Stafford's own allegations accordingly make
clear that the February 5 p.m. Email is not a matter outside the pleadings, as Stafford contends.
Stafford's Rule 12 arguments fail for another reason as well. Stafford seems to ignore
that Woody brought this motion under both Rule 12 and Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure as a Motion to Dismiss Or in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus,
even if the February 5 p.m. email were outside the pleadings, which it is not, this Court could
consider it under the summary judgment standards of Rule 56. Rule 12(b) does not mandate that
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the Court ignore the email as Stafford suggests, but instead simply provides that if on a motion to
dismiss "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." I.R.C.P.
12(b). Woody's Motion and accompanying discussion of the February 5 p.m. Email, therefore,
is wholly consistent with the standards outiined in Rule 12 regarding matters outside of the
pleadings.
Stafford also contends that Woody cannot attach a copy of the February 5 p.m. Email to
this Reply. (Opp'n 15.) That contention, however, lacks merit. Stafford relies on Rule 56(c) of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to support his contention, but that rule says nothing that
would prevent Woody from attaching that email to this Reply Memorandum. Moreover, the
February 5 p.m. Email is attached as an exhibit to Woody's Opposition to Stafford's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings so it is already properly before the Court. Stafford simply does not
have a basis to exclude this communication from the Court's consideration.
The reason that Stafford tries to manufacture a basis to exclude the February 5 p.m.
Email, however, is clear: the February 5 p.m. Email unequivocally establishes that the parties
had not formed enforceable agreements. Stafford's counsel explained in that email, "[w]e have
yet to receive a response to the proposal we sent you last Thursday so we don't know at this
stage how close we are to an agreement." (Ex. 1 (emphasis added).) That admission rebuts any

notion that the parties had an enforceable agreement on January 30, and makes clear that the
parties were still engaged in back-and-forth negotiations. The February 5 p.m. Email also makes
clear that the parties contemplated an agreement that was more formalized and detailed
15

negotiations and counter proposals in the letters that Stafford cites. Indeed, Stafford's counsel
wrote, "[ uJnfortunately, prior history indicates that when trying to finalize agreements between
these parties, the 'devil is in the details."' (Ex. 1 (emphasis added).) The February 5 p.m.

Email makes clear that (1) the parties had not yet reached an agreement, and (2) the parties
contemplated an agreement that would be sufficiently formalized and detailed.

III.

Stafford Does Not Even Address Woody''s Arguments About the Implied Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing And Promissory Estoppel.

Finally, Stafford's Opposition is also notable because it does nothing to address the
defects in Stafford's claims for (1) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and (2) promissory estoppel. Stafford's failure to even discuss those claims is a tacit concession
that those claims lack merit.
Specifically, Stafford's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing fails because that covenant only applies where the paiiies have formed a valid contract.
In contrast, where, as here, an agreement between parties "is not enforceable, there are no
obligations imposed by the agreement that the parties are required to perform in good faith."
Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'l Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 (Idaho 2005).

Stafford's claim of promissory estoppel is also defective. The bottom line is that
"[p]romissory estoppel is simply a substitute for consideration, not a substitute for an agreement
between parties." Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 367-68. For that reason, the "doctrine of promissory
estoppel is of no consequence," where, as here, "[w]hat is lacking is a sufficiently definite
agreement" id In tacit recognition of this defect, Stafford does not even attempt to argue that
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claim of promissory estoppel has merit. Stafford's claims of breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and promissory estoppel should accordingly be dismissed.

CONCLUSION
Despite his efforts to cherry-pick the communications between the parties, Stafford
simply fails to state valid contract claims because the parties did not form valid, enforceable
contracts about the purchase of the Bid Properties or division of other properties owned by
Staffwood. The parties instead were simply engaged in ongoing negotiations toward a final
settlement agreement that would accomplish what two prior settlement agreement had failed to
do. Such an agreement was never reached. The Amended Complaint should accordingly be
dismissed.
DATED this 29th day of May, 2014.

Micha W.~p nee
Greggory J. Savage
Michael D. Mayfield
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaim-Plaintiff
and Third-Party Stafford Woodruff D. Smith

17

4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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foregoing DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO

DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was
maiied, First Class, postage prepaid, to the following:
Kara L. Pettit
Michael R. Carlston
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Stanley J. Preston
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Five Gateway Office Center
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Exhibit 1

Greggory Savage
from:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:

Michael Spence;
Mike Carlston (mcarlston@scmlaw.com}; Bryan M. Scott; Damian Smith
Release of Woody's Escrow Funds

Mike and Gregg,
Stafford received earlier today a request from Hal Bennett to allow Woody to withdraw his escrow deposit from
TitleOne. We have advised Stafford that we should respond to this request through counsel. Hal cites as the basis for
this request the fact that the parties "have reached an agreement in principle and are just hammering out the
details." Unfortunately, prior history indicates that when trying to finalize agreements between these parties, the "devil
is in the details." We have yet to receive a response to the proposal we sent you last Thursday so we don't know at this
stage how close we are to an agreement. In light of Mike's email to me last Thursday that "there will, indeed, be a
material issue or two," (that he is cautiously optimistic will be worked out), we do not think it is advisable to release the
escrow funds at this time. The offer we made on December 20, 2013, which Woody accepted by means of your letter
dated January 13, 2014, stated at paragraph 2 that the escrow funds would be released at the closing and my client
wants to hold to this provision.
We recognize that you need an appropriate period of time to fully evaluate our last proposal and to discuss it with your
client. Nonetheless, we believe the proposal is fair to both sides and we did our best not to introduce anything that was
inconsistent with the outlined settlement and an appropriate division of Staffwood's property. As a result, we are
hopeful that we can move forward with the Closing in a matter of days, along the lines we proposed, and then work
together to get a formal settlement agreement in place thereafter, as discussed in my letter dated January 30, 2014. Of
course, Woody's escrowed funds would be released to him as part of this Closing. Thus, we do not anticipate that
Woody will have to wait much longer to have his funds released to him in any event. In the meantime, we look forward
to hearing from you regarding a Closing date and if you have any suggested changes to the Addendum previously sent to
you, Regards, Stan
Stanley J. Preston
PRESTON & SCOIT
Five Gateway Office Center
178 S. Rio Grande St, Suite 250
SLC, UT 84101
Tel.: 801-869-1620
Fax: 801-869-1621

DD: 801-869-1623
sip@prestonandscott.com
www.prestonandscott.com
The information contained in this e-mail and any attachments Is confidential and solely for the use of the intended recipient. If the intended
recipient is our client, then this information is also a privileged attorney-client communication. Unauthorized use or disclosure of this information
is prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, do not read it. Please delete it from your system without copying it, and notify the
sender by e-mail or by calling 801-869-1620, so that our address record can be corrected. Thank you.
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Kara L. Pettit (Idaho State Bar No. 5276)
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Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff/counterclaim
defendant Stafford L. Smith ("Stafford") and Third-Party Defendant Smith Chevrolet Co. Inc.
("Smith Chevrolet") respectfully submit this Reply Memorandum, which is filed in support of
their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Plaintiff's Motion"). 1

INTRODUCTION Al~D SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Woody's opposition to Plaintiff's Motion neither acknowledges nor references the
undisputed the fact that Stafford expressly made a written "offer" to purchase the Bid Properties
that Woody unconditionally "accepted." 2 Apparently to Woody the acceptance of an offer does
not form a contract; it is merely a starting point for negotiations. This position is rebutted by the
unambiguous terms of the December 20, January 13 and January 30 Letters, which establish a
meeting of the minds on the material terms necessary to enforce the Agreements.
Woody argues that these three letters merely attempted to negotiate an "all-encompassing
settlement agreement." To the contrary, the words "all-encompassing settlement," or "global
senlement," do not appear in these three letters. In addition, the January 13 Letter, which was
crafted by Woody's attorneys, is carefully written so that it does not constitute a "counter-offer."

1

Plaintiff's Motion seeks judg1nent on all claims assert.ed in this lawsuit, both the claims brought by
Stafford in his Amended Complaint (the "Complaint") and the claims asserted by defendant/
counterclaimant/third-party plaintiff WoodrnffD. Smifu ("Woody") in his Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint (the "Counterclaim").
2

Here, Stafford uses the same defined terms used in his prior pleadings and memoranda filed with this
Court. Specifically, the "Bid Properties Purchase Agreement," refers to the parties agreement that
Stafford would purchase fue "Bid Properties" (the "Smith Chevrolet Property," the "RV Property," and
the "Outlet Property") from "Staffwood" (the Idaho general partnership owned 50/50 by Stafford and
Woody. The "Division of Staffwood Properties Agi-eement," refers to the parties' agreement to divide up
Staffwood's remaining real es:tate. These two "Agreements" were formed by the "December 20 Letter,"
the "January 13 Letter" and the "January 30 Letter:'
2
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Stafford accepted Woody's offer to divide up Staffwood' s remaining properties, and the facts
establish that the parties agreed on all material terms that were part of the Agreements. In fact,
with respect to the only other "proposal" contained in the January 13 Letter (paragraph 8
regarding the tax-free distribution), Woody's attorneys expressly stated that "since this provision
is outside of the terms of Stafford's offer, we make clear that we do not require Stafford's
agreement to paragraph no. 8." Ex. B to Compl.
Woody's argument that the Agreements were never formed is primarily based on his
selective quotations from subsequent communications between the parties' attorneys. Indeed,
Woody attaches for the first time in this case tlvo documents: the "February 5 p.m. Email" from
Stafford's attorneys, and the "March 5 Letter" from Woody's attorneys. These two letters,
however, as well as the other subsequent correspondence cited by Woody, are extrinsic evidence
that cannot be used to vary the terms of the Agreements. Significantly, Woody fails to address
Stafford's arguments regarding exclusion of the parties' subsequent correspondence as extrinsic
evidence, or the fact that it is well-established under Idaho lavv that such extrinsic evidence
cannot vary the Agreements, which were set forth completely and unambiguously in the
December 20, January 13 and January 30 Letters.
Regardless, these letters support Stafford's position. The February 5 p.m. Email
expressly states that it is referring to the "proposal sent last Thursday," which was January 30.
This is a reference to the draft Addendum to the title company and the drafts of the required
deeds that were reqnired for the closing on the agreed real estate transactions in accordance with
the terms of the Agreements. Thus, the repeatedly cited statement about the "devil is in the
3
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details" is not referencing the Agreements, or any material terms related thereto, but was
referencing the need to finalize and agree on the form of the instructions to the title company and
the deeds which were required to implement the closing. See Ex. D to Compl.
Similarly, the March 5 Letter establishes, consistent with Stafford's arguments herein,
that Woody had reversed his prior express position, and was now asserting that structuring the
transaction as a tax-free dissolution was material to the Agreements, which is directly contrary to
his stated position in the January 13 Letter and the February 6 Email. The March 5 Letter also
shows that Woody was trying to re-negotiate the terms of the Agreements and that he was
refusing to proceed with the closing unless his new terms were met, which conclusively
establishes his breach of the Agreements. Finally, this letter also shows that Woody cannot point
to any material terms that were not resolved by the Agreements.
In opposing Plaintiffs Motion, Woody repeatedly states that there was no agreement on
several material terms that were raised in the January 13 and January 30 Letters. This argument
is without merit, because Stafford, in his January 30 Letter accepted Woody's proposal for
division of Staffwood's remaining property. Woody fails to identify any other material terms
which were not agreed to by the parties, except for two alleged terms. First is Woody's proposal
that the real estate transactions be done on a tax-free basis. As noted above, the failure to agree
on this proposal cannot render the Agreements unenforceable because Woody expressly stated
that it was not a condition to closing on the agreed real estate transactions. Second is the parties'

failure to sign a formal settlement agreement. The December 20, January 13 and January 30
Letters make it clear that the Agreements were not conditioned on the parties signing a formal
4
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settlement agreement. In addition, the fact that a signed formal settlement agreement is not a
material term to the Agreements is demonstrated by the fact that Woody has failed to identify

any material terms that would have been included in such a formal agreement, to which the
parties had not already agreed.
Woody's so le argument for opposing the Court's exercise of its inherent equitable power
to specifically enforce the Agreements is based on a misreading of Idaho law. Woody
mistakenly asserts that specific performance is only allowed where there is clear and convincing
evidence of the agreement. While the three letters do satisfy this enhanced burden of proof,
Idaho law only requires that clear and convincing evidence when enforcing an oral contract.
Here the Agreements are in writing, so Woody's argument is inapplicable.
Finally, Woody seeks in conclusory fashion to argue that the enforceability of the
Agreements does not moot most of his counterclaims. He does so without providing a single
reason why his counterclaims would not be mooted. Woody's vague assertion that his claims
would survive a determination that the Agreements are enforceable further illnstrates that the key
issue in this case is the Agreements' enforceability.

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Woody's background section is nearly identical to this same section in his memorandum
supporting his motion to dismiss. Stafford has already addressed Woody's position in this
section in Stafford's opposing memorandum to Woody's motion to dismiss, where Stafford
demonstrates that the December 20, January 13 and January 30 Letters formed the Agreements,
and that the Agreements are complete on their face and show a clear agreement as to all of the
5
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material terms. See Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 5-14. 3 However, Woody makes a few additional points
in his opposition to Plaintiffs Motion that warrant a response.
A.

The January 13 Letter

Significantly, Woody does not address how the Court should interpret the opening line of
his letter: "Woody hereby accepts Stafford's offer as set forth in your letter of December 20,
2013." Ex. B to Comp!. Woody's attorneys drafted this letter and knew exactly what they were
doing by accepting Woody's offer unconditionally up front. Setting forth "further detail about
our understanding of the terms of settlement" does not in any way modify Woody's
unconditional acceptance. Regardless, this "further detail" was acknowledged by Stafford and
shows that the parties had a meeting of the minds on these points. See Pl.'s Mem. at 24; Ex. D to
Compl.
Despite the clear evidence of acceptance, Woody's attorneys now argue that the terms
introduced in the January 13 Letter were new terms that "negated any notion of acceptance."
Def's Opp. Mem. at 25. Woody cannot have it both ways. His anomeys clearly stated their
acceptance of Woody's offer and worded their proposal so as not to undermine that acceptance.

See PL' s Mem. at 23. They cannot now claim that these terms negated Woody's express
acceptance. The language of the January 13 Letter is a clear and unambiguous unconditional
acceptance of Woody's offer, but to the extent that there is any ambiguity about Woody's
acceptance it must be construed against Woody's position. It is easy to imagine that if Stafford
had tried to back out of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement, Woody could have used his
3

Stafford also sets forth his position on this issue in his supporting memorandum to Plaintiff's Motion.

See PL' s Mem. at 20-31.
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opening sentence of acceptance to argue that the parties reached an agreement. Parties should be
discouraged from including ambiguity in settlement negotiations as a way to later argue the
position that becomes most favorable. See Roth v. lvfalson, 67 Cal. App. 4th 552, 559 (Cal. Ct
App. 1998) ("Can any reasonable person ignore the possibility that a plantiff who seeks to
enforce such an 'agreement' in his favor would not use his action to avoid the purchase if it were

not in his favor. This potential for game-playing must be avoided at all costs." (emphasis in
original)).
The principle of law relied upon by Woody is that "[a]n acceptance of an offer, to be
effectual, must be identical with the offer and unconditional, and must not modify or introduce
any new terms into the offer." C. H Leavell & Co. v. Grafe & Assocs., Inc., 414 P.2d 873, 877
(Idaho 1966) (emphasis added); Def.'s Opp. Mem. at 24. Woody clearly accepted the offer Jn
the opening sentence of the January 13 Letter. Further, he did not attach any conditions to that
acceptance. Accordingly, the additional terms proposed in the January 13 Letter could not have
been an attempt to add "new terms into the offer," which was unconditionally accepted, and
would have to be a separate offer. Of course, this interpretation is consistent with the language
of the Agreements as well as the language in Stafford's December 20 Letter that "once we reach
an agreement on [Stafford's) purchase of the bid properties, we will expect to promptly receive
your proposal for dividing Staffwood's remaining properties between the pa1iners." Ex. A to
Compl. Thus, Woody's January 13 Letter was an acceptance of the tenns of the December 20
Letter and an offer for the division of Staffwood's remaining properties, as set forth in Plaintiff's

Memorandum. PL's Mem. at 22-25, 27-29.
7
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The February 5 a.m. and p.m. Emails.

Woody purports to quote language (specifically, the repeatedly cited "devil is in the
details" sentence) from the February 5 a.m. Email, when this language is not in this email.
Instead this language is only in the February 5 p.m. Email. Compare Def.'s Opp. Mem. at 9 with
Page 2 of Ex. C to Compl. In fact, Woody's opposing memorandum mistakenly creates the
impression that this language is in both the February 5 a.m. and the February 5 p.m. Emails,
when it is not. 4
This is worth noting because, while the February 5 a.m. Email was attached to the
Complaint, and therefore part of the pleadings before the Court, the February 5 p.m. Email is
before the Court for the first time because it was attached to Woody's opposing memorandum.
While the February 5 p.m. Email is ''extrinsic evidence" that is "not admissible to contradict,

vary, alter, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract" (see In re University Place/Idaho

Warer Center Project, 199 P.3cl 102, 111 (Idaho 2008)), it is consistent with the existence of the
Agreements. This email was written in response to a request to allow Woody to withdraw an
escrow deposit. See Def.'s Opp. Mem. at 9 and Ex. 1 thereto. This request was made on the
basis "that the parties 'have reached an agreement in principle and are just hammering out the

details.'" Ex. 1 to Def 's Opp. Mem. A review of the relevant communications reveals that the
referenced "details" that were being hammered om were the form of the escrow instructions and
deeds necessary to close on the agreed real estate transactions. Specifically, the February 5 p.m.
4

This time, the inclusion of this quote in the context of the February 5 a.m. Email appears to be an artifact

from copying and pasting Woody's arguments from his supporting memorandum to his motion to dismiss
into this memorandum, since the same quote is repeated in its proper context in the following paragraph.

See Def. 's Opp. Mem. at 9.
8
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Email states:
Unfortunately, prior history indicates that when trying to finalize agreements
between these parties, the 'devil is in the details.' We have yet to receive a
response we sent to you last Thursday so we don't know at this stage how close
we are to an agreement.
Ex. l to Def.'s Opp. Mem. (emphasis added). The prior Thursday was January 30, and refers to
the draft Addendum and warranty deeds that were enclosed with the January 30 Letter, which
states:
Enclosed is a draft Addendum to the TitleOne Escrow Instructions to effect a
Closing regarding Stafford's purchase of the properties subject to the bid process,
as well as the transfer of Property Set A to Woody and Property Set B to Stafford,
as well as drafts of the Special Warranty Deeds to be attached as Exhibits to the
Addendum.
Please let me know as soon as possible if you have any suggested changes to the
enclosed Addendmn ....
Ex. D to Compl. 5
Thus, regardless of how many times Woody cites and attempts to rely on the "devil is in
the details" quote, a review of the January 13 Letter and the Febrnary 5 p.m. Email establishes
that this is not a reference to a failure to reach agreement on the material terms that had already
been agreed on to enforce the Agreements, but it is referencing the need to finalize and agree on
the form of the instructions to the title company and the deeds which were required to implement

the closing. See id. The draft Addendum was an attempt by Stafford's co1.msel to draft closing

5

As of February 5, 2014, Woody had not responded to Stafford's proposed draft Addendum and the
deeds, and Stafford was naturally following up on that as Stafford "would like to close this matter this
week" Ex. C to Com pl. Further, if the Agreements were not effective and/or a formal settlement
agreement was required, Stafford would have had no reason to hope that closing could be accomplished
"this week" when February 5 was on Wednesday. See id
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instructions that were consistent with the terms of the Agreement and, as repeatedly stated,
Stafford was requesting Woody's input on revising these instructions and the deeds and related
documents necessary to effect the closing of the agreed real estate transactions, so long as any
suggested changes were consistent with the terms of the Agreements. See Ex:s.

C.

F to Comp!.

The March 6 [sic], 2014 Letter

The Jetter attached as Exhibit 2 to Woody's opposing memorandum is a letter dated
March 5, 2014, not March 6, 2014 (the "March 5 Letter"), as Woody asse1is. Woody claims that
this letter, which was written by Woody's attorneys some six weeks after the Agreements were
entered into, identifies another material term on which the parties had not reached agreements,

i.e., the assertion that "Woody would have to come up with an additional $252,419 in cash
payable to Stafford." Def's Opp. Mem. at 11. The March 5 Letter, however, never references
any such obligation and apparently it is a reference to Woody's change in position where he is
now insisting that the parties treat the transaction as a tax-free dissolution. The March 5 Letter
effectively demonstrates that Woody was trying to add new terms to the Agreements that were
never part of the December 20, January 13 and January 20 Letters. For example., in the March 5
Letter, Woody is insisting that the non-solicitation and right of first refosal provisions in the
2012 Agreement now be removed before he is willing to close on the real estate transactions
agreed to in the Agreements. See Ex. 2 to Def.' s Opp. Mem.
Most troubling, however, is Woody's insistence that the transactions be treated as a tax
free distribution; despite the fact that Woody had expressly stated that this was not a required
condition to Stafford's purchase of the Bid Properties and that, if Stafford did not agree to
10
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Woody's "tax-free" proposal, "the Closing of the bid properties and the subsequent divisions
shall take place exactly as set forth above."

6

B to CompL In fact Woody expressly stated

that Woody did "not require Stafford's Agreement to [the ta.x-free proposal]." Id. 7

It is hard to imagine how Woody could have been any clearer that treating the transaction
as a ta.'l'..-free distribution was not a material term of the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement. In
the January 13 Letter, Woody's attorneys certainly could have made a counteroffer that made
treatment of the transactions as a tax-free a condition to Stafford's purchase of the Bid
Properties, as well as the division of Staffwood' s remaining real property, but Woody expressly
stated it was not. The March 5 Letter conclusively establishes that Woody had second thoughts
about the Agreements he had entered into, and now he is trying to add new tenns and use his
Counterclaim as leverage to force a better deal. This is further demonstrated by the fact that he
is also insisting that the payment to Stafford of $400,000, as part of Stafford's remuneration for
receiving Property Set B of Staffwood's property, should now be reduced by $200,000, even

though it was Woody who made this proposal in the January 13 Letter. Compare Ex. 2 to Def.'s
Opp. Mem. with Ex. B to Campi. Woody should be required to live up to his contractual

obligations, and Woody's subsequent change in position on this issue cannot undo the parties'
Agreements. See Page v. Pasquali, 244 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Idaho 2010) ("Courts cannot revise the
6

Even after the Agreements were formed, Woody continued to recognize Stafford's right to treat the
transaction as a spurchase. Woody's att0meys stated in the February 6 Email, "We realize that Stafford
has the right to treat this as a sale and exchange ofthe 3 bid properties under our Settlement Agreements,
but we ask Stafford to consider a dissolution . . . . Please advise whether Stafford is willing to consider
this." Ex. C to Compl. (emphasis added).
7

Thus, the January 13 Letter establishes the falsity of Woody's assertion in the March 5 Letter that, "A
material part of Woody's proposal, at every tum, has always been that this entire transaction be
accomplished on a tax free basis." Ex. 2 to Def: s Opp. Mem. (emphasis added).
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contract in order to change or make a better agreement for the parties.").

RESPONSE TO WOODY'S RESPONSES TO STAFFORD'S STATEMENT OF
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
Woody's responses to Stafford's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts show that there
are no fact issues preventing the Court from rendering judgment on the claims in this lawsuit as a
matter of law. The Court has the December 20, January 13, and January 30 Letters and Woody
has acknowledged their authenticity. Accordingly, the Court can interpret the Agreements as a
matter of law. To the extent that Woody disputes Stafford's Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts, he does so by asserting that he disputes the fact paragraph "to the extent that it
mischaracterizes" either the nature or content of the certain communications or "the basis and
nature of the dispute." Def's Opp. Mem. at 12-20. In any event, the basis on which he disputes
the fact paragraphs in Plaintiff's supporting memorandum are conclusory and, more importantly,
they do not represent material disputes that would preclt1de the granting of Plaintiffs Motion.

ARGUMENT

I.

WOODY'S ARGUMENTS THAT THE AGREEMENTS ARE NOT VALID AND
ENFORCEABLE ARE WITHOUT JVIERIT.
Stafford has fully set forth his arguments why the Agreements are binding and

enforceable under Idaho law in his prior memoranda, which are incorporated herein by this
reference. See Pl.'s Mem. at 18-31; PL's Opp. Mem. at 17-23. Here, Stafford will address the
primary argLiments asserted in Woody's opposing memorandum.
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The Express Language of the Three Letters that Formed the Agreements
Establishes that They Were Not Metely Part of a Negotiation of a Global
Settlement.

Woody's primary argument against the enforceability of the Agreements is that the
December 20, January 13 and Jam1ary 30 Letters were merely part of the negotiations of an "allencompassing settlement agreement." This argument is directly contradicted by the express
language of these three letters. Nowhere in these three letters is there any mention of, nor a
statement that, the offers and acceptances are conditioned on a global settlement of all issues. In
the December 20 Letter, Stafford made an offer to purchase the Bid Properties from Staffwood
on certain terms that Woody unconditionally accepted in the January 13 Letter. In the January
13 Letter, Woody also made a proposal to divide Staff\vood' s remaining properties in response
to Stafford's request that Woody make such a proposal once the parties reached an agreement on
the purchase of the Bid Properties. See Exs. A, B to Comp!. Stafford accepted Woody's
proposal in the January 30 Letter. These three letters show that there was a meeting of minds on
all the material tenns necessary to enforce the real estate transactions agreed to in the
Agreements. Thus, Woody's repeated assertion that the Agreements are not enforceable because
they were "simply pieces of the larger puzzle" (Def.' s Opp. Mem. at 23) is inconsistent with the
express and 1mambiguous tenns of the Agreements.

In addition, Woody's assertions that the parties were only seeking "an all-encompassing
settlement agreement" overlook the fact that_, taken together, the Agreements do resolve the
parties' disputes and accomplish a division of all jointly owned real property. The Agreements
resolved the pressing disputes over the purchase of the Bid Properties, divided up Staffwood's

13
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remaining properties, provided for Staffwood's dissolution at the "end of calendar year 2014,"

and contained a mutual release of claims by the parties. See Ex. B to Comp!. Thus the
Agreements contained all of the material terms necessary for "an all-encompassing settlement
agreement."
Significantly, Woody has not pointed to any material issues that required forther
resolution by the parties. His subsequent complaints about the Agreements were not that they
did not resolve the parties' issues, but that they did not require that the real estate transactions be
structured as a tax-free dissolution. As discussed above, Woody expressly recognized that this
was not a tenn of the Agreements. Woody fails either to identify these material terms or
articulate why they are material to enforcement of the Agreements.
Woody does argue that the Agreements are not enforceable because the parties never
signed a formal settlement agreement. This argument is without merit because the Agreements
are sufficiently definite to be enforceable. Woody argues: "Nor can Stafford explain why an
agreement would need to be 'memorialize[ d]' if it was alteady sufficiently definite." Id. That is
precisely Stafford's point. Because the Agreements \:Vere sufficiently definite to be enforced,
they were not required to be memorialized to be effective. However, just because a formal
agreement was not required does not mean that there would have been no value in memorializing
the Agreements.

ln addition, Woody foils to articulate how a formal settlement agreement would have
resolved any material terms that had not already been agreed upon. Further, it is significant that
Woody has failed to identify a single material issue that would have prevented the parties from
14
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closing on the Agreements or that was not addressed in the Agreements that would need to be
addressed in any formal settlement agreement between the parties, This deficiency also renders
Woody's supposed distinction about Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho inapplicable. Woody
argues that "[t]he parties here have not come anywhere near entering the kind of allencompassing settlement agreement involved in Suitts, which is fatal to Stafford's motion."
Def. 's Opp. Mem. at 32. As discussed above, the Agreements constitute such an "all~
encompassing settlement agreement" similar to that reached in Suitts. Woody's bare assertion to
the contrary, absent a single example of a material term lacking from the Agreements, is not
credible.
Finally, the three letters that formed the Agreements do not state that a condition to the
Agreements is the signing of a fom1al settlement agreement. While Stafford's attorneys
suggested this, they recognized it was not a requirement by expressly recognizing that such a
formal signed agreement was not necessary for the Agreements to be enforceable: "Please let me
know as soon as possible if you have any suggested changes to the enclosed Addendum, and

whether you agree that the parties should prepare and sign a third settlement agreement along
the lines proposed herein." Ex. D to Compl. (emphasis added). In any event, a formal
agreement was not necessary to enforce the clear and complete terms of the Agreements as
neither party made his acceptance conditional upon such a formal agreement.

3

8

In addition, Woody's reliance on the February 6 Email to support his assertion that a signed, formal
settlement agreement was a condition to closing (see Def.'s Opp. Mem. at 28), is unavailing because
Woody never expressed such a requirement when he
his
in the
13 Letter
that "Closing is to be held within 30 days of the date hereof." Ex. B to Comp!.
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Woody's Attempt to Distinguish the Case Law Cited By Stafford Is
Unavailing.

Woody attempts to distinguish two of the cases Stafford cites in his favor: P. 0. Ventures

v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust and Ogden v. Griffith, but ultimately misses the point of
Stafford's citation to each. See Def.'s Opp. Mem. at 29.
Woody seeks to distinguish P. 0. Ventures on the basis that it "involved purely an
agreement to purchase real property" and that '"the Addendum' at issue in that case, 'did not
demonstrate any intent to sign a more formal document in the future.'" Id Stafford cited this
case to show the necessary material terms for enforcement of the Bid Properties Purchase
Agreement See PL's Mem. at 25. The Bid Properties Purchase Agreement is a straightforward
agreement for Stafford to purchase the clearly identified Bid Prope1iies from Staffwood at an
agreed upon price within 30 days from the January 13 Letter. This is exactly analogous to the
agreement in P.O. Ventures. Significantly, while Woody suggests that the Bid Properties
Purchase Agreement did not show agreement "on all of the essential terms," he does not suggest
a single term that would have prevented its enforcement. Def.'s Opp. Mem. at 29. Further, the

attempt to distinguish the case on the basis of requiring a formal document in the future is
irrelevant. That issue is dealt with above and focuses solely on formation of the agreement, not
what the essential terms of the agreement are. Woody has not suggested that if a formal
agreement is intended in the future, the essential terms of the parties' agreement in P.O. Ventures
would have changed. See id.
Woody's attempt to distinguish Ogden fails for some of the same reasons. Again, Woody

tries to
16
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the entire dispute between the parties." Id. As stated above, the Bid Properties Purchase
Agreement settled the parties' immediate, urgent dispute regard[ng the sale of the Bid Properties.
The resulting settlement agreement was a simple agreement to require Stafford to purchase the

Bid Properties from Staffwood. Just as in Ogden, the Bid Properties Purchase Agreement did
not require additional terms that might accompany a settlement agreement because such terms
were not essential to effectuating the payment of funds. See PL' s Mem. at 26 (citing Ogden v.

Griffith, 236 P.3d 1249, 1255 (Idaho 2010)).
C.

Extrinsic Evidence Cannot Be Used to Vary or Contradict the Unambiguous
Language of the Agreements.

Woody's reliance on the communications between the parties' attorneys following the
formation of the Agreements is unavailing because it is a fundamental principle lmder Idaho law

that where ''a written contract is complete upon its face and unambiguous ... extrinsic evidence
of prior or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary,
alter, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract." In re University Place/Idaho Water

Center Project, 199 P.3d 102, 111 (Idaho 2008); Pl.'s Mem. at 4-5, 19, 25-26, 29-30. Woody
fails even to address the inadmissibility of the extrinsic evidence on which he attempts to rely
and has not disputed that all of the parties' correspondence outside of the December 20, January
13, and January 30 Letters constitute extrinsic evidence. See Def.'s Opp Mem. Accordingly, if
the Court finds that the terms within these three letters are "complete upon its face and
unambiguous," which they certainly are, extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary or contradict
the Agreements. In any event, for the reasons discussed above, even if the February 5 p.m.
lS

it

not undercut

of the Agreements because it was an
17
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attempt to finalize the form of the escrow instructions and related deeds necessary to effect a
closing on the real estate transactions agreed to in the Agreements, and there is nothing before
the Court to suggest that the Addendums introduced any new material terms that were
inconsistent with the Agreements.

II.

THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT FOR THE COURT
TO RESOLVE AND ST AFFORD JS ENTITLED TO SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE.
Woody attempts to argue that genuine issues of material fact regarding Woody's breach

prevent the Court from granting Plaintiffs Motion. Def.'s Opp. Mem. at 32-33. However,
Woody fails to identify a single disputed fact that might prevent granting Plaintiff's Motion, but
rather lists issues of law as to the interpretation of the parties' correspondence. The Court has
the parties' correspondence before it and can determine whether the Agreements are enforceable.
The Court also has the parties' correspondence regarding Woody's subsequent backtracking on
the Agreements and his refusal to close. There are no genuine issues of material fact that would
prevent the Court from determining the enforceability of the Agreements and that Woody
breached the Agreements.
Further, Woody has failed to establish that if the Agreements are enforceable, that the
Court should not grant Stafford specific performance of the Agreements. The pa11:ies agree that
the principle expounded in Garner is applicable here, that "[s]pecific performance is an
extraordinary remedy that provides relief when legal remedies are inadequate." See Pl.'s. Mem.
at 31-32; Def.'s Opp. Mem at 33. 1n Plaintiff's Memorandum, Stafford set forth a number of
reasons that legal remedies are inadequate, inclnding that the land at issue is unique and that the
18
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"properties at issue in the Agreements must be transferred from Staffwood to Stafford and

Woody to effectuate a complete separation of the parties' jointly owned real property interests."

PL's Mem. at 32. The general principle of law is that "[t]here is a virtual presumption, because
of the uniqueness of land and the consequent inadequacy of monetary damages, that specific
performance is the byer's appropriate remedy for the vendor's breach of the contract to convey."

Kilarjian v. Vastola, 877 A.2d 372, 376 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2004). Woody has failed to set forth a
single counterargument to these points. See Def.'s Opp. Mem. at 33. 9
Woody's argument against specific performance mistakenly relies on language from

Anderson v. Whipple that the "law requires as a condition to specific performance that the
contract be proved by clear and convincing evidence." Def.'s Opp. Mem. at 33 (quoting

Anderson v. Whipple, 227 P.2d 351, 358 (Idaho 1951)). However, this principle only applies
where a party requests specific performance on an oral contract. The contract at issue in

Anderson was an oral agreement that the tenants were to occupy a parcel of fann property as
tenants for life at a reasonable rental. Anderson, 227 P.2d 351. A later Idaho Supreme Court
case cited Anderson for the correct principle that "[b]efore an oral agreement to convey land will
be specifically enforced, the underlying contract must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence." Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 874 P.2d 528,533 (Idaho 1994) 10 (emphasis

9

Further, given Woody's propensity to back out of his obligations, it will be far easier for the Comt to
order that title change hands than to later go through proceedings to enforce an award of damages in
Stafford's favor.

°

1

Further, all of the cases citing Anderson for this principle involve oral contracts. See, e.g. Thorn
Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Smith, 50 P .3d 97 5 (Idaho 2002) (oral agreement for the conveyance of land);
Jolley v. Clay, 646 P.2d 413, 418 (Idaho 1982) ( oral contract to convey real property); Mclvfahon v.
Auger, 357 P.2d 374 (Idaho 1960) (oral contract to leave by will).
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added) (citing Anderson, 227 P.2d at 358); see also Wingv. Munns, 849 P.2d 954,959 n.2 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1992) ("Where, as here, the plaintiff is seeking specific perfonnance of an oral contract
to covey an interest in real property, the plaintiff must prove both the existence of the agreement
and its terms by clear and convincing evidence."); A1cCandless v. Schick, 380 P .2d 893, 897
(Idaho 1963) ("[A]bsolute certainty and completeness in every detail is not a prereq1Jisite of a
specific performance, only reasonable certainty and completeness being required."). The fact
that the Agreements are written eliminates any need for Stafford to prove them by clear and
convincing evidence. However, even if this standard was applicable, the existence of the
Agreements and the terms are established by clear and convincing evidence based on the express
language of the December 20, Jamrnry 13, and January 30 Letters.

III.

THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THE AGREEMENTS MOOTS WOODY'S
COUNTERCLAIM.
Woody asserts, without any explanation, that some of his claims would survive even if

the Agreements are enforceable. Def.'s Opp. Mem. at 34. Stafford and Smith Chevrolet set
forth in detail in Plaintiff's Memorandum why each of Woody's claims is rendered moot by
specific performance of the Agreements. See Pl.'s Mem. at 32-36. In response, Woody has now
responded that
Staffwood's [sic] arguments about mootness are self-serving and conclusory. The
reality is that even if Stafford's motion had merit, which it does not, judgment in
Stafford's favor would fail to resolve several of Woody's claims. Those claims
include Unjust Enrichment/Constructive Trust; Breach of Contract; Declaratory
Judgment- Stafford's Unilateral Actions on Behalf of Staffwood; Breach of
Fiduciary Duty; and Mutual Mistake, among others.
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Def.'s Opp. Mem. at 34. This is the entirety of Woody's argument on this point. 11 It is ironic
that Woody would call Stafford's arguments, which exceed three pages of explanation,
"conclusory'' and then seek to address those arguments in three sentences. Surely if Woody
really felt that Stafford's arguments were so flawed, he would have actually identified those
flaws. In reality, Woody's bare bones response about his claims strengthens what both parties
have said all along that the key issue in this case is whether the Agreements are valid and
enforceable. All of the parties' remaining claims are subordinate to resolution of this issue.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Stafford and Smith Chevrolet respectfully request that Plaintiffs
Motion be granted and that the Court render judgment in Stafford's favor on his claims for
breach of contract and in Stafford and Smith Chevrolet's favor on all of Woody's claims

DATED this 29111 day of May, 2014.
SNOW, CHRlSTENSEN & tvlARTlNEAU

By..r::_::___ _ _ _ _~ - - - Kara L. Pettit
Michael R. Carlston
PRESTON & SCOTT

Stanley
reston
Altorneys for P laintiff!Counterdefendant Stafford L
Smith and Third-Party Defendant Smith Chevrolet
Co., Inc.
11

excludes the opening sentence of the paragraph which
states Stafford's
that Woody's claims are mooted by the Agi-eements. See Def.'s Opp. Mem. at 34.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 29, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing REPLY 1VIEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR

,JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS FILED BY STAFFORD SMITH AND SMITH
CHEVROLET, to be delivered via electronic mail and first class mail, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following person(s):
Michael W. Spence
Greggory J. Savage

Michael D. Mayfield
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385
Attorneys for Dejendanr/Counrerclaimant rVoodrufl D. Smith

22

P 023

